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31Blameworthiness, slips, and the obvious need to pay enough attention: an internalist response to capacitariansAsian Journal of Philosophy 2 (1): 1-25. 2023.Capacitarianism says that an agent can be non-derivatively blameworthy for wrongdoing if at the time of their conduct the agent lacked awareness of the wrong-making features of their conduct but had the capacity to be aware of those features. In this paper, I raise three objections to capacitarianism in relation to its verdict of the culpability of so-called “slips” and use these objections to support a rival (“accessibility internalist”) view which requires awareness of wrong-making features fo…Read more
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21Moral Responsibility and Motivating Reasons: On the Epistemic Condition for Moral BlameworthinessDissertation, University of Auckland. 2021.In response to the radical view that moral blameworthiness entails full awareness of wrongdoing, I proposed a rival view that avoids the radical view’s counter-intuitive implication that blameworthiness is hard to find. I argued that blameworthiness requires only partial awareness of wrongdoing, and I provided an original account of what those partial awareness conditions are.
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93Epistemic Conditions of Moral ResponsibilityInternet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2022.What conditions on a person’s knowledge must be satisfied in order for them to be morally responsible for something they have done? The first two decades of the twenty-first century saw a surge of interest in this question. Must an agent, for example, be aware that their conduct is all-things-considered … Continue reading Epistemic Conditions of Moral Responsibility →
Thomas A. Yates
Massey University
Auckland University of Technology
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Auckland University of TechnologyTeaching Assistant (Part-time)
University of Auckland
PhD, 2021
Areas of Specialization
Normative Ethics |
Moral Responsibility |
Epistemology |
Meta-Ethics |