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Conference on Neural Correlates of Consciousness: Empirical and Conceptual QuestionsConsciousness and Cognition 7 108. 1998.
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38Desiderata for a mereotopological theory of consciousnessIn Shimon Edelman, Tomer Fekete & Neta Zach (eds.), Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience, John Benjamins. pp. 88--185. 2012.
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Faster than thought: Holism, homogeneity, and temporal codingIn Conscious Experience, Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.
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1Immediate transfer of synesthesia to a novel inducerJournal of Vision 9 (12): 1-8. 2009.In synesthesia, a certain stimulus (eg grapheme) is associated automatically and consistently with a stable perceptual-like experience (eg color). These associations are acquired in early childhood and remain robust throughout the lifetime. Synesthetic associations can transfer to novel inducers in adulthood as one learns a second language that uses another writing system. However, it is not known how long this transfer takes. We found that grapheme-color associations can transfer to novel graph…Read more
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First-order embodiment, second-order embodiment, third-order embodimentIn Lawrence A. Shapiro (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Embodied Cognition, Routledge. 2014.
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466The Elephant and the Blind is a book about why we need a new culture of consciousness, and how to get it. A culture of consciousness (or Bewusstseinskultur) is a culture that values and cultivates the mental states of its members in an ethical and evidence-based way.
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40Unconscious integration of multisensory bodily inputs in the peripersonal space shapes bodily self-consciousnessCognition 166 (C): 174-183. 2017.
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Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examplesIn Rahul Banerjee & Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of brain and mind: physical, computational, and psychological approaches, Elsevier. 2008.
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777Artificial Suffering: An Argument for a Global Moratorium on Synthetic PhenomenologyJournal of Artificial Intelligence and Consciousness 1 (8): 1-24. 2021.
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175Minimal phenomenal experiencePhilosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I): 1-44. 2020.This is the first in a series of instalments aiming at a minimal model explanation for conscious experience, taking the phenomenal character of “pure consciousness” or “pure awareness” in meditation as its entry point. It develops the concept of “minimal phenomenal experience” as a candidate for the simplest form of consciousness, substantiating it by extracting six semantic constraints from the existing literature and using sixteen phenomenological case-studies to incrementally flesh out the ne…Read more
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644Radical disruptions of self-consciousnessPhilosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (I): 1-13. 2020.This special issue is about something most of us might find very hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether missing.
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8Zeitfenster im Gehirn und die Einheit des Bewußtseins. Der Zusammenhang zwischen phänomenalem Bewußtsein und subsymbolischer InformationsverarbeitungIn Hans Lenk & Hans Poser (eds.), Neue Realitäten. Herausforderung der Philosophie: Xvi. Deutscher Kongreß Für Philosophie Berlin 20.–24. September 1993, De Gruyter. pp. 246-260. 1995.
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22Open Mind: An Open Access Collection of Research on Mind, Brain, andJournal of Consciousness Studies 22 (7-8): 233-234. 2015.
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2Open MIND Philosophy and the Mind Sciences in the 21st Century. Volume 2, (edited book)MIT Press. 2016.
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1329Before one can even begin to model consciousness and what exactly it means that it is a subjective phenomenon one needs a theory about what a first-person perspective really is. This theory has to be conceptually convincing, empirically plausible and, most of all, open to new developments. The chosen conceptual framework must be able to accommodate scientific progress. Its ba- sic assumptions have to be plastic as it were, so that new details and empirical data can continuously be fed into the t…Read more
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270Conscious Experience (edited book)Ferdinand Schoningh. 1995.The contributions to this book are original articles, representing a cross-section of current philosophical work on consciousness and thereby allowing students and readers from other disciplines to acquaint themselves with the very latest debate, so that they can then pursue their own research interests more effectively. The volume includes a bibliography on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science and brain research, covering the last 25 years and consisting of over 1000 entries in 18 the…Read more
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78This book contains a representationalist theory of self-consciousness and of the phenomenal first-person perspective. It draws on empirical data from the cognitive and neurosciences.
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1000Real Virtuality: A Code of Ethical Conduct. Recommendations for Good Scientific Practice and the Consumers of VR-TechnologyFrontiers in Robotics and AI 3 1-23. 2016.The goal of this article is to present a first list of ethical concerns that may arise from research and personal use of virtual reality (VR) and related technology, and to offer concrete recommendations for minimizing those risks. Many of the recommendations call for focused research initiatives. In the first part of the article, we discuss the relevant evidence from psychology that motivates our concerns. In Section “Plasticity in the Human Mind,” we cover some of the main results suggesting t…Read more
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3544Vanilla PP for Philosophers: A Primer on Predictive ProcessingPhilosophy and Predictive Processing. 2017.The goal of this short chapter, aimed at philosophers, is to provide an overview and brief explanation of some central concepts involved in predictive processing (PP). Even those who consider themselves experts on the topic may find it helpful to see how the central terms are used in this collection. To keep things simple, we will first informally define a set of features important to predictive processing, supplemented by some short explanations and an alphabetic glossary. The features describe…Read more
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3387The Problem of Mental ActionPhilosophy and Predicitive Processing. 2017.In mental action there is no motor output to be controlled and no sensory input vector that could be manipulated by bodily movement. It is therefore unclear whether this specific target phenomenon can be accommodated under the predictive processing framework at all, or if the concept of “active inference” can be adapted to this highly relevant explanatory domain. This contribution puts the phenomenon of mental action into explicit focus by introducing a set of novel conceptual instruments and de…Read more
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228DreamsIn D. Barrett & Patrick McNamara (eds.), The New Science of Dreaming, Praeger Publishers. 2007.differences between dreaming and waking consciousness as well. In this chapter, we will argue that these differences mainly concern the subjective quality of the dreaming experience. The interesting question, from a philosophical point of view, is not so much whether or not dreams are conscious experiences at all. Rather, one must ask in what sense dreams can be considered as conscious experiences, and what happens to the experiential subject during the dream state. Finally, in order to arrive a…Read more
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25Reply to Zahavi: The Value of Historical ScholarshipPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Let me begin by focusing on the long list of agreements between the Dan Zahavi and me. As he is such a careful and scholarly author, there are almost no misunderstandings to get out of the way first. At the beginning of section 2, there is a conflation of different concepts of possibility. If we grant that imaginability is conceivability, if we pass over “practical” possibility as a non-defined term, and grant that by “physically” possible Zahavi very likely means “nomologically” possible, it st…Read more
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514Reply to ghin: Self-sustainment on the level of global availabilityPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Of all the current philosophical attempts to rescue the concept of “self” by working out a weaker version, one that does not imply an ontological substance or an individual in the metaphysical sense, Marcello Ghin’s is clearly my favorite. His reconstruction of the original theory is absolutely accurate and without any major misunderstandings. Enriching the concept of a “SMT-system” with the notions of “autocatalysis” and “self- sustainment,” and adding the intriguing idea that we are systems re…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Consciousness |