•  248
    On the function of self‐deception
    European Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    Self-deception makes best sense as a self-defensive mechanism by which the self protects itself from painful reality. Hence, we typically imagine self-deceivers as people who cause themselves to believe as true what they want to be true. Some self-deceivers, however, end up believing what they do not want to be true. Their behaviour can be explained on the hypothesis that the function of this behaviour is protecting the agent's perceived focal benefit at the cost of inflicting short-term…Read more
  •  416
    On the nature of indifferent lies, a reply to Rutschmann and Wiegmann
    Philosophical Psychology 33 (5): 757-771. 2020.
    In their paper published in 2017 in Philosophical Psychology, Ronja Rutschmann and Alex Wiegmann introduce a novel kind of lies, the indifferent lies. According to them, these lies are not intended to deceive simply because the liars do not care whether their audience is going to believe them or not. It seems as if indifferent lies avoid the objections raised against other kinds of lies supposedly not intended to deceive. I argue that this is not correct. Indifferent lies, too, are either…Read more
  •  568
    Transparent Delusion
    Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1): 183-201. 2020.
    In this paper, I examine a kind of delusion in which the patients judge that their occurrent thoughts are false and try to abandon them precisely because they are false, but fail to do so. I call this delusion transparent, since it is transparent to the sufferer that their thought is false. In explaining this phenomenon, I defend a particular two-factor theory of delusion that takes the proper integration of relevant reasoning processes as vital for thought-evaluation. On this proposal, which is…Read more
  •  830
    Deception (Under Uncertainty) as a Kind of Manipulation
    with Chantelle Saville
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4): 830-835. 2019.
    In his 2018 AJP paper, Shlomo Cohen hints that deception could be a distinct subset of manipulation. We pursue this thought further, but by arguing that Cohen’s accounts of deception and manipulation are incorrect. Deception under uncertainty need not involve adding false premises to the victim’s reasoning but it must involve manipulating her response, and cases of manipulation that do not interfere with the victim’s reasoning, but rather utilize it, also exist. Therefore, deception under uncert…Read more
  •  731
    Traditionalists affirm that in self-deception I intend to deceive myself; but, on the standard account of interpersonal deception, according to which deceiver intend to make their target believe a falsehood, traditionalism generates paradoxes, arising from the fact that I will surely know that I want to make myself believe a falsehood. In this thesis, I argue that these well-known paradoxes need not arise under my manipulativist account of deception. In particular, I defend traditionalism about …Read more
  •  776
    Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2). 2019.
    This article defends the view that liars need not intend to deceive. I present common objections to this view in detail and then propose a case of a liar who can lie but who cannot deceive in any relevant sense. I then modify this case to get a situation in which this person lies intending to tell his hearer the truth and he does this by way of getting the hearer to recognize his intention to tell the truth by lying. This case, and further cases that I develop from it, demonstrate that lying wit…Read more
  •  725
    Knowledge‐lies re‐examined
    Ratio 31 (3): 312-320. 2018.
    Sorensen says that my assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it is meant to undermine your justification for believing truly that ∼p, not to make you believe that p and that, therefore, knowledge-lies are not intended to deceive. It has been objected that they are meant to deceive because they are intended to make you more confident in a falsehood. In this paper, I propose a novel account according to which an assertion that p is a knowledge-lie if it is intended not to provide evidence that p b…Read more
  •  48
    Students' responses to scenarios depicting ethical dilemmas: a study of pharmacy and medical students in New Zealand
    with Marcus A. Henning, Phillipa Malpas, Sanya Ram, Vijay Rajput, Matt Boyd, and Susan J. Hawken
    Journal of Medical Ethics 42 (7): 466-473. 2016.
    One of the key learning objectives in any health professional course is to develop ethical and judicious practice. Therefore, it is important to address how medical and pharmacy students respond to, and deal with, ethical dilemmas in their clinical environments. In this paper, we examined how students communicated their resolution of ethical dilemmas and the alignment between these communications and the four principles developed by Beauchamp and Childress. Three hundred and fifty-seven pharmacy…Read more