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9Rethinking the Evolution of ConsciousnessIn Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley. 2017.Reasoning about consciousness concerns theoretical connections between the etiology of consciousness and philosophical theories of its nature. Discussions concerning the origins of consciousness are different from those about the origins of hearts, lungs, and stomachs. And it is these lines of reasoning that concern this chapter. Before examining some arguments concerning the evolution of consciousness, we need to understand what a good explanation of the adaptation of consciousness would look l…Read more
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52Responses to criticsPhilosophical Psychology 31 (3): 446-457. 2018.In response to points raised by our critics in this book symposium, we offer some clarifications about how to understand the role of science in assessing the multiple realization thesis. We also consider the connection between functionalism and multiple realization in the contexts of both psychological and biological sciences.
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206Physicalism and Moorean SupervenienceAnalytic Philosophy 54 (1): 72-92. 2013.G. E. Moore argues that goodness is an intrinsic non-natural property that supervenes irreducibly on the intrinsic natural properties of its bearers. Accordingly, it is often supposed that “Moorean” supervenience is incompatible with physicalism, a naturalistic thesis. In this paper I argue that Moorean supervenience is not in itself incompatible with physicalism, Moore’s ethical non-naturalism notwithstanding. Understanding why will help us to better appreciate the full range of resources avail…Read more
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90In defense of interventionist solutions to exclusionStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 68 51-57. 2018.Mental and physical causes do not competedthe presence of one does not exclude the efficacy of the other. This point is obvious from the perspective of an interventionist theory of causation, but only when this theory gets its proper due. Doubts about the interventionist justification for concluding that there is both physical and mental causation, we have argued, rest on misunderstandings of interventionism. When looking to interventions to reveal causal structures, care must be taken to consid…Read more
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110The Puzzling Resilience of Multiple RealizationMinds and Machines 33 (2): 321-345. 2023.According to the multiple realization argument, mental states or processes can be realized in diverse and heterogeneous physical systems; and that fact implies that mental state or process kinds cannot be identified with particular kinds of physical states or processes. More specifically, mental processes cannot be identified with brain processes. Moreover, the argument provides a general model for the autonomy of the special sciences. The multiple realization argument is widely influential, but…Read more
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17The natural method: essays on mind, ethics, and self in honor of Owen Flanagan (edited book)The MIT Press. 2020.This collection offers cutting-edge chapters on themes related to the philosophical work of Owen Flanagan. Flanagan is an influential philosopher in the late 20th and early 21st Century, whose wide-ranging work spans philosophy of mind (especially consciousness, identity, and the self), ethics and moral psychology, comparative philosophy, and philosophical study of psychopathology (especially disorders of self, dreams, and addiction). Flanagan is the author of numerous scholarly and popular arti…Read more
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7Peter Godfrey-Smith's Other Minds (review)BJPS Review of Books. 2017.Godfrey-Smith begins with the particular, with the peculiarities of some creatures in a small corner of the animal kingdom, and builds up his reasoning and evidence through a series of detailed comparisons with other creatures. He often finds that similar effects have different causes, and appears to rely on the inverse of the Newtonian principle, namely, that similar causes will have similar effects. But the similarities and differences that occupy Godfrey-Smith are not only or mainly by compar…Read more
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36Naturalizing the Metaphysics of SciencePhilosophia 50 (2): 659-670. 2021.Most practitioners of the metaphysics of science agree that it should be a naturalized metaphysics. But, just as in other areas of philosophy, there is no consensus on what constitutes naturalism. Here I will focus on just one aspect, viz., the idea that the metaphysics of science should be epistemically naturalized. In the first section I will characterize the kind of epistemic naturalism relevant to the metaphysics of science. The main idea, drawing on the work of Penelope Maddy, is that metap…Read more
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113The Multiple Realization BookOxford University Press UK. 2016.Since Hilary Putnam offered multiple realization as an empirical hypothesis in the 1960s, philosophical consensus has turned against the idea that mental processes are identifiable with brain processes, and multiple realization has become the keystone of the 'antireductive consensus' across philosophy of science. Thomas W. Polger and Lawrence A. Shapiro offer the first book-length investigation of multiple realization, which serves as a starting point to a series of philosophically sophisticated…Read more
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685Some people believe that there is an “explanatory gap” between the facts of physics and certain other facts about the world—for example, facts about consciousness. The gap is presented as a challenge to any thoroughgoing naturalism or physicalism. We believe that advocates of the explanatory gap have some reasonable expectations that cannot be merely dismissed. We also believe that naturalistic thinkers have the resources to close the explanatory gap, but that they have not adequately explained …Read more
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310Recently some philosophers interested in consciousness have begun to turn their attention to the question of what evolutionary advantages, if any, being conscious might confer on an organism. The issue has been pressed in recent dicussions involving David Chalmers, Todd Moody, Owen Flanagan and Thomas Polger, Daniel Dennett, and others. The purpose of this essay is to consider some of the problems that face anyone who wants to give an evolutionary explanation of consciousness. We begin by framin…Read more
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144Zombies explainedIn Don Ross, Andrew Brook & David Thompson (eds.), Dennett’s Philosophy: A Comprehensive Assessment, Mit Press. pp. 259--286. 2000.In this article I reply to the challenge set forth by Dennett in his critique of Flanagan and Polger (1995). Through careful textual analysis, I show that Dennett is presenting us with a dilemma and that this dilemma is the keystone of Dennett’s argument in his Consciousness Explained. I argue that one horn of the dilemma does not have the consequence that Dennett claims; Specifically, I argue that theories that allow for the possibility of non-conscious functional duplicates of conscious beings…Read more
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488A place for dogs and trees?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Rosenberg does not provide arguments for some crucial premises in his argument against physicalism. In particular, he gives no independent argument to show that physicalists must accept the entry-by-entailment thesis. The arguments provided establish weaker premises than those that are needed. As a consequence, Rosenberg.
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54Some Metaphysical Anxieties of ReductionismIn Maurice Kenneth Davy Schouten & Huibert Looren de Jong (eds.), The matter of the mind: philosophical essays on psychology, neuroscience, and reduction, Blackwell. 2007.By now it is cliché to observe that so-called reductionism is not one mammoth doctrine. There are, as it were, many reductionisms. Needless to say, there are at least as many antireductionisms. Despite the fact that neither reductionisms nor their counterparts are single and unified doctrines there do seem to be some family resemblances. One, it seems to me, is that both reductionisms and antireductionisms are acute responses to certain metaphysical worries. Some of these worries are metaphysica…Read more
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164Neural machinery and realizationPhilosophy of Science 71 (5): 997-1006. 2004.The view that the relationship between minds and brains can be thought of on the model of software and hardware is pervasive. The most common versions of the view, known as functionalism in philosophy of mind, hold that minds are realized by brains
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273H2O, 'water', and transparent reductionErkenntnis 69 (1): 109-130. 2008.Do facts about water have a priori, transparent, reductive explanations in terms of microphysics? Ned Block and Robert Stalnaker hold that they do not. David Chalmers and Frank Jackson hold that they do. In this paper I argue that Chalmers
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223Computational functionalismIn Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Routledge. 2009.An introduction to functionalism in the philosophy of psychology/mind, and review of the current state of debate pro and con. Forthcoming in the Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology (John Symons and Paco Calvo, eds.)
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416The Innocent Eye: Why Vision Is Not a Cognitive Process By Nico Orlandi (review)Analysis 75 (2): 343-345. 2015.In The Innocent Eye, Nico Orlandi argues that vision is not a cognitive process. In particular, she argues that forming subject-level visual representations that are available for reasoning should not itself be understood as a process of inference. This comes to the claim that vision (properly so-called) is a process that produces representations but is not best understood as a process that uses representations.
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601Zombies and the function of consciousnessJournal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4): 313-21. 1995.Todd Moody’s Zombie Earth thought experiment is an attempt to show that ‘conscious inessentialism’ is false or in need of qualification. We defend conscious inessentialism against his criticisms, and argue that zombie thought experiments highlight the need to explain why consciousness evolved and what function(s) it serves. This is the hardest problem in consciousness studies
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319Realization and the metaphysics of mindAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2). 2007.According to the received view in philosophy of mind, mental states or properties are _realized_ by brain states or properties but are not identical to them. This view is often called _realization_ _physicalism_. Carl Gillett has recently defended a detailed formulation of the realization relation. However, Gillett’s formulation cannot be the relation that realization physicalists have in mind. I argue that Gillett’s “dimensioned” view of realization fails to apply to a textbook case of realizat…Read more
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196Mechanisms and explanatory realization relationsSynthese 177 (2). 2010.My topic is the confluence of two recently active philosophical research programs. One research program concerns the metaphysics of realization. The other research program concerns scientific explanation in terms of mechanisms. In this paper I introduce a distinction between descriptive and explanatory approaches to realization. I then use this distinction to argue that a well-known account of realization, due to Carl Gillett, is incompatible with a well-known account of mechanistic explanation,…Read more
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118Escaping the epiphenomenal trapSouthern Society for Philosophy and Psychology. 1998.I describe a feature of the debate between Functionalists and Anti-Functionalists in philosophy of mind that I call The Epiphenomenal Trap. I argue that the dialectic is a trap because neither side can resolve the central metaphysical issue as it has been put. That is because the debate typically trades in possible explanations. So long as Functionalists and Anti-Functionalists continue to debate whether functionalist explanations are possible, the central metaphysical issue cannot be resolved
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129A consideration of the benefits of taking physicalism to be necessarily true if true, against the standard view that physicalism is at best contingently true. Presented at the 2006 Central Division meeting of the APA, in the session Themes from Jaegwon Kim, sponsored by the Society for Asian and Asian-American Philosophy
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75Toward a Distributed Computation Model of Extended CognitionAPA Newsletter on Philosophy and Computers, 10 (1): 16-20. 2010.In the early years of the 1990s, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists became enthused about the idea that mental states are spatially and temporally distributed in the brain, and that this has significant consequences for philosophy of mind. Daniel Dennett (1991), for example, appealed to the spatial and temporal distribution of cognitive processes in the brain in order to argue that there is no unified place where or time when consciousness occurs in the brain. Dennett used this in…Read more
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127It is commonly held that there are two obstacles to precisely formulating the doctrine of physicalism: Hempel’s Problem, and Hume’s Problem.2 Hempel’s Problem is that if physicalism is to be formulated in terms of physics—or in terms of any science, for the problem is fully general if it is a problem at all—whether to use the current or future science. If physicalism is formulated in terms of current physics, then it is most likely false because current physics is at least very likely to be fals…Read more
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205Identity theoriesPhilosophy Compass 4 (5): 822-834. 2009.Identity theories are those that hold that 'sensations are brain processes'. In particular, they hold that mental/psychological state kinds are identical to brain/neuroscientific state kinds. In this paper, I isolate and explain some of the key features of contemporary identity theories. They are then contrasted with the main live alternatives by means of considering the two most important lines of objection to identity theories.
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226Closing the gap on pain: Mechanism, theory, and fitIn Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study, Bradford Book/mit Press. 2005.A widely accepted theory holds that emotional experiences occur mainly in a part of the human brain called the amygdala. A different theory asserts that color sensation is located in a small subpart of the visual cortex called V4. If these theories are correct, or even approximately correct, then they are remarkable advances toward a scientific explanation of human conscious experience. Yet even understanding the claims of such theories—much less evaluating them—raises some puzzles. Conscious ex…Read more
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123Review of The unity of consciousness, by Tim BayneAnalysis 72 (2): 398-400. 2012.On the one hand, it is obvious that a person’s conscious experiences are unified with one another in a way that they are not unified with anyone else’s experiences. My experiences are mine, and yours are not. On the other hand, it is equally plain that a person’s experiences are not monolithic. Generally, I can distinguish various aspects of my experiences, and I can attend to some rather than others. Conscious experience is unified, and it is not. Is there a unification thesis that is substanti…Read more
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100Exclusion, still not tractedPhilosophical Studies 171 (1): 135-148. 2012.Karen Bennett has recently articulated and defended a “compatibilist” solution to the causal exclusion problem. Bennett’s solution works by rejecting the exclusion principle on the grounds that even though physical realizers are distinct from the mental states or properties that they realize, they necessarily co-occur such that they fail to satisfy standard accounts of causal over-determination. This is the case, Bennett argues, because the causal background conditions for core realizers being s…Read more
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56Review of Drew Khlentzos' Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge (review)Review of Metaphysics 59 (3): 181-183. 2005.Drew Khlentozos’ Naturalistic Realism and the Antirealist Challenge is a meticulous introduction and roadmap to the core arguments of the contemporary realism/antirealism debate. It has several features that I especially admire. The book is carefully argued and for the most part clearly written. Rare among recent writers in Anglo-American philosophy, Khlentzos is a charitable reader of his opponents and earnestly endeavors to present their views as clearly and generously as possible. This genero…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Metaphilosophy |
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
General Philosophy of Science |