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Evidence and Normativity: Reply to LeitePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2): 465-474. 2007.According to one view about the rationality of belief, such rationality is ultimately nothing other than the rationality that one exhibits in taking the means to one’s ends. On this view, epistemic rationality is really a species or special case of instrumental rationality. In particular, epistemic rationality is instrumental rationality in the service of one’s distinctively cognitive or epistemic goals (perhaps: one’s goal of holding true rather than false beliefs). In my (2003), I dubbed this …Read more
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A Moorean fact, in the words of the late David Lewis, is ‘one of those things that we know better than we know the premises of any philosophical argument to the contrary’. Lewis opens his seminal paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’ with the following declaration.Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 179-209. 2005.
Princeton, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Metaphilosophy |
| Meta-Ethics |