-
80Plant Sentience: Theoretical and Empirical Issues: Editorial IntroductionJournal of Consciousness Studies 28 (1-2): 7-16. 2021.
-
29The emperor has no blanket!Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45. 2022.While we applaud Bruineberg et al.'s analysis of the differences between Markov blankets and Friston blankets, we think it is not carried out to its ultimate consequences. There are reasons to think that, once Friston blankets are accepted as a theoretical construct, they do not do the work proponents of free energy principle (FEP) attribute to them. The emperor is indeed naked.
-
49Embodiment and cognitive neuroscience: the forgotten talesPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3): 603-623. 2022.In this paper, I suggest that some tales (or narratives) developed in the literature of embodied and radical embodied cognitive science can contribute to the solution of two longstanding issues in the cognitive neuroscience of perception and action. The two issues are (i) the fundamental problem of perception, or how to bridge the gap between sensations and the environment, and (ii) the fundamental problem of motor control, or how to better characterize the relationship between brain activity an…Read more
-
22In Favor of ImproprietyConstructivist Foundations 15 (3): 213-216. 2020.Heras-Escribano argues against the normative character of affordances from a framework that relies on a Wittgensteinian notion of normativity and the incompatibility of direct perception, …
-
47Resonance and radical embodimentSynthese 199 (Suppl 1): 113-141. 2020.One big challenge faced by cognitive science is the development of a unified theory that integrates disparate scales of analysis of cognitive phenomena. In this paper, I offer a unified framework that provides a way to integrate neural and behavioral scales of analysis of cognitive phenomena—typically addressed by neuroscience and experimental psychology, respectively. The framework is based on the concept of resonance originated in ecological psychology and aims to be the foundation for a unifi…Read more
-
48Radical embodied cognitive science and “Real Cognition”Synthese 198 (Suppl 1): 115-136. 2019.A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instan…Read more
-
1078Ecological psychology is radical enough: A reply to radical enactivistsPhilosophical Psychology 32 (7): 1001-1023. 2019.Ecological psychology is one of the most influential theories of perception in the embodied, anti-representational, and situated cognitive sciences. However, radical enactivists claim that Gibsonians tend to describe ecological information and its ‘pick up’ in ways that make ecological psychology close to representational theories of perception and cognition. Motivated by worries about the tenability of classical views of informational content and its processing, these authors claim that ecologi…Read more
-
77A Theory of Resonance: Towards an Ecological Cognitive ArchitectureMinds and Machines 28 (1): 29-51. 2018.This paper presents a blueprint for an ecological cognitive architecture. Ecological psychology, I contend, must be complemented with a story about the role of the CNS in perception, action, and cognition. To arrive at such a story while staying true to the tenets of ecological psychology, it will be necessary to flesh out the central metaphor according to which the animal perceives its environment by ‘resonating’ to information in energy patterns: what is needed is a theory of resonance. I offe…Read more
-
38From Kepler to GibsonEcological Psychology 29 (2): 136-160. 2017.We argue that the idea of embodiment and the strategies for carrying out embodied approaches are some of the most prevalent and interdisciplinary legacies of early modern science. The idea of embodiment is simple: to explain the behavior of bodies, we must understand them as unified wholes in their environments. Embodied approaches eschew explanations in terms of qualitative descriptions of the intrinsic properties of bodies and promote explanation in terms of the interaction between bodies. Thi…Read more
-
35Culture in the world shapes culture in the head (and vice versa)Behavioral and Brain Sciences 42. 2019.We agree with Heyes that an explanation of human uniqueness must appeal to cultural evolution, and not just genes. Her account, though, focuses narrowly on internal cognitive mechanisms. This causes her to mischaracterize human behavior and to overlook the role of material culture. A more powerful account would view cognitive gadgets as spanning organisms and their (shared) environments.