Theptawee Chokvasin

Background and Objectives: In this research article, the researcher addresses the issue of creating public understanding in a democratic society about the progress of science, with an emphasis on pluralism from philosophers of science. The idea that there is only one truth and that there are just natural laws awaiting discovery by scientists has historically made it difficult to explain scientific progress. This belief motivates science to develop theories that explain the unity of science, and it is thought that diversity in the way different ideas presented by scientists is a problem that results in time being wasted in search of the most accurate theory. Some scientists perceive a benefit in having a range of scientific hypotheses, though. One benefit that is frequently cited is that scientific diversity as a whole contributes to the development of a democratic society that permits the expression of a range of viewpoints. The road to accountable scientific pluralism is fraught with difficulties, though. Therefore, it is crucial to take into account both pluralism's advantages and disadvantages. This research aims at: 1. analyzing in an epistemological way the interpretation of scientific theories and the progress of science from the perspectives of scientific pluralists; 2. analyzing the relationship between science and democracy in explaining scientific significance and progress; and 3. synthesizing new knowledge on epistemic dependentism and to argue that it plays a significant role in evaluating research issues related to scientific pluralism. Methodology: The research methodology involves the application of documentary investigation along with philosophical discourse. The method of philosophical argumentation involves analyzing the lines of arguments found in relevant academic publications in order to assess their validity and soundness. Main Results: One key argument of the pluralists is the use of the concept of theoretical pluralism, which suggests that scientific knowledge is created from a variety of perspectives according to the social and cultural context of knowledge creation. It is found that part of Longino's argument is based on the negation of rational/social dichotomy. Moreover, her theory is a departure from philosopher of science Philip Kitcher, who advocates the creation of scientific knowledge and the evaluation of scientific progress through the means of democratic society. He explains that these procedures will lead to "well-ordered science" in democratic society. Discussions: The researcher examines the underlying ideas accepted by these two philosophers of science and finds that although their opinions differ, they have common ground in the acceptance of consensus. However, the views of both philosophers still lack weight in explaining the knowledge itself. The researcher argues that the acceptance of pluralism as a way of understanding scientific progress necessarily lends itself to dependentism, which points to interdependence in comparisons of superiority/inferiority between scientific theories. It is undeniable that the situation has emerged all the time, even though the success of the scientific theories being compared to each other comes from different social and cultural grounds of thought. Conclusions: Some popular models of scientific pluralism in the philosophy of science still lack a compelling justification, particularly on the epistemic grounds. By elucidating the epistemic significance of the interdependence of these things, scientific pluralism can be strengthened by incorporating the notion of epistemic dependentism into the analysis of scientific progress.

This chapter asks how moral shame and dread in Theravāda Buddhist philosophy compare with their appropriated use in contemporary Thai society. There has been a received view or an appropriated understanding of these concepts, warning against doing bad deeds. Moral shame and dread imply an irrational fear of doing something morally horrible in this contemporary usage. For example, one has an excessive fear of punishments in purgatory and believes it should be the sole morally appropriate reason for not killing. However, how does this appropriated understanding differ from the original Buddhist understanding? This chapter argues that they differ in their philosophical assumptions: causalism and possibilism. Theravāda philosophy espouses causalism, the view that one should avoid bad deeds because of the doctrine of karma. On the other hand, the appropriated understanding implies possibilism, with a scrupulosity-based assumption that avoiding evil behaviors is motivated by the grip of unreasonable fear that doing them could result in irredeemable errors. I offer a new conception of meditative intentionality's power to solve this implied irrational fear problem.

Can posthumous love be rationally comprehensible for us to talk about? In this research article, I look into some Renaissance writings on Christian ethics that talk about posthumous love as if there are some virtues in it that deserve to be praised. I try to show that the most notable virtues that can be seen in posthumous love are honesty in love as well as the intention to keep a promise to cherish the eternal love in married couples even after their death. If it is accepted that posthumous love is considered a morally rational virtue for these Renaissance Christian writers, there will still be a question, namely, on what criterion it should be based for us to talk about that promise. In this article, I show that the reverence of true love and faithfulness in love can be found in medieval Christian and Renaissance philosophy throughout Christian theological writings, especially in Robert Grosseteste’s notion of caritas. Next, I argue, based on Nicholas Rescher’s definition of rationality as human resource and Huw Price’s anthropological explanative power of concepts, that keeping a promise of posthumous love is a rational virtue. My argument is based on an idea that rationality is durable. This is because, as I will also argue, love is invincible. durability thesis of rationality reflected in the invincibility-of-love thesis through Rescher’s erotetic principle in metaphysical questioning strengthened with Price’s respond-dependence.

In this essay, I offer a comparative analysis on the ontological perspective from Heidegger and Theravada Buddhism on ‘the motility of life’: namely, the essence of the organism belonging to living beings whether human or non-human animals. To question about the innermost essence of life by considering birth, maturing, aging, and death, Heidegger finds out later that his approach is incomplete and inadequate because his existential analytic of human Dasein cannot explain the animal motility as captivation. However, in Theravada Buddhist philosophy there is some doctrine in ‘The Four Noble Truths’ mentioning the same point of those processes of life, birth – decay - death, as ‘Dukkha’. Next, from the analysis I offer an argument to show that if the Buddhist conception of Dukkha is read into the motility of life, we can find a new Heideggerian concept of ‘underlying motility’ as a result which can give an answer to his question.

The intent of this research article is to argue with the line of reasoning of arguments from Paul Hager and other educational theorists against the front-end model of education. The model is rejected because it cannot be achieved in occupational preparation, and, moreover, those critics said that it is based on a wrong idea of conceptual interpretation of learning that makes it less conducive to lifelong learning in the long run. The framework which is rejected is a sharp distinction of two concepts; process and product. The reason of rejection is that the sharp distinction does not exist. However, from the research, many analyses show that the front-end model is one of the most important aspects of employment and vocational education, which is the belief that actual practice at work will guarantee the skills of learners before they enter the actual operation. Based on a method of postmodern philosophical analysis, I found that the relationship between education and work is a highly complex relationship. The result of this complexity makes it impossible to have a perfect reason for Hager and his colleagues to reject the significance of the front-end model as concluded by their previous research. On the other hand, I argue that we would have more weight in reasoning if we are to point out that the new policy of lifelong learning still requires a new interpretation on integrity of front-end model of career preparation. This is because the more plausible definition of human being from Hannah Arendt is related to work and working. From what is conceptualized here as an argument of imperfect employability, I pointed out that the rejection of front-end model itself has an important base of conceptualization that does not match the definition of such conditions of being human. Therefore, the rejection of front-end model should be considered as an argument that does not yet have enough weight in reasoning.

This essay is a philosophical construction of an epistemological theory of self-knowledge when one is an autonomous moral agent with right self-guidance. It is called, in Buddhist thought, Attasammāpaṇidhi, which means the characteristics of right self-conduct or right self-guidance. An exploration of the concept is important in Thai higher education because of the related Buddhist precept of Yonisomanasikāra, which are methods of thinking with critical reflections. This chapter considers some explanations of what knowledge might be when one knows that one is capable of proper self-guidance, with specific attention to the university learning environment. The question of Attasammāpaṇidhi is examined in terms of epistemological arguments between moral particularism and moral generalism. The arguments from both of the encampments are mistaken about the status of being a knower. I argue that the knowledge of Attasammāpaṇidhi should be explained as moral self-knowledge from performative understanding in the core idea of knowing.

This chapter is to offer a critical study of what the human living condition would be like in a new era of hi-tech mobilization, especially the condition of self-government or autonomy, and how, in the Thai perspective, the condition affects culture. Habermas’ analysis of individuation through socialization and Heidegger’s question concerning technology and being are used in the study, and it is revealed that we are now confronted with a new technological condition of positioned individuals in the universe of communication through mobile phones. This situation surely will be realized in a world highly mobilized by the phenomenon of connectedness. This means that we are concerning ourselves with our concrete individuality for our self-expression in that universe. I offer an interpretation that we would hold this kind of individuality to be valuable because of an effect from technological thinking. In addition, comparing this view on individuality with Buddhism, I found that the view offered here is not similar to the Buddhist concept of self as a construction. I offer an argument to show that these concepts are basically different for ethical reasons; while the Buddhist concept still preserves the nobility of the moral agent (Buddhism, after all, is a religion and needs to concern itself with morality), the concrete individuality discussed here is considered only as an instrumental value in a world of hi-tech mobilization.