•  54
    Out of the closet—Frege's boots
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 106 (3): 399-407. 2006.
    It is not obvious how one might reconcile Frege's claim that different numbers may not 'belong to the same thing' with his apparent identification of one pair with two boots, even if one grants his view of 'statements of number'. I suggest a way. It requires some revision of the semantic theory that is generally attributed to Frege
  •  21
    Joint Commitment
    ProtoSociology 35 38-52. 2018.
    I defend some of Gilbert’s central claims about our capacity jointly to commit ourselves, and what follows from an exercise of it. I argue that, to explain these claims, we do not need to suppose, as Gilbert does, that we ever are jointly committed, that is, jointly in a state of being committed. I offer a diagnosis of why the gratuitousness of this supposition has been overlooked.
  •  275
    'Shared agency', Gilbert, and deep continuity
    Journal of Social Ontology 1 (1): 49-57. 2015.
    I compare Bratman’s theory with Gilbert’s. I draw attention to their similarities, query Bratman’s claim that his theory is the more parsimonious, and point to one theoretical advantage of Gilbert’s theory.
  •  74
    Playing One’s Part
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2): 213-44. 2011.
    The consensus in the philosophical literature on joint action is that, sometimes at least, when agents intentionally jointly φ, this is explicable by their intending that they φ, for a period of time prior to their φ-ing. If this be granted, it poses a dilemma. For agents who so intend either severally or jointly intend that they φ. The first option is ruled out by two stipulations that we may consistently make: (i) that at least one of the agents non-akratically believes that, all things consid…Read more
  •  41
    What is the Hallé?
    Philosophical Papers 34 (1): 75-109. 2005.
    I address what I call the Number Issue, which is raised by our ordinary talk and beliefs about certain social groups and institutions, and I take the Hallé orchestra as my example. The Number Issue is that of whether the Hallé is one individual or several individuals. I observe that if one holds that it is one individual, one faces an accusation of metaphysical extravagance. The bulk of the paper examines the difficulty of reconciling the view that the Hallé is several individuals with two prima…Read more
  •  156
    Romantic Love
    Essays in Philosophy 12 (1): 68-92. 2011.
    Nozick provides us with a compelling characterization of romantic love, but, as I argue, he under-describes the phenomenon, for he fails to distinguish it from attitudes that those who are not romantically involved may bear to each other. Frankfurt also offers a compelling characterization of love, but he is sceptical about its application to the case of romantic love. I argue that each account has the resources with which to complete the other. I consider a preliminary synthesis of the two acco…Read more
  •  60
    Non-distributive blameworthiness
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1): 31-60. 2009.
    I adapt an old example of Frank Jackson's, in order to show that it is not only possible that actions with different individual agents are sub-optimal when each is not, but that they are impermissible when each is not, and blameworthy when each is not.