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386Scepticism about epistemic blamePhilosophical Studies 180 (5): 1813-1828. 2023.I advocate scepticism about epistemic blame; the view that we have good reason to think there is no distinctively epistemic form of blame. Epistemologists often find it useful to draw a distinction between blameless and blameworthy norm violation. In recent years, this has led several writers to develop theories of ‘epistemic blame.’ I present two challenges against the very idea of epistemic blame. First, everything that is supposedly done by epistemic blame is done by epistemic evaluation, at …Read more
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226Arbitrariness Arguments against Temporal DiscountingAustralasian Philosophical Review 5 (3): 302-308. 2021.Craig Callender [2022] provides a novel challenge to the non-arbitrariness principle. His challenge plays an important role in his argument for the rational permissibility of a non-exponential temporal discounting rate. But the challenge is also of wider interest: it raises significant questions about whether we ought to accept the non-arbitrariness principle as a constraint on rational preferences. In this paper, I present two reasons to resist Callender’s challenge. First, I present a reason t…Read more
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105Reconsidering the Rule of Consideration: Probabilistic Knowledge and Legal ProofEpisteme 19 (2): 303-318. 2022.In this paper, I provide an argument for rejecting Sarah Moss's recent account of legal proof. Moss's account is attractive in a number of ways. It provides a new version of a knowledge-based theory of legal proof that elegantly resolves a number of puzzles about mere statistical evidence in the law. Moreover, the account promises to have attractive implications for social and moral philosophy, in particular about the impermissibility of racial profiling and other harmful kinds of statistical ge…Read more
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University of Notre Dame AustraliaLecturer (Level B)
Sydney, New South Wales, Australia
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Normative Ethics |
Decision Theory |