Tomomi Asakura

Words are changing their meanings in natural language. Even if their extension remains the same, their intension does not, and a sentence often alters in meaning. Whenever such a phenomenon occurs, what is happening in us? Contextualism offers some effective explanation, but is unable to see why even the meaning of a predicate changes, why our “thought” expressed in a sentence undergoes substantial transformation, or why the world changes its "meanings" for us. I explore a theory of semantic determination to describe and explain ways our own selves and the world simultaneously change. This theory consists of such elements as perspective extension, epistemic restriction by our “mental walls,” and role-playing volition, all of which together constitute a multilayered standpoint.

Modern East Asian philosophy faced a difficulty in endowing objective knowledge with its adequate location in the traditional Eastern view of mind. This led some philosophers to reconsider intellectual intuition and the relevant question of things themselves from an Eastern perspective, and among them most notably are Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zongsan. Although these philosophers have recently been comparatively studied, their core concepts such as ＂absolute nothing＂ and ＂infinite mind＂ have not been sufficiently discussed from the perspective of objective knowledge. This paper examines the question of grasping things themselves or facts themselves by reconsidering two philosophers' middle works on the theory of knowledge. The result is the synthetic view of their seemingly divergent theories, based on the pursuit of self-awareness and the principle of bidirectional transcendence; according to this principle, the outward transcendence is correlated to the inward or immanent transcendence, so that the knowledge of facts themselves are epistemologically correlated to absolute nothing or infinite mind, which gives foundation to objective knowledge. This view not only explains the meaning of the ＂knowledge＂ of facts themselves, but also strongly implies the epistemic value of the two philosophers' seemingly esoteric concepts of mind and nothingness.

In philosophy of language, contribution from continental philosophy is scarcely examined or acknowledged although Deleuze’s criticism against truth-conditional semantics is worth consideration. I examine his peculiar phenomenological theory of possible-world semantics that draws on analytic function. It contains a meta-semantic theory of emergence, which describes how individuality and personhood originate from the impersonal and pre-individual field. This is a type of meaning theory different from the truth-conditional ones, and I argue that it supplements the latter with the philosophy of mind.

This paper attempts to show the characteristics of Tiantai’s perfect teaching (yuanjiao) in Nishida’s philosophy of basho. This is an alternative to a certain type of Nishida interpretation that emphasizes influences from Huayan Buddhism and the Awakening of Faith in Nishida’s metaphysics, especially in his later notion of absolutely contradictory identity. These Buddhist doctrines as well as Yogācāra Buddhism are classified by Tiantai Buddhism as distinctive teaching (biejiao), not perfect teaching. This paper clarifies that the characteristics of the theory of basho cannot be found in distinctive teaching although Nishida’s theory of cognitive act indeed shows similarities to Yogacara Buddhism. Following Mou Zongsan’s (1909―95) and Ando Toshio’s (1909―73) interpretation, I argue that Tiantai Buddhism, in its elucidation of the ontological stratum as the envelopment of cognitive act, has the same metaphysical structure as that found in Nishida’s logic of basho, which further crystallizes into the principle of contradictory identity.

Japanese philosophy can be viewed as consisting of three historical phases. In the first and classical phase, theoretical speculation in Japan is usually seen as a variation of East Asian intellectual tradition, which basically consists of Confucianism and Sinicized Buddhism. Some thinkers nevertheless start to depart from this framework by drawing either on the indigenous culture or on the knowledge of occidental civilization, which eventually leads to the Westernization of Japanese society. In the second, or modern, phase of Japanese philosophy, there arises a theoretical task to synthesize Eastern and Western frameworks, and many pioneering works of modern East Asian philosophy are produced in the first half of the 20th century. The third and contemporary phase of Japanese philosophy spans from the postwar reconstruction of Japan to the present, when eminent researchers lead philosophical studies under the framework either of analytic or continental context. Recent philosophical research in Japan is increasingly getting free from such academic frameworks, producing some remarkable results-- although most of these contemporary works remain unknown overseas.

Buddhism has gradually reclaimed its place as the most important spiritual tradition to the extent that modern Japanese philosophers no longer even mention Confucian thought, especially since the birth of a Japanese style of philosophy represented by the Kyoto School. Against this historical background, it may seem questionable if anything like an effective interaction between Japanese Buddhist-inspired philosophy and Confucianism ever existed. This essay concentrate on the two occasions in the history of modern Japanese philosophy when the problem of morality gained crucial importance. The first concerns the issue of morality among the second generation of Kyoto School philosophers, culminating in the theme of “overcoming modernity,” and its discussion of how to go beyond modernity, thereby transforming society and the world. This discussion is clearly inspired by Confucian ideas. Since this theme is based on the evaluation of past philosophies and thoughts, it is inseparable from a modern version of doctrinal classification conceived by KŌYAMA Iwao 高山岩男. The second occasion we will examine in this essay is the postwar Marxist critique of this theme. Inheriting this theme of the Kyoto School, HIROMATSU Wataru 廣松渉 proceeds to criticize modern Japanese Buddhist philosophy and Buddhism itself from a practical point of view in order to surpass their shortcomings. In both cases, the question is how such notions as morality and morals are problematized in modern Japanese philosophy, or, more specifically, what the place of morality and practice in Buddhist philosophy is? This is the question that will enable us to see the modern version of interaction between Buddhism and Confucianism.

This paper tries to clarify the theory of difference in terms of ji or soku ("即") that is developed by Nishida Kitarō and Mou Zongsan, comparing it with contemporary occidental Metaphysics of difference. It is known that Nishida's argument for basho or place shows a kind of hesitation between identity and difference; several Kyoto philosophers, along with recent researchers, interpret Nishida's philosophy of "absolutely contradictory identity" in terms of soku as an ontology of not identity but of difference. A similar hesitation is seen in Mou Zongsan's metaphysical argument for the difference between the act- and being- strata, which leads him to affirm the "identical" completeness of yuanjiao in terms of ji. I argue that these arguments become fully intelligible only as the result of their ontology of difference that strikingly resembles Deleuze's post-Heideggerian metaphysical attempt. This interpretation also shows how far their ontological speculation in terms of ji/ soku owes to the heritage of East Asian Buddhism because the contradiction between identity and difference is most seriously explored in the Tiantai tradition.

Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) in his later years explored the so-called "dialectical" interpretation of complex analysis, an important part of his philosophy of mathematics that has previously been criticized as lacking mathematical accuracy and philosophical importance. I interpret his elaboration on complex analysis as an attempt to develop Leibniz's theory of individual notion and to supplement Hegel's view of higher analysis with the development in mathematics such as the theory of analytic continuation and Riemann surface. This interpretation shows the previously underrated philosophico-mathematical significance of Tanabe's argument.

Recent research both on the Kyoto School and on the contemporary New Confucians suggests significant similarities between these two modern East Asian philosophies. Still missing is, however, an explanation of the shared philosophical ideas that serve as the foundation for comparative studies. For this reason, I analyze the basic theories of the two distinctly East Asian philosophies of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) and Mou Zongsan (1909-95) so as to identify and extract the same type of argument. This is an alternative to the analyses provided by the previous studies of their philosophies, which inevitably regard their theories as an East Asian assimilation of modern European philosophy in the Kantian, Neo-Kantian, or phenomenological tradition, or else as the traditional tenets under the guise of philosophical speculation, without being able to clarify how these theories contribute to philosophy. My analysis shows that both the logic of basho and the theory of perfect teaching formulate the same type of theory, the ontological or topological-onto-topological-turn from the act of consciousness to its basho or its vertical enfolding, which constitutes the bedrock of East Asian philosophy.

This paper attempts to interpret the theory of personhood in the works of Nishida Kitarō (1870-1945) in a way that refutes a certain type of Nishida interpretation that Critical Buddhism offers. According to this type of interpretation, the logic of basho is a modern version of the Qixinlun system. Based on this interpretation, Critical Buddhism denounces Kyoto School philosophy as "topical Buddhism." This paper shows how Nishida himself consciously differentiates his philosophy from the idealistic and monistic system with which the earlier version of the logic of basho can easily be confused. To show that his theory of personhood opposes the Qixinlun-like system, I argue that Mou Zongsan's (1909-1995) Tiantai theory of personhood is analogous to Nishida's and explore the common nature of their philosophies.

East Asia has nurtured an intellectual tradition that includes Buddhism, Daoism, and Confucianism, whose richness is arguably compared with ancient Greek. Yet, this region has repeatedly been said to have "no philosophy”—by occidental philosophers whose name value surpasses any of the eastern thinkers. Is this because of the deficiency of East Asian tradition? Or is it due to “our” ignorance? My answer is: both. I argue that modern East Asian philosophy was an attempt to recognize the deficiency and develop the insight of intellectual tradition in order to make philosophical contribution with a focus on the onto-topological constitution of metaphysics. Exemplary are the Kyoto school and the New Confucians, but I show how their attempt has been misunderstood due to the lack of communication among contemporary East Asian philosophers.

Mou Zongsan's notion of "Buddhistic ontology" is interpreted here in its fundamental difference from his own previous metaphysical scheme, in the light of the Kyoto School philosophers' similar attempts to resolve the Kantian antinomy of practical reason. This is an alternative both to the analysis provided by previous interpreters of Mou's Buddhistic philosophy, such as Hans-Rudolf Kantor and N. Serina Chan, and to the comparative studies of Mou's theories with Kyoto School philosophy by Ng Yu-kwan. Previous researchers considered Mou's Buddhist philosophy in continuity with moral metaphysics. However, this idea of ontology, inspired by Tiantai perfect teaching, is essentially different from the Qixinlun-inspired scheme of "twofold ontology." The implications of this problematic idea, however, were not pursued by Mou himself, but by the next generation of philosophers, such as Wing-cheuk Chan and Ng Yu-kwan. A comparison with Kyoto School philosophy enables us to clarify how the idea of Buddhism-inspired ontology is a radical criticism against Kantian philosophy, and how it shows similarity to Nishitani's Heidegger-inspired interpretation of Buddhism, which seeks to affirm the being of all things without reserve

Doctrinal classification or the panjiao 判教 system of Chinese Buddhism has been rediscovered and renewed in modern East Asian philosophy since both the Kyoto School and New Confucianism clarified the philosophical meaning of this intellectual tradition. The theoretical relation between these two modern reconsiderations, however, has not yet been studied. I analyze the theory of panjiao in Kōyama Iwao 高山岩男 and Mou Zongsan 牟宗三 so as to identify and extract, despite their apparent irrelevance, the same type of philosophical argument concerning the ontological character of yuanjiao 圓教. My analysis shows that Mou’s distinction between the “two-door mind” paradigm and Buddhistic ontology in his interpretation of Tiantai 天台 Buddhism corresponds to Kōyama’s distinction between an idealistic system and the existential turn in his generalized panjiao system.