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340Value Promotion and the Explanation of Evidential StandardsErkenntnis 88 (8): 3505-3526. 2023.While it is commonly accepted that justified beliefs must be strongly supported by evidence and that support comes in degrees, the question of how much evidential support one needs in order to have a justified belief remains. In this paper, I consider how the question about degrees of evidential support connects with recent debates between consequentialist and deontological explanations of epistemic norms. I argue that explaining why strong, but not conclusive, evidential support is required for…Read more
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555Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double IntentionalityTopoi 41 (1): 183-194. 2021.Emotions seem to be epistemically assessable: fear of an onrushing truck is epistemically justified whereas, mutatis mutandis, fear of a peanut rolling on the floor is not. But there is a difficulty in understanding why emotions are epistemically assessable. It is clear why beliefs, for instance, are epistemically assessable: epistemic assessability is, arguably, assessability with respect to likely truth, and belief is by its nature concerned with truth; truth is, we might say, belief’s “formal…Read more
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Stockholm UniversityPost-doctoral Fellow
Institut Jean Nicod
PhD, 2019
Stockholm, Stockholm County, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Emotions |
Philosophy of Mind |
Areas of Interest
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |