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1140Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic LogicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1): 15-29. 2013.Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that …Read more
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900A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight ViewIn David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117. 2013.
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798Contextualism, skepticism, and the structure of reasonsPhilosophical Perspectives 13 57-89. 1999.
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771Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 309-329. 2002.The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”
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718Rationality and TruthIn Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In…Read more
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704Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lotteryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.(1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411
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547Suppositional Reasoning and Perceptual JustificationLogos and Episteme 7 (2): 215-219. 2016.James Van Cleve raises some objections to my attempt to solve the bootstrapping problem for what I call “basic justification theories.” I argue that given 1 the inference rules endorsed by basic justification theorists, we are a priori (propositionally) justified in believing that perception is reliable. This blocks the bootstrapping result.
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470Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a ReplyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4): 400-415. 2013.No abstract
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387Theorizing about the epistemicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 839-857. 2016.I argue that epistemologists’ use of the term ‘epistemic’ has led to serious confusion in the discussion of epistemological issues. The source of the problem is that ‘epistemic’ functions largely as an undefined technical term. I show how this confusion has infected discussions of the nature of epistemic justification, epistemic norms for evidence gathering, and knowledge norms for assertion and belief.
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380Justification, truth, and coherenceSynthese 55 (2): 191-207. 1983.A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher lev…Read more
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359Two Kinds of Skeptical ArgumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 143-159. 1998.This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles---an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without …Read more
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355Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justificationPhilosophical Perspectives 24 (1): 141-159. 2010.
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325Why Basic Knowledge is Easy KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 417-430. 2007.The problem of easy knowledge arises for theories that have what I call a “basic knowledge structure”. S has basic knowledge of P just in case S knows P prior to knowing that the cognitive source of S's knowing P is reliable.1 Our knowledge has a basic knowledge structure (BKS) just in case we have basic knowledge and we come to know our faculties are reliable on the basis of our basic knowledge. The problem I raised in “Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy Knowledge”2 (BKEK) is that once we …Read more
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246Contextualism defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's skeptical problems, contextualist solutionsPhilosophical Studies 103 (1). 2001.
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221Knowledge, context, and social standardsSynthese 73 (1). 1987.This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives r…Read more
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218Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 447-455. 2012.
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203Luminosity, Reliability, and the SoritesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 718-730. 2010.
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198Knowledge as aptnessPhilosophical Studies 144 (1): 121--125. 2009.I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
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143Contextualism and unhappy-face solutions: Reply to Schiffer (review)Philosophical Studies 119 (1-2): 185-197. 2004.
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102Greco’s Agent Reliabilism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2). 2003.John Greco's Putting Skeptics in their Place presents an illuminating perspective on the nature of the skeptical problem and how to respond to it. Building on Ernest Sosa's Virtue Epistemology, Greco develops an account of knowledge he calls, “Agent Reliabilism”. In this essay, I will take up several issues regarding the details of this account.
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100Knowledge, speaker and subjectPhilosophical Quarterly 55 (219). 2005.I contrast two solutions to the lottery paradox concerning knowledge: contextualism and subject-sensitive invariantism. I defend contextualism against an objection that it cannot explain how 'knows' and its cognates function inside propositional attitude reports. I then argue that subject-sensitive invariantism fails to provide a satisfactory resolution of the paradox.
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88Fumerton on Metaepistemology and SkepticismMetaepistemology and Skepticism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 913. 1998.