Vitor Sommavilla

Montaigne, no "De l'art de conferer", discute critérios que permitem distinguir os homens segundo suas capacidades (suffisances). A "maneira" de discursar ocupa o centro desta questão e entre suas qualidades se destaca a "ordem", que nos é apresentada, sobretudo, a partir dos desvios da "tolice" (sottise) e "obstinação" (opiniastreté), símbolos do dogmatismo e de uma errônea lide com os saberes que se apoiam na memória. Procura-se mostrar que a ordem se funda na assimilação e penetração do julgamento nas matérias que garantem o nexo necessário para o desenvolvimento adequado da conversação (conference). Montaigne, in "De l'art de conferer", discusses the criteria to distinguish men according to their capabilities (suffisances). The "manner" of discussing is central to this issue and among its qualities "order" distinguishes itself. The "order" is presented to us by the exposition of its deviations: foolishness ("sottise") and obstinacy ("opiniastreté"). These inadequacies represent both dogmatism and an erroneous way of using knowledge based on memory. We intend to show how order is founded on a kind of judgment which assimilates and penetrates matters and subjects - being it the only way to assure the necessary connection to adequately develop the conversation ("conference")

According to a tradition going back to Socrates, one should thoroughly examine the grounds of one’s judgments before settling on what one has reason to do or believe. According to contemporary metaethical constructivism, assumed in this essay, reflective scrutiny is also central to assessing a judgment’s claim to justification. This essay argues against the injunctions to thoroughly examine oneself and seek ultimate reasons for one’s normative judgments. In other words, the essay argues against the ideal of the philosophical way of life. It shows that in most cases one does not have reason to question the practical conclusion of one’s initial deliberation. It is only under very limited conditions, specified in the essay, that one is justified in engaging in further reflection. Furthermore, the essay argues that if one does go for full self-examination, the consequences are most likely to be bad for oneself, given one’s practical interests.

In this paper, I discuss which semantic theory moral subjectivists should adopt. Moral subjectivism is understood broadly to include all theories according to which moral sentences are truth-apt, at least sometimes true, and made true by the mental attitudes of certain relevant agent or set of agents. Due to the breadth of this definition, an initial concern is whether a unified semantic approach is able to accommodate all varieties of subjectivism. I argue that it is. I then proceed to analyse the main semantic theories for moral sentences as they apply to the standard issue of moral disagreements. I conclude in favour of so-called Non-Indexical Contextualism.

According to a tradition going back to Socrates, one should thoroughly examine the grounds of one’s judgments before settling on what one has reason to do or believe. According to contemporary metaethical constructivism, assumed in this essay, reflective scrutiny is also central to assessing a judgment’s claim to justification. This essay argues against the injunctions to thoroughly examine oneself and seek ultimate reasons for one’s normative judgments. In other words, the essay argues against the ideal of the philosophical way of life. It shows that in most cases one does not have reason to question the practical conclusion of one’s initial deliberation. It is only under very limited conditions, specified in the essay, that one is justified in engaging in further reflection. Furthermore, the essay argues that if one does go for full self‐examination, the consequences are most likely to be bad for oneself, given one’s practical interests.

This paper is a defence of the view that, contrary to a recent trend in the literature, there is a distinctively political kind of normativity. Four steps are taken to establish that conclusion. First, I introduce a constructivist methodology for practical philosophy, one that is focused on the problem-solving nature of normative concepts. Second, I propose to understand the political as constituted by political problems, that is, by problems that concern members of a collective as members of that collective. Third, I claim that there is a kind of collective obligations, which I call political collective obligations, that do not provide direct and clear action guidance to those subject to them, but that are rather best conceived of as thin obligations. Such thin obligations stemming from properly conceived political problems constitute a distinctive kind of normativity, the normativity of politics. Because political collective obligations typically lack action guidance, what they mandate is that each obliged agent contribute their share to what they normatively regard as the best collective solution to the political problem. The paper concludes with some considerations about the so-called inefficacy problem in light of the previously established conclusions.

In this paper, I argue that principles of justice, contrary to what John Rawls and Thomas Nagel believe, do apply transnationally. I start with a debate about the proper scope of justice and defend the view according to which social practices, apart from the structure of the state, ought to be included in the purview of justice. However, I hold that there is no need to include individual behaviour, alongside social practices, opposing G. A. Cohen’s view on this matter and agreeing with Aaron James. I then argue for a relational account of equality, understood as a central principle of justice, whose application is feasible at the transnational level. Finally, I briefly discuss two examples of international social practices that could (and in my view ought to) be assessed in terms of social justice and respond to two objections to my position.