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4698The prima/ultima facie justification distinction in epistemologyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 551-566. 1996.
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2192Defending Divine FreedomIn L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion, Oxford University Press. pp. 168-95. 2013.
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2135What if there are no political obligations? A reply to A. J. SimmonsPhilosophy and Public Affairs 16 (3): 260-268. 1987.
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2101On the Tenability of Brute Naturalism and the Implications of Brute TheismPhilosophia Christi 10 (2): 273-280. 2010.Timothy O’Connor’s book Theism and Ultimate Explanation offers a defense of a new version of the cosmological argument. In his discussion, O’Connor argues against the coherence of a brute fact “explanation” of the universe and for the claim that the God of theism cannot be logically contingent. In this paper, I take issue with both of these arguments. Regarding the former, I claim that contrary to what O’Connor asserts, we have no good reason to prefer an account according to which the universe …Read more
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1436A Critical Review of Alvin Plantinga’s Warranted Christian Belief (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 42 (3): 389-396. 2002.
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1232Internalistic foundationalism and the justification of memory beliefSynthese 94 (3). 1993.In this paper I argue that internalistic foundationalist theories of the justification of memory belief are inadequate. Taking a discussion of John Pollock as a starting point, I argue against any theory that requires a memory belief to be based on a phenomenal state in order to be justified. I then consider another version of internalistic foundationalism and claim that it, too, is open to important objections. Finally, I note that both varieties of foundationalism fail to account for the epist…Read more
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1188In this paper I argue for a version of the Total Evidence view according to which the rational response to disagreement depends upon one's total evidence. I argue that perceptual evidence of a certain kind is significantly weightier than many other types of evidence, including testimonial. Furthermore, what is generally called "The Uniqueness Thesis" is actually a conflation of two distinct principles that I dub "Evidential Uniqueness" and "Rationality Uniqueness." The former principle is likely…Read more
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1174The IncarnationIn Chad Meister & Paul Copan (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion, Routledge Press. 2007.
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1074Preserving preservationism: A reply to LackeyPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1). 2007.
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1060Incarnation, Timelessness, and Leibniz's Law ProblemsIn Gregory E. Ganssle & David M. Woodruff (eds.), God and Time: Essays on the Divine Nature, Oxford University Press. 2002.
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984God, Supernatural Kinds, and the IncarnationReligious Studies 27 (3): 353-370. 1991.Traditionally, the term ’God’ has been understood either as a proper name or as a description. However, according to a new view, the term God’ in a sentence like "Jesus Christ is God" functions as a kind term, much as the term ’tiger’ functions in the sentence "Tigger is a tiger." In this paper I examine the claim that divinity can be construed as a ’supernatural’ kind, developing the outlines of an account of the semantics of God’ along these lines, and suggest that it might solve an important …Read more
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913The Incarnation and the TrinityIn Michael J. Murray (ed.), Reason for the Hope Within, Wm. B. Eerdmans. 1999.
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848Drawing on Many Traditions: An Ecumenical Kenotic ChristologyIn Anna Marmodoro & Jonathan Hill (eds.), The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, Oxford University Press. 2011.
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835Harman, negative coherentism, and the problem of ongoing justificationPhilosophia 24 (3-4): 271-294. 1995.
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793Two factor theories, meaning wholism and intentionalistic psychology: A reply to FodorPhilosophical Psychology 5 (2): 133-151. 1992.In the third chapter of his book Psychosemantics , Jerry A. Fodor argues that the truth of meaning holism (the thesis that the content of a psychological state is determined by the totality of that state's epistemic liaisons) would be fatal for intentionalistic psychology. This is because holism suggests that no two people are ever in the same intentional state, and so a psychological theory that generalizes over such states will be composed of generalizations which fail to generalize. Fodor the…Read more
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684Review of Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (3). 2002.
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661Should Cubs Fans Be Committed? What Bleacher Bums Have to Teach Us about the Nature of FaithIn Eric Bronson (ed.), Baseball and Philosophy, Open Court. 2004.
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643Review of Paul K. Moser, The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1). 2011.
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549The real presence of an eternal GodIn Kevin Timpe & Eleonore Stump (eds.), Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump, Routledge. 2009.
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545On Privileging God's Moral GoodnessFaith and Philosophy 23 (4): 409-422. 2006.According to Eric Funkhouser, omnipotence and necessary moral perfection (what Funkhouser calls "impeccability") are not compatible. Funkhouser gives two arguments for this claim. In this paper, I argue that neither of Funkhouser's arguments is sound. The traditional theist can reasonably claim that, contra Funkhouser, (i) there is no possible being who possesses all of God's attributes sans impeccability, and (ii) the fact that there are things that God cannot do does not entail that God lacks …Read more
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519MemoryIn Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology (Second Edition), Wiley-blackwell. 2010.
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459E.J.Lowe: The Subjects of Experience (review)Philosophical Review 112 (3): 416-419. 2003.Subjects of Experience is as ambitious as it is contrary to the spirit of most of contemporary analytic metaphysics and philosophy of mind. The reader needs a scorecard to keep track of all the currently unfashionable positions that Lowe adopts in this courageous little book. While the work ranges broadly over many topics, Lowe’s account of the self is at its core, and will be the focus of this review. However, it should be noted that one of the virtues of Subjects of Experience is its broad per…Read more
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369Trusting Lucy: Believing the IncredibleIn Gregory Bassham & Jerry L. Walls (eds.), The Chronicles of Narnia and Philosophy, Open Court. 2005.
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184Justified Belief and Demon WorldsRes Philosophica 90 (2): 203-214. 2013.The New Demon World Objection claims that reliabilist accounts of justification are mistaken because there are justified empirical beliefs at demon worlds— worlds at which the subjects are systematically deceived by a Cartesian demon. In this paper, I defend strongly verific (but not necessarily reliabilist) accounts of justification by claiming that there are two ways to construct a theory of justification: by analyzing our ordinary concept of justification or by taking justification to be a th…Read more
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143The Knowledge-As-Perception Account of KnowledgeJournal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999): 91-109. 2016.William Alston once argued that justification is not necessary for knowledge. He was convinced of this because he thought that, in cases of clear perception, one could come to know that P even if one’s justification for believing P was defeated. The idea is that the epistemic strength of clear perception is sufficient to provide knowledge even where justification is lacking; perceiving (and believing) that P is sufficient for knowing that P. In this paper, I explore a claim about knowledge that …Read more
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Philosophy of Religion |
Areas of Interest
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Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
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