•  28
    Corrigendum Corrigendum to: Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective 386–401, doi: 10.1163/15685373-12342157)
    with James Beebe, Miguel A. Endara, and Runya Qiaoan
    Journal of Cognition and Culture 15 (5): 543-544. 2015.
  •  35
    Are we really moralizing creatures through and through?
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4): 351-352. 2010.
    Knobe contends that in making judgments about a wide range of matters, moral considerations and scientific considerations are and thus that We argue that his own account of the mechanism underlying these judgments does not support this radical conclusion
  •  57
    An event algebra for causal counterfactuals
    Philosophical Studies 180 (12): 3533-3565. 2023.
    “If the tower is any taller than 320 ms, it may collapse,” Eiffel thinks out loud. Although understanding this counterfactual poses no trouble, the most successful interventionist semantics struggle to model it because the antecedent can come about in infinitely many ways. My aim is to provide a semantics that will make modeling such counterfactuals easy for philosophers, computer scientists, and cognitive scientists who work on causation and causal reasoning. I first propose three desiderata th…Read more
  •  28
    The delusive benefit of the doubt
    Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 100 (C): 47-55. 2023.
    Science promises benefits, some true and some illusory. Consider a scientific agnostic who thinks that to reap the true benefits of a scientific theory he does not have to believe in its theoretical posits. Instead, it is enough if he believes that the theory successfully predicts the behavior of the observables, as ultimately only such predictions matter. Say, however, that given the results of her thorough research, a psychologist proposes a theory describing a psychological mechanism underlyi…Read more
  •  57
    Conjoined cases
    Synthese 201 (6): 1-19. 2023.
    Incorporating normality ascriptions into counterfactual theories of causation was supposed to handle isomorphs. It doesn’t—conjoining isomorphs can produce cases that such ascriptions cannot resolve.
  •  50
    The Underdeterministic Framework
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. forthcoming.
    Philosophy and statistics have studied two causal species, deterministic and probabilistic. There's a third species, however, hitherto unanalysed: underdeterministic causal phenomena, which are non-deterministic yet non-probabilistic. Here, I formulate a framework for modelling them. Consider a simple case. If I go out, I may stumble into you but also may miss you. If I don’t go out, we won't meet. I go out. We meet. My going out is a cause of our encounter even if there was no determinate proba…Read more
  •  46
    Arguments over Intuitions?
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (2): 477-499. 2016.
    Deutsch 2010 (The Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1: 447–460) claims that hypothetical scenarios are evaluated using arguments, not intuitions, and therefore experiments on intuitions are philosophically inconsequential. Using the Gettier case as an example, he identifies three arguments that are supposed to point to the right response to the case. In the paper, I present the results of studies ran on Polish, Indian, Spanish, and American participants that suggest that there’s no deep differ…Read more
  •  42
    Explanatory Circles, Induction, and Recursive Structures
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1): 13-16. 2016.
    Lange offers an argument that, according to him, “does not show merely that some proofs by mathematical induction are not explanatory. It shows that none are […]”. The aim here is to present a counterexample to his argument.
  •  51
    Normality: a Two-Faced Concept
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4): 689-716. 2020.
    Consider how we evaluate how normal an object is. On the dual-nature hypothesis, a normality evaluation depends on the object’s goodness and frequency. On the single-nature hypothesis, the evaluation depends solely on either frequency or goodness. To assess these hypotheses, I ran four experiments. Study 1 shows that normality evaluations vary with both the goodness and the frequency assessment of the object. Study 2 shows that manipulating the goodness and the frequency dimension changes the no…Read more
  •  149
    “Moral Objectivism in Cross-Cultural Perspective”
    with James Beebe, Runya Qiaoan, and Miguel A. Endara
    Journal of Cognition and Culture 15 (3-4): 386-401. 2015.
    Moral psychologists have recently turned their attention to the study of folk metaethical beliefs. We report the results of a cross-cultural study using Chinese, Polish and Ecuadorian participants that seeks to advance this line of investigation. Individuals in all three demographic groups were observed to attribute objectivity to ethical statements in very similar patterns. Differences in participants’ strength of opinion about an issue, the level of societal agreement or disagreement about an …Read more