•  5
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4 (edited book)
    Oxford University Press UK. 2013.
    Oxford Studies in Epistemology is a biennial publicaton which offers a regular snapshot of state-of-the-art work in this important field. Under the guidance of a distinguished editorial board composed of leading philosophers in North America, Europe and Australasia, it publishes exemplary papers in epistemology, broadly construed.
  •  276
    The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology (edited book)
    Oxford University Press. 2016.
    This is the most comprehensive book ever published on philosophical methodology. A team of thirty-eight of the world's leading philosophers present original essays on various aspects of how philosophy should be and is done. The first part is devoted to broad traditions and approaches to philosophical methodology. The entries in the second part address topics in philosophical methodology, such as intuitions, conceptual analysis, and transcendental arguments. The third part of the book is devoted …Read more
  •  66
    The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance
    Journal of Philosophy 97 (2): 55. 2000.
  •  11
    Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions, and Cognitive Equilibrium
    Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1): 68-89. 2007.
  •  106
    Imagination
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2019.
    To imagine is to form a mental representation that does not aim at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expe…Read more
  •  15
    Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments
    Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206): 34-54. 2002.
  • Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology
    Oxford University Press UK. 2010.
    Tamar Gendler draws together in this book a series of essays in which she investigates philosophical methodology, which is now emerging as a central topic of philosophical discussions. Three intertwined themes run through the volume: imagination, intuition and philosophical methodology. Each of the chapters focuses, in one way or another, on how we engage with subject matter that we take to be imaginary--and they explore the implications of this for how thought experiments and appeals to intuiti…Read more
  • Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology
    Oxford University Press UK. 2010.
    Concerns about philosophical methodology have emerged as a central issue in contemporary philosophical discussions. In this volume, Tamar Gendler draws together fourteen essays that together illuminate this topic. Three intertwined themes connect the essays. First, each of the chapters focuses, in one way or another, on how we engage with subject matter that we take to be imaginary. This theme is explored in a wide range of cases, including scientific thought experiments, early childhood pretens…Read more
  •  234
    Self-Deception as Pretense
    Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1). 2007.
    I propose that paradigmatic cases of self-deception satisfy the following conditions: (a) the person who is self-deceived about not-P pretends (in the sense of makes-believe or imagines or fantasizes) that not-P is the case, often while believing that P is the case and not believing that not-P is the case; (b) the pretense that not-P largely plays the role normally played by belief in terms of (i) introspective vivacity and (ii) motivation of action in a wide range of circumstances. Understandin…Read more
  •  43
    The Human Animal
    Philosophical Review 108 (1): 112. 1999.
    The Human Animal is an extended defense of what its author calls the Biological Approach to personal identity: that you and I are human animals, and that the identity conditions under which we endure are those which apply to us as biological organisms. The somewhat surprising corollary of this view is that no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or sufficient for a human animal—and thus for us—to persist through time. In challenging the hegemony of Psychological Approaches to per…Read more
  •  3
    This book offers a novel analysis of the widely-used but ill-understood technique of thought experiment. The author argues that the powers and limits of this methodology can be traced to the fact that when the contemplation of an imaginary scenario brings us to new knowledge, it does so by forcing us to make sense of exceptional cases
  •  112
    I—The Third Horse: On Unendorsed Association and Human Behaviour
    Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 88 (1): 185-218. 2014.
    On one standard reading, Plato's works contain at least two distinct views about the structure of the human soul. According to the first, there is a crucial unity to human psychology: there is a dominant faculty that is capable of controlling attention and behaviour in a way that not only produces right action, but also ‘silences’ inclinations to the contrary—at least in idealized circumstances. According to the second, the human soul contains multiple autonomous parts, and although one of them,…Read more
  •  16
    Exceptional Persons
    In Jonathan Shear & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), Models of the Self, Imprint Academic. 1999.
  •  8
    Critical Study of Carol Rovane’s The Bounds of Agency
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1): 229-240. 2002.
    “Like much recent work on personal identity,” Carol Rovane writes in the opening sentence of The Bounds of Agency: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics, “this effort takes its main cue from Locke”. The work also—as its title suggests—takes inspiration from Strawsonian neo-Kantianism. And although direct allusion to his writings is limited to a few passing references, Rovane’s essay is largely Davidsonian in spirit. Indeed, it would not be an exaggeration to say that The Bounds of Agency answers a…Read more
  •  23
    Empiricism, Rationalism and the Limits of Justification
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3): 641-648. 2001.
    BonJour’s intricately argued and provocative book raises a fundamental challenge for the empiricist: if we lack the capacity for direct apprehension of necessary truths, how do we know so much? How do we know about logic and mathematics and other apparently a priori subjects? How do we know about generalities, about the past and the future, about objects that are not present? How do we know about the relations that hold between premises and conclusions? If the first half of BonJour’s book is rig…Read more
  •  1
    Thought experiment is one of the most widely-used and least understood techniques in philosophy. A thought experiment is a process of reasoning carried out within the context of a well-articulated imaginary scenario in order to answer a specific question about a non-imaginary situation. The aim of my dissertation is to show that both the powers and the limits of this methodology can be traced to the fact that when the contemplation of an imaginary scenario brings us to new knowledge, it does so …Read more
  •  7
    Imaginative Resistance
    In Stephen Davies, Kathleen Marie Higgins, Robert Hopkins, Robert Stecker, David Cooper & E. (eds.), A Companion to Aesthetics: Second Edition, Blackwell. 2009.
  •  116
    Summary
    Analysis 72 (4): 759-764. 2012.
  •  29
    Review of David Schmidtz, ed. Robert Nozick (review)
    Philosophical Review 112 (1): 106-110. 2003.
    David Schmidtz’s Robert Nozick is a collection of nine specially commissioned papers on Nozick’s work by a wide range of distinguished philosophers. Nearly all of the papers are of high quality, and the volume is well conceptualized and well executed. The collection will certainly be useful to anyone with a comprehensive interest in Nozick’s corpus. In addition, many of its individual essays will be of independent interest to those concerned with particular aspects of Nozick’s work.
  •  23
    Review of Eric Olson: The Human Animal (review)
    Philosophical Review 108 (1): 112-115. 1999.
    The Human Animal is an extended defense of what its author calls the Biological Approach to personal identity: that you and I are human animals, and that the identity conditions under which we endure are those which apply to us as biological organisms. The somewhat surprising corollary of this view is that no sort of psychological continuity is either necessary or sufficient for a human animal—and thus for us—to persist through time. In challenging the hegemony of Psychological Approaches to per…Read more
  •  180
    Imagination
    In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Center For the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University. 2011.
  •  364
    Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions
    with Karson Kovakovich
    In Matthew Kieran (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art, Blackwell. pp. 241-253. 2006.
    The “paradox of fictional emotions” involves a trio of claims that are jointly inconsistent but individually plausible. Resolution of the paradox thus requires that we deny at least one of these plausible claims. The paradox has been formulated in various ways, but for the purposes of this chapter, we will focus on the following three claims, which we will refer to respectively as the Response Condition, the Belief Condition and the Coordination Condition
  •  25
    Robert Nozick
    Philosophical Review 112 (1): 106-110. 2003.
  •  218
    – develop self-knowledge [Socrates] – cultivate internal harmony [Plato] – foster virtue through habit [Aristotle] – cultivate and appreciate true friendship [Cicero] – recognize what is and is not in your control [Epictetus].
  •  25
    Why language is not a “direct medium”. Commentary on Ruth Garrett Millikan
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1): 71-72. 1998.
    Millikan contrasts her substance-based view of concepts with “descriptionism” according to which description determines what falls under a concept. Focusing on her discussion of the role of language in the acquisition of concepts, I argue that descriptions cannot be separated from perception in the ways Millikan's view requires.
  •  92
    Introduction: Perceptual experience
    In John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Perceptual Experience, Oxford University Press. pp. 1--30. 2006.
    Much contemporary discussion of perceptual experience can be traced to two observations. The first is that perception seems to put us in direct contact with the world around us: when perception is successful, we come to recognize— immediately—that certain objects have certain properties. The second is that perceptual experience may fail to provide such knowledge: when we fall prey to illusion or hallucination, the way things appear may differ radically from the way things actually are. For much …Read more
  •  193
    Empiricism, rationalism and the limits of justification (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3). 2001.
    BonJour’s intricately argued and provocative book raises a fundamental challenge for the empiricist: if we lack the capacity for direct apprehension of necessary truths, how do we know so much? How do we know about logic and mathematics and other apparently a priori subjects? How do we know about generalities, about the past and the future, about objects that are not present? How do we know about the relations that hold between premises and conclusions? If the first half of BonJour’s book is rig…Read more
  •  47
    Discussion. Continence on the cheap
    Mind 107 (428): 821-821. 1998.