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12Particulars, Individual Qualities, and UniversalsIn Kevin Mulligan (ed.), Language, Truth and Ontology, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 37--47. 1991.
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7TruthIn Michael Devitt & Richard Hanley (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Language, Wiley-blackwell. 2006.This chapter contains sections titled: Plato's Theory Convention T Tarski's Theory of Truth The Liar Paradox Disquotation and Correspondence.
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15A puzzle about de rebus beliefsAnalysis 60 (4). 2000.George Boolos (1984, 1985) has extensively investigated plural quantifi- cation, as found in such locutions as the Geach-Kaplan sentence There are critics who admire only one another, and he found that their logic cannot be adequately formalized within the first-order predicate calculus. If we try to formalize the sentence by a paraphrase using individual variables that range over critics, or over sets or collections or fusions of critics, we misrepresent its logical structure. To represent plural…Read more
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The categoricity of logicIn Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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12If P, then Q: Conditionals and the Foundations of ReasoningPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 239-242. 1992.
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3An Epistemic Principle Which Solves Newcomb's ParadoxGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 197-217. 1991.If it is certain that performing an observation to determine whether P is true will in no way influence whether P is tme, then the proposition that the observation is performed ought to be probabilistically independent of P. Applying the notion of "observation" liberally, so that a wide variety of actions are treated as observations, this proposed new principle of belief revision yields the result that simple utihty maximization gives the correct solution to the Fisher smoking paradox and the tw…Read more
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8An Epistemic Principle Which Solves Newcomb's ParadoxGrazer Philosophische Studien 40 (1): 197-217. 1991.If it is certain that performing an observation to determine whether P is true will in no way influence whether P is tme, then the proposition that the observation is performed ought to be probabilistically independent of P. Applying the notion of "observation" liberally, so that a wide variety of actions are treated as observations, this proposed new principle of belief revision yields the result that simple utihty maximization gives the correct solution to the Fisher smoking paradox and the tw…Read more
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Ramsey's DialetheismIn Graham Priest, Jc Beall & Bradley P. Armour-Garb (eds.), The law of non-contradiction : new philosophical essays, Oxford University Press. 2004.
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17Whittle’s assault on Cantor’s paradiseOxford Studies in Metaphysics 9. 2015.This chapter presents a response to Chapter 1. The arguments put forward in that chapter attempted to drive us from the paradise created by Cantor’s theory of infinite number. The principal complaint is that Cantor’s proof that the subsets of a set are more numerous than its elements fails to yield an adequate diagnosis of Russell’s paradox. This chapter argues that Cantor’s proof was never meant to be a diagnosis of Russell’s paradox. Further, it argues that Cantor’s theory is fine as it is.
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15The Revision Theory of Truth (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3): 727-730. 1996.
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21Timothy Williamson, Vagueness: London and New York: 1994 (review)Linguistics and Philosophy 21 (2): 221-235. 1998.
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2John Etchemendy. The concept of logical consequence. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., and London, 1990, vii + 174 pp (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 57 (1): 254-255. 1992.
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3James Van Aken. Axioms for the set-theoretic hierarchy. The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 51 , pp. 992–1004. - Stephen Pollard. More axioms for the set-theoretic hierarchy. Logique et analyse, n.s. vol. 31 , pp. 85–88. - Michael D. Potter. Sets. An introduction. Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York1990, xi + 241 pp (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 58 (3): 1077-1078. 1993.
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13XIII*—Two Problems with Tarski's Theory of ConsequenceProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 92 (1): 273-292. 1992.Vann McGee; XIII*—Two Problems with Tarski's Theory of Consequence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 92, Issue 1, 1 June 1992, Pages 273–292, htt.
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Omnibus Review (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1): 329-332. 1991.Reviewed Works:S. N. Artemov, B. M. Schein, Arithmetically Complete Modal Theories.S. N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, On Modal Logics Axiomatizing Provability.S.N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, Nonarithmeticity of Truth Prdicate Logics of Provability.V. A. Vardanyan, E. Mendelson, Arithmetic Complexity of Predicate Logics of Provability and Their.S. N. Artemov, E. Mendelson, Numerically Correct Provability Logics.
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Truth and Necessity in Partially Interpreted LanguagesDissertation, University of California, Berkeley. 1985.Tarski showed how to give satisfactory theories of truth for a wide variety of languages, but he required that the theory of truth for a language be formulated in an essentially richer metalanguage. Since there is no human language essentially richer than a natural language and since we would like to develop consistent theories of truth for natural languages, we would like to learn how to formulate a theory of truth for a language within that very language. ;Toward this end, I consider a class o…Read more
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2University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, June 3–7, 2000Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 6 (3). 2000.
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21There's Something about Gödel is a bargain: two books in one. The first half is a gentle but rigorous introduction to the incompleteness theorems for the mathematically uninitiated. The second is a survey of the philosophical, psychological, and sociological consequences people have attempted to derive from the theorems, some of them quite fantastical.The first part, which stays close to Gödel's original proofs, strikes a nice balance, giving enough details that the reader understands what is go…Read more
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3Ramsey and the Correspondence TheoryIn Volker Halbach & Leon Horsten (eds.), Principles of truth, Hänsel-hohenhausen. pp. 153-168. 2002.
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