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91892This paper presents two accounts of how Oedipus might have arrived at the answer to the Sphinx's riddle by proceeding methodically.
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9571This paper contests a standard interpretation of how Descartes comes to the conclusion that he is not his body in the second meditation. I propose an alternative interpretation in its place.
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3572This paper disputes a common definition of token identity theory. It also observes that within the philosophical literature there are two significantly different definitions of token identity theory that are commonly used.
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3490Does Marilyn Strathern Argue that the Concept of Nature Is a Social Construction?Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (4): 437-442. 2016.It is tempting to interpret Marilyn Strathern as saying that the concept of nature is a social construction, because in her essay “No Nature, No Culture: the Hagen Case” she tells us that the Hagen people do not describe the world using this concept. However, I point out an obstacle to interpreting her in this way, an obstacle which leads me to reject this interpretation. Interpreting her in this way makes her inconsistent. The inconsistency is owing to a commitment that she shares with previous…Read more
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1721Cartesian dualism and the study of cultural artefactsE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 22 (2): 12-18. 2015.This paper evaluates an argument according to which many anthropologists commit themselves to Cartesian dualism, when they talk about meanings. This kind of dualism, it is argued, makes it impossible for anthropologists to adequately attend to material artefacts. The argument is very original, but it is also vulnerable to a range of objections.
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1438Feminist Research and Paradigm Shift in AnthropologyMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 4 (2): 343-362. 2012.In her paper ‘An Awkward Relationship: the Case of Feminism and Anthropology’, Marilyn Strathern argues that feminist research cannot produce a paradigm shift in social anthropology. I reconstruct her arguments and evaluate them, revealing that they are insufficient for ruling out this possibility.
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1371Joseph Raz on the Problem of the AmoralistAbstracta 7 (1): 85-93. 2013.Joseph Raz has argued that the problem of the amoralist is misconceived. In this paper, I present three interpretations of what his argument is. None of these interpretations yields an argument that we are in a position to accept.
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1286The asymmetry objection to political liberalism: evaluation of a defenceE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 25 (1): 26-32. 2018.This paper evaluates Jonathan Quong’s attempt to defend a version of political liberalism from the asymmetry objection. I object that Quong’s defence relies on a premise that has not been adequately supported and does not look as if it can be given adequate support.
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1245Traditional literary interpretation versus subversive interpretationAsian Journal of Advances in Research 16 (3): 34-39. 2022.I present some objections to traditional literary interpretation and consider subversive interpretation as a solution to these problems. Subversive interpretation may seem more scientific and more democratic than traditional interpretation, but it is open to doubt that it is more democratic.
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1165Torture with consentPhilosophical Pathways (230): 1-3. 2019.There are attempts to define torture which say that a person is only being tortured if the pain inflicted upon them is pain that they have not consented to. In this very brief paper, I recommend that we define torture without this condition.
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1081Astrology, Fate and CausationPhilosophical Pathways (200). 2016.Some philosophers assert that astrology is a false theory. The simplest way to argue against all astrology is to identify a proposition that any kind of astrology must be committed to and then show that this proposition is false. In this paper I draw attention to some misconceptions about which propositions are essential to astrology.
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1079Rawls versus utilitarianism: the subset objectionE-Logos Electronic Journal for Philosophy 23 (2): 37-41. 2016.This paper presents an objection to John Rawls’s use of the original position method to argue against implementing utilitarian rules. The use of this method is pointless because a small subset of the premises Rawls relies on can be used to infer the same conclusion.
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1046The Dualism of Conceptual Scheme and Undifferentiated RealityE-Logos 19 (1): 2-8. 2012.This paper evaluates a form of dualism, which is referred to here as the dualism of conceptual scheme and undifferentiated reality. According to this dualism, although reality appears to be divided into distinct things from the perspective of our system of concepts, it is actually not. I justify the view that this dualism is incoherent
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1030A solution to the surprise exam paradoxFilozofia 72 (4): 325-327. 2017.The students’ argument against the possibility of a surprise exam assumes that the following would not occur: the teacher decides to give the exam on a certain day; the teacher believes that the exam would be a surprise on that day; but, actually, the exam would not be a surprise on that day. I give a reason to reject this assumption, and I point out that an attempt to reformulate the surprise exam paradox in order to allow for the assumption does not result in an acceptable argument.
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999Do individuals in John Rawls’s original position take into account the fallibility of human nature? Some notable commentators on Rawls say that they do or that they should. But this enables us to say that individuals in the original position would not come to an agreement at all.
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981A Challenge to Social Constructivism about ScienceEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (2): 150-156. 2013.This paper presents a challenge to the coherence of social constructivism about science. It introduces an objection according to which social constructivism appeals to the authority of science regarding the nature of reality and so cannot coherently deny that authority. The challenge is how to avoid this incoherence.
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915Descriptive metaphysics, revisionary metaphysics, anti-metaphysicsEthos: Dialogues in Philosophy and Social Sciences 5 (2): 36-43. 2012.This paper observes that P. F. Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics is a baffling one from the perspective of traditional metaphysics. If one thinks of metaphysics as the study of the fundamental nature of reality, it is bewildering to divide up metaphysics in this way. The paper then tries to show how the distinction is no longer bewildering if we deny that such study is possible.
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906Has Nagel uncovered a form of idealism?Accepted for Sorites 22. 2009.In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel attempts to identify a form of idealism. The position that he deems idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. Nagel claims that this position is held by a number of contemporary philosophers. Even if this is so, I justify the view that it is not a form of idealism.
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777Unintentional ConsentKritike 9 (1): 86-95. 2015.Some political philosophers have judged that it is absurd to think that there can be unintentional consent. In this paper, I present an example of unintentional consent, which I refer to as the adapted boardroom example. I consider reasons for denying that this is an example of unintentional consent, but find that these reasons are unconvincing.
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747The definition of systematizing in S. Baron-Cohen's gender and autism researchPhilosophical Pathways (219): 1-4. 2018.The professor of psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen is well-known for his thesis that males are on average better at systematizing than empathizing and females are on average better at empathizing than systematizing. In this paper, I note an ambiguity in how he defines systematizing.
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730Cultural artefacts and neglect of the materials from which they are madeAbstracta 10 35-44. 2017.This paper discusses an explanation, offered by Tim Ingold, for why social and cultural anthropologists have so far paid little attention to the materials from which artefacts are composed. The explanation is that these anthropologists accept a certain argument. According to the argument, what an anthropologist should focus on when examining an artefact is the quality that makes it part of a culture, and this is not the materials from which the artefact is composed. I show that Ingold has not ma…Read more
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712Anthropology in the context that produced itMeta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy 6 (1): 347-360. 2014.This paper evaluates a definition of anthropology at home formulated by Marilyn Strathern in her book contribution 'The Limits of Auto-Anthropology'. According to the definition, anthropology at home is anthropology carried out in the social context that produced this discipline. I argue that this is not an adequate definition of anthropology at home.
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710This is a two page handout summarizing a number of objections made against Robert Graves's book of Greek myths.
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687Are there uncontroversial error theories?Philosophical Pathways (162). 2011.This paper evaluates an argument for the conclusion that in order to produce a viable objection to a particular error theory, the objection must not be applicable to any error theory. The reason given for this conclusion is that error theories about some discourses are uncontroversial. But the examples given of uncontroversial error theories are not good ones, nor do there appear to be other examples available.
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631Nagel on ConceivabilityAbstracta 5 (1): 16-29. 2009.In the sixth chapter of The View from Nowhere, Thomas Nagel aims to identify a form of idealism, to isolate the argument for it and to counter this argument. The position that Nagel takes to be idealist is that what there is must be possibly conceivable by us. In this paper, I show that Nagel has not made a convincing case against this position. I then present an alternative case. In light of this alternative case, we have reason to reject an important example that Nagel offers of a contemporary…Read more
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607Non-social human beings in the original positionPhilosophical Pathways (205). 2016.This paper argues that Rawls must commit himself to non-social human beings to defend his original position procedure.
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493Joe Horton’s all-or-nothing problem concerns a situation in which it is morally permissible to do nothing and to save two people but not to save only one. This description seems to entail that we should do nothing rather than save only one. I object to Horton’s solution and challenge a principle he draws attention to, which is required to generate the problem but which Horton regards as beyond dispute.
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483This paper responds to Kathleen Stock’s attempt to explain a puzzling fact, at least from her standpoint: widespread assertions that some people who are biologically male are women and some people who are biologically female are men. She regards these assertions as made while immersed in a fiction. Stock rejects an alternative explanation – that a lot of these people have read Judith Butler or 1970s feminism. Clarifying that explanation reveals it to be not so easy to dismiss.
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472Overlooked systems in S. Baron-Cohen's gender researchIJRDO Journal of Biological Science 5 (6): 1-7. 2019.The professor of psychopathology Simon Baron-Cohen claims that males are on average stronger at systematizing than empathizing and females are on average stronger at empathizing than systematizing. Systematizing is defined as the drive to construct or understand systems. In this paper, I observe that Baron-Cohen overlooks certain examples of systems, examples which lead to doubts about his claim.
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451John Rawls recommends a reflective equilibrium method for evaluating which principles institutions should abide by. In this paper, I identify and challenge three assumptions that he makes.
Manchester, England, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
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