Viorel Cernica

In the following paper, I suggest an interpretation of Petrovici’s and Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, both of them structured in accordance with the concept of unity of existence (the world), itself given in a close relation with the idea about an existential subject. Each philosophy includes a representation of the unity of existence, founded, the first, in a spiritual conviction (noetic belief), and the second, in a perceptual faith. This representation is in the same time a privileged kind by which a subject enters the world. Also, I will suggest arguments in order to legitimate the idea that each representation and its construction let themselves be led by the regulativity of a model of philosophizing: the philosophy of life (in the context of a metaphysics) – Petrovici; the existential philosophy (in a phenomenological context) – Merleau-Ponty.

In this paper, I will attempt to formulate some observations about the limits of a traditional ontology that is in its essence a judicative one. The main goal is to explore the possibility of constructing a pre-judicative ontology; in other words, to describe the cognitive and affective elements that are “under” the main ontological judgments, related naturally to being. The arguments in favor of a pre-judicative ontology offer a new perspective on judicative ontology itself. This pre-judicative ontology is nevertheless a kind of judicative ontology that covers a nonspecific realm of values. The paper has three parts: 1) a description of the main characteristics of traditional ontology from a judicative perspective; 2) the formulation of some logical conditions of possibility for a pre-judicative ontology; and 3) the outline of a pre-judicative ontology as an ontology of values.

In Teoria cunoștinței (Theory of knowledge), the author N. Bagda­sar enunciated the following idea: the metaphysics is conditioned by the theory of knowledge, since the first is a knowledge placed from the beginning under rules. After I will emphasise the Kantian sense of this idea and depict the manner in which the author explains Auguste Comte’s positivism in relation with the meaning of ‘positive’ (given) in that context, I will put into discussion two theories about the unknowability of a “fact” that is in its possibility an object of knowledge. The first, belonging to Mircea Florian, can be deemed as “ontologically negative” and privileges the idea of a suspen­sion of knowledge in the front of the given (an object to be known, in its possibility). The second, belonging to J.-L. Marion, which can be labelled as “cognitively negative”, suggests the idea of negative certitudes – in connection to the recognizing, in some situations, of the unknowability of the given (an object to be known, in its possibility). Both theories condition the “power” of knowledge by the nature of object of knowledge, also assuming that this power, when questions its own possibilities, can produce unknow­ability. In this perspective, the two theories discussed here and Comte’s positive philosophy draw similar conclusions. The references to a possible relation between metaphysics and theory of knowledge will be maintained in the following, but the formal privilege that the last has towards the first in Bagdasar’s view will be relativized.