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82Rational Learners and Moral RulesMind and Language 31 (5): 530-554. 2016.People draw subtle distinctions in the normative domain. But it remains unclear exactly what gives rise to such distinctions. On one prominent approach, emotion systems trigger non-utilitarian judgments. The main alternative, inspired by Chomskyan linguistics, suggests that moral distinctions derive from an innate moral grammar. In this article, we draw on Bayesian learning theory to develop a rational learning account. We argue that the ‘size principle’, which is implicated in word learning, ca…Read more
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146Side constraints and the structure of commonsense ethicsPhilosophical Perspectives 23 (1): 305-319. 2009.In our everyday moral deliberations, we attend to two central types of considerations – outcomes and moral rules. How these considerations interrelate is central to the long-standing debate between deontologists and utilitarians. Is the weight we attach to moral rules reducible to their conduciveness to good outcomes (as many utilitarians claim)? Or do we take moral rules to be absolute constraints on action that normatively trump outcomes (as many deontologists claim)? Arguments over these issu…Read more
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9S. Matthew Liao (ed.), Moral Brains: The Neuroscience of MoralityJournal of Moral Philosophy 19 (6): 637-641. 2022.
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Susquehanna UniversityAssistant Professor
Selinsgrove, Pennsylvania, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |