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259Salmon trappingPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (2): 351-370. 1997.Let us call a sentential context semantically transparent if and only if all synonymous expressions are substitutable for one another in it salva veritate. A sentential context is semantically opaque if and only if it is not semantically transparent. Nathan Salmon has boldly advanced a refreshingly crisp theory according to which belief contexts are semantically transparent.1 If he is right, belief contexts are much better behaved than widely suspected.2 Impressive as it is, I do not believe tha…Read more
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216Against Creationism in FictionNoûs 35 (s15): 153-172. 2001.Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the Sherlock Holmes stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” the relevant fiction. I wish to …Read more
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204Worlds and individuals, possible and otherwiseOxford University Press. 2010.Modal realism -- Time, space, world -- Existence -- Actuality -- Modal realism and modal tense -- Transworld individuals and their identity -- Existensionalism -- Impossibility -- Proposition and relief -- Fictional worlds -- Epistemology.
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199A new argument against the existence requirementAnalysis 65 (1). 2005.It may appear that in order to be any way at all, a thing must exist. A possible – worlds version of this claim goes as follows: (E) For every x, for every possible world w, Fx at w only if x exists at w. Here and later in (R), the letter ‘F’ is used as a schematic letter to be replaced with a one – place predicate. There are two arguments against (E). The first is by analogy. Socrates is widely admired now but he does not exist now. So, it is not the case that for every x, for every time t, Fx …Read more
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168Modal Realism with Modal TenseAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2): 309-327. 2008.Modal realists should fashion their theory by postulating and taking seriously the modal equivalent of tense, or modal tense. This will give them a uniform way to respond to five different objections, one each by Skyrms, Quine, and Peacocke, and two by van Inwagen, and suggest a non-Lewisian path to modal realism.
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137Primitive worldsActa Analytica 17 (1): 19-37. 2002.Modal Dimensionalism is a metaphysical theory about possible worlds that is naturally suggested by the often-noted parallelism between modal logic and tense logic. It says that the universe spreads out not only in spatiotemporal dimensions but also in a modal dimension. It regards worlds as nothing more or less than indices in the modal dimension in the way analogous to the way in which Temporal Dimensionalism regards temporal points and intervals as indices in the temporal dimension. Despite it…Read more
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118Deep theorizing about possibility requires theorizing about possible objects. One popular approach regards the notion of a possible object as intertwined with the notion of a possible world. There are two widely discussed types of theory concerning the nature of possible worlds: actualist representationism and possibilist realism. They support two opposing views about possible objects. Examination of the ways in which they do so reveals difficulties on both sides. There is another popular approa…Read more
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111Impossibilia and Modally Tensed PredicationActa Analytica 30 (4): 317-323. 2015.Mark Jago’s four arguments against Takashi Yagisawa’s extended modal realism are examined and shown to be ineffective. Yagisawa’s device of modal tense renders three of Jago’s arguments harmless, and the correct understanding of predications of modal properties of world stages blocks the fourth one
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103Précis of worlds and individuals, possible and otherwiseAnalytic Philosophy 52 (4): 270-272. 2011.
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96Possible worlds as shifting domainsErkenntnis 36 (1). 1992.Those who object to David Lewis' modal realism express qualms about philosophical respectability of the Lewisian notion of a possible world and its correlate notion of an inhabitant of a possible world. The resulting impression is that these two notions either stand together or fall together. I argue that the Lewisian notion of a possible world is otiose even for a good Lewisian modal realist, and that one can carry out a good Lewisian semantics for modal discourse without Lewisian possible worl…Read more
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89Unrestricted Quantification and Reality: Reply to Kim (review)Acta Analytica 27 (1): 77-79. 2012.In my book, Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise , I use the novel idea of modal tense to respond to a number of arguments against modal realism. Peter van Inwagen’s million-carat-diamond objection is one of them. It targets the version of modal realism by David Lewis and exploits the fact that Lewis accepts absolutely unrestricted quantification. The crux of my response is to use modal tense to neutralize absolutely unrestricted quantification. Seahwa Kim says that even when equipped …Read more
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79Partee verbsPhilosophical Studies 103 (3). 2001.Approximately thirty years ago, Barbara H. Partee tried to think of counterexamples to David Lewis’s observation that no intransitive verbs appeared to have intensional subject positions. She came up with such verbs as ‘rise,’ ‘change,’ and ‘increase.’ Lewis agreed that they were indeed counterexamples to his observation. He mentioned it to Richard Montague, who incorporated these verbs into his now famous grammatical theory for English.
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74Review: Judith Thomson and Alex Byrne (eds): Content and Modality: Themes from the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker (review)Mind 117 (466): 532-537. 2008.
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72Modal space exploration: Replies to Ballarin, Hayaki, and KimAnalytic Philosophy 52 (4): 302-311. 2011.
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62Deflationary ExistenceAnnals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22 1-16. 2014.I propose and defend a surprisingly simple yet useful analysis of existence according to which existence is a relation between a thing and a set: a thing x bears the relation of existence to a set S if and only if x is a member of S . This simple set-theoretic analysis of existence demystifies existence and is powerful and flexible enough to serve important theoretical purposes
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60A somewhat Russellian theory of intensional contextsPhilosophical Perspectives 11 43-82. 1997.Consider the following sentence schemata: (1) The proposition that P is F; (2) The property of being Q is F; (3) The relation of being R is F, where `P' is a schematic letter for a sentence, `Q' and `F' are schematic letters for a nonrelational predicate, and `R' is a schematic letter for a relational predicate. For example, if we substitute `Snow is white' for `P', `famous' for `F' in (1), `round' for `Q', `instantiated' for `F' in (2), `a father of' for `R', and `asymmetric' for `F' in (3), th…Read more
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57THE Way OF THE MOdal REalisT: dialETHEisM aNd BUddHisT PHilOsOPHyPhilosophy East and West 63 (3): 359-369. 2013.
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51Knocked out senseless: Naturalism and analyticityIn Dunja Jutronić (ed.), The Maribor Papers in Naturalized Semantics, Pedagoška Fakulteta Maribor. pp. 82. 1997.
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50Thinking in neurons: Comments on Stephen Schiffer's The Language-of-Thought Relation and its ImplicationsPhilosophical Studies 76 (2-3): 287-96. 1994.
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39The cost of meaning solipsismIn Abraham Zvie Bar-On (ed.), Grazer Philosophische Studien, Distributed in the U.s.a. By Humanities Press. pp. 213-230. 1986.Meaning Solipsism says that it is possible for there to be a meaningful state without any other meaningful state. The meaning of such a solo meaningful state should be non-natural. The best strategy for establishing Meaning Solipsism is to argue for the determination of the meaning of a possible solo meaningful state via the set of entities the meaning of the state fits. Embracing merely possible and impossible entities is the most straightforward way to do so. Also, a good way to honor analayti…Read more
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