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25Précis of The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian MonismPhilosophia 1-8. forthcoming.In The Matter of Consciousness (TMOC), I defend Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986, 1995) knowledge argument, which poses a significant challenge to physicalism. I also argue that the knowledge argument leads to Russellian monism.
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19Consciousness and the Mind-Body Problem: A ReaderOup Usa. 2011.Ideal for courses in consciousness and the philosophy of mind, Consciousness and The Mind-Body Problem: A Reader presents thirty-three classic and contemporary readings, organized into five sections that cover the major issues in this debate: the challenge for physicalism, physicalist responses, alternative responses, the significance of ignorance, and mental causation. Edited by Torin Alter and Robert J. Howell, the volume features work from such leading figures as Karen Bennett, Ned Block, Dav…Read more
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9Physicalism and the Knowledge ArgumentIn Susan Schneider & Max Velmans (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, Wiley. 2017.This chapter explains how the knowledge argument works and describes various physicalist responses to the knowledge argument. Frank Jackson first presented the knowledge argument in his 1982 paper, “Epiphenomenal Qualia”. “Qualia” refers to phenomenal properties: properties such as those Mary is said to understand only after leaving the room. Not everyone shares Jackson's opinion that epiphenomenalism is the best option for knowledge argument proponents. And some argue that there are versions of…Read more
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29The Matter of Consciousness: From the Knowledge Argument to Russellian MonismOxford University Press. 2023.This book defends Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument against physicalism. According to physicalism, consciousness is a physical phenomenon. The knowledge argument stars Mary, who learns all objective, physical information through black-and-white media and yet acquires new information when she first sees colors for herself: information about what it is like to see in color. Based partly on that case, Jackson concludes that not all information is physical. The book argues that the knowledge argume…Read more
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31Physicalism, supervenience, and monismSynthese 200 (6): 1-19. 2022.Physicalism is standardly construed as a form of monism, on which all concrete phenomena fall under one fundamental type. It is natural to think that monism, and therefore physicalism, is committed to a supervenience claim. Monism is true only if all phenomena supervene on a certain fundamental type of phenomena. Physicalism, as a form of monism, specifies that these fundamental phenomena are physical. But some argue that physicalism might be true even if the world is disorderly, i.e., not order…Read more
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Are there brute facts about consciousness?In Elly Vintiadis & Constantinos Mekios (eds.), Brute Facts, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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95Physicalism, Infinite Decomposition, and ConstitutionErkenntnis (4): 1735-1744. 2022.How could physicalism be true of a world in which there are no fundamental physical phenomena? A familiar answer, due to Barbara Gail Montero and others, is that physicalism could be true of such a world if that world does not contain an infinite descent of mentality. Christopher Devlin Brown has produced a counterexample to that solution. We show how to modify the solution to accommodate Brown’s example: physicalism could be true of a world without fundamental physical phenomena if that world d…Read more
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53A defense of the supervenience requirement on physicalismThought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4): 264-274. 2021.The supervenience requirement on physicalism says roughly that if physicalism is true then mental properties supervene on fundamental physical properties. After explaining the basis of the requirement, I defend it against objections presented by Lei Zhong (“Physicalism without supervenience,” Philosophical Studies 178 (5), 2021: 1529–44), Barbara Gail Montero (“Must physicalism imply supervenience of the mental on the physical?” Journal of Philosophy 110, 2013: 93–110), and Montero and Christoph…Read more
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137Russellian Monism and Structuralism About PhysicsErkenntnis 88 (4): 1409-1428. 2023.It is often claimed that Russellian monism carries a commitment to a structuralist conception of physics, on which physics describes the world only in terms of its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. We argue that this claim is mistaken. On Russellian monism, there is more to consciousness, and to the rest of concrete reality, than spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. But the latter claim supports only a conditional claim about physics: _if_ structuralism about physics is true, then there i…Read more
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100The God Dialogues: A Philosophical JourneyOup Usa. 2011.The God Dialogues is an intriguing and extensive philosophical debate about the existence of God. Engaging and accessible, it covers all the main arguments for and against God's existence, from traditional philosophical "proofs" to arguments that involve the latest developments in biology and physics.
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114Physicalism Without FundamentalityErkenntnis 87 (4): 1975-1986. 2022.Physicalism should be characterized in a way that makes it compatible with the possibility that the physical world is infinitely decomposable. Some have proposed solving this problem by replacing a widely accepted No Fundamental Mentality requirement on physicalism with a more general No Low-Level Mentality requirement. The latter states that physicalism could be true if there is a level of decomposition beneath which nothing is mental, whereas physicalism is false otherwise. Brown argues that t…Read more
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106Russellian physicalism and protophenomenal propertiesAnalysis 80 (3): 409-417. 2020.According to Russellian monism, phenomenal consciousness is constituted by inscrutables: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. On Russellian physicalism, those inscrutables are construed as protophenomenal properties: non-structural properties that both categorically ground dispositional properties and, perhaps when appropriately structured, collectively constitute phenomenal properties. Morris and Brown argue that protophenomen…Read more
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247Russellian monism and mental causationNoûs 55 (2): 409-425. 2021.According to Russellian monism, consciousness is constituted at least partly by quiddities: intrinsic properties that categorically ground dispositional properties described by fundamental physics. If the theory is true, then consciousness and such dispositional properties are closely connected. But how closely? The contingency thesis says that the connection is contingent. For example, on this thesis the dispositional property associated with negative charge might have been categorically ground…Read more
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43A Dialogue on ConsciousnessOup Usa. 2009.A Dialogue on Consciousness introduces readers to the debate about consciousness and physicalism, starting with its origins in Descartes, through a lively and entertaining dialogue between unemployed graduate students, who, secretly living in a university library, discuss major theories and quote passages from classic and contemporary texts in search of an answer.
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10The Nature of Consciousness—Mark Rowlands (review)International Philosophical Quarterly 47 (3): 373-375. 2007.
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62Consciousness in the Physical World: Perspectives on Russellian Monism (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2015.Consciousness in the Physical World collects historical selections, recent classics, and new pieces on Russellian monism, a unique alternative to the physicalist and dualist approaches to the problem of consciousness.
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2Knowing What It is LikeDissertation, University of California, Los Angeles. 1995.I examine the notion of knowing what an experience or emotion it is like. What kind of knowledge is this? Is it, for example, a species of factual knowledge? If so, what sort of fact is known by someone who possesses this kind of knowledge? ;Knowing what it is like plays a central role in a recent, influential argument, which runs : complete knowledge of the physical facts would fail to provide one with knowledge of what it is like to taste a lemon or see red; therefore, there must be more to su…Read more
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651Nagel on imagination and physicalismJournal of Philosophical Research 27 143-58. 2002.In "What is it Like to be a Bat?" Thomas Nagel argues that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat or presently understand how physicalism might be true. Both arguments have been seriously misunderstood. I defend them against various objections, point out a problem with the argument against physicalism, and show how the problem can be solved.
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22The God Dialogues: A Philosophical JourneyOxford University Press. 2011.The God Dialogues is an intriguing and extensive philosophical debate about the existence of God. Engaging and accessible, it covers all the main arguments for and against God's existence, from traditional philosophical "proofs" to arguments that involve the latest developments in biology and physics
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149On Two Alleged Conflicts Between Divine AttributesFaith and Philosophy 19 (1): 47-57. 2002.Some argue that God’s omnipotence and moral perfection prevent God from being afraid and having evil desires and thus from understanding such states—which contradicts God’s omniscience. But, I argue, God could acquire such understanding indirectly, either by (i) perceiving the mental states of imperfect creatures, (ii) imaginatively combining the components of mental states with which God could be acquainted, or (iii) having false memory traces of such states. (i)–(iii) are consistent with the p…Read more
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10This volume presents thirteen new essays on phenomenal concepts and phenomenal knowledge: twelve by philosophers and one by a scientist. In this introduction, we provide some background and summarize the essays.
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741Does synesthesia undermine representationalism?PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.Does synesthesia undermine representationalism? Gregg Rosenberg (2004) argues that it does. On his view, synesthesia illustrates how phenomenal properties can vary independently of representational properties. So, for example, he argues that sound/color synesthetic experiences show that visual experiences do not always represent spatial properties. I will argue that the representationalist can plausibly answer Rosenberg
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122Symbolic Meaning and the Confederate Battle FlagPhilosophy in the Contemporary World 7 (2-3): 1-4. 2000.The Confederate Battle Flag (CBF) is in the news again. On January 16th, 2000, 46,000 people came to Columbia, South Carolina, to protest its display over the state’s capital dome. On July 1st, the CBF was removed. But on the same day, it was raised in front of the Statehouse steps. The controversy has received a great deal of media coverage and was a factor in the 2000 presidential primaries. CBF displays raise a philosophical question I wish to address: What determines whether a symbol or symb…Read more
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2347Phenomenal knowledge without experienceIn Edmond Wright (ed.), The case for qualia, Mit Press. pp. 247. 2008.: Phenomenal knowledge usually comes from experience. But it need not. For example, one could know what it’s like to see red without seeing red—indeed, without having any color experiences. Daniel Dennett (2007) and Pete Mandik (forthcoming) argue that this and related considerations undermine the knowledge argument against physicalism. If they are right, then this is not only a problem for anti‐physicalists. Their argument threatens to undermine any version of phenomenal realism— the view that …Read more
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249Nothing matters in survivalThe Journal of Ethics 9 (3-4): 311-330. 2005.Do I have a special reason to care about my future, as opposed to yours? We reject the common belief that I do. Putting our thesis paradoxically, we say that nothing matters in survival: nothing in our continued existence justifies any special self-concern. Such an "extreme" view is standardly tied to ideas about the metaphysics of persons, but not by us. After rejecting various arguments against our thesis, we conclude that simplicity decides in its favor. Throughout the essay we honor Jim Rach…Read more
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165Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism, by Derk PereboomMind 121 (484): 1115-1122. 2012.
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470The knowledge argumentA Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. 1999.Frank Jackson first presented the Knowledge Argument in "Epiphenomenal Qualia" 1982). The KA is an argument against physicalism, the doctrine that everything is physical. The general thrust of the KA is that physicalism errs by misconstruing or denying the existence of the subjective features of experience. Physicalists have given numerous responses, and the debate continues about whether the KA ultimately succeeds in refuting any or all forms of physicalism. Jackson himself has recently.
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6A symbol might have racist connotations in the sense that a substantial portion of the relevant population associates it with racist values or institutions. A governmental symbol display might therefore carry racist connotations that the government doesn’t intend, including connotations that haven’t always been attached to the symbol. So I claimed recently in the pages of this journal (Alter 2000b). I also explained how those claims create problems for some of George Schedler’s (1998) main views…Read more
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Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Language |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Mind |