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2Structure and Connection: Comments on Sosa's EpistemologyIn John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: The Structure of Knowledge Safety.
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43The Analysis of Knowing: A Decade of ResearchPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (3): 523-528. 1986.
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33Metaepistemology and SkepticismPhilosophical and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 913-918. 1998.
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379Justification, truth, and coherenceSynthese 55 (2): 191-207. 1983.A central issue in epistemology concerns the connection between truth and justification. The burden of our paper is to explain this connection. Reliabilism, defended by Goldman, assumes that the connection is one of reliability. We argue that this assumption is too strong. We argue that foundational theories, such as those articulated by Pollock and Chisholm fail to elucidate the connection. We consider the potentiality of coherence theories to explain the truth connection by means of higher lev…Read more
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1139Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic LogicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1): 15-29. 2013.Timothy Williamson has fruitfully exploited formal resources to shed considerable light on the nature of knowledge. In the paper under examination, Williamson turns his attention to Gettier cases, showing how they can be motivated formally. At the same time, he disparages the kind of justification he thinks gives rise to these cases. He favors instead his own notion of justification for which Gettier cases cannot arise. We take issue both with his disparagement of the kind of justification that …Read more
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467Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a ReplyInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (4): 400-415. 2013.No abstract
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19Lehrer on Coherence and Self-TrustSelf-Trust: A Study of Reason, Knowledge and AutonomyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4): 1043. 1999.
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21Pragmatic encroachment and having reasonsIn Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology, Routledge. 2019.
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709Rationality and TruthIn Julien Dutant & Fabian Dorsch (eds.), The New Evil Demon, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.The traditional view in epistemology is that we must distinguish between being rational and being right (that is also, by the way, the traditional view about practical rationality). In his paper in this volume, Williamson proposes an alternative view according to which only beliefs that amount to knowledge are rational (and, thus, no false belief is rational). It is healthy to challenge tradition, in philosophy as much as elsewhere. But, in this instance, we think that tradition has it right. In…Read more
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88Fumerton on Metaepistemology and SkepticismMetaepistemology and Skepticism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 913. 1998.
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52Basic Knowledge and the Problem of Easy KnowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 309-329. 2002.The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”
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896A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight ViewIn David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 98-117. 2013.
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217Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality? (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2): 447-455. 2012.
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3Contextualism defendedIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 56-62. 2013.
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386Theorizing about the epistemicInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 839-857. 2016.I argue that epistemologists’ use of the term ‘epistemic’ has led to serious confusion in the discussion of epistemological issues. The source of the problem is that ‘epistemic’ functions largely as an undefined technical term. I show how this confusion has infected discussions of the nature of epistemic justification, epistemic norms for evidence gathering, and knowledge norms for assertion and belief.
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203Luminosity, Reliability, and the SoritesPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 718-730. 2010.
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703Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lotteryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (2). 1998.(1998). Contextualist solutions to epistemological problems: Scepticism, Gettier, and the lottery. Australasian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 76, No. 2, pp. 289-306. doi: 10.1080/00048409812348411
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770Basic knowledge and the problem of easy knowledgePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2): 309-329. 2002.The dominant response to this problem of the criterion focuses on the alleged requirement that we need to know a belief source is reliable in order for us to acquire knowledge by that source. Let us call this requirement, “The KR principle”
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62Replies to my commentatorsInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 59 (7-8): 906-922. 2016.
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221Knowledge, context, and social standardsSynthese 73 (1). 1987.This paper defends the view that standards, which are typically social in nature, play a role in determining whether a subject has knowledge. While the argument focuses on standards that pertain to reasoning, I also consider whether there are similar standards for memory and perception.Ultimately, I argue that the standards are context sensitive and, as such, we must view attributions of knowledge as indexical. I exploit similarities between this view and a version of the relevant alternatives r…Read more
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102Greco’s Agent Reliabilism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2). 2003.John Greco's Putting Skeptics in their Place presents an illuminating perspective on the nature of the skeptical problem and how to respond to it. Building on Ernest Sosa's Virtue Epistemology, Greco develops an account of knowledge he calls, “Agent Reliabilism”. In this essay, I will take up several issues regarding the details of this account.
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246Contextualism defended: Comments on Richard Feldman's skeptical problems, contextualist solutionsPhilosophical Studies 103 (1). 2001.
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358Two Kinds of Skeptical ArgumentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (1): 143-159. 1998.This paper compares two kinds of epistemic principles---an underdetermination principle and a deductive closure principle. It argues that each principle provides the basis for an independently motivated skeptical argument. It examines the logical relations between the premises of the two kinds of skeptical argument and concludes that the deductive closure argument cannot be refuted without refuting the underdetermination argument. The underdetermination argument, however, can be refuted without …Read more