-
13A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in NarrativeIn Janyce M. Wiebe & William J. Rapaport (eds.), A Computational Theory of Perspective and Reference in Narrative, Association For Computational Linguistics. 1988.Narrative passages told from a character's perspective convey the character's thoughts and perceptions. We present a discourse process that recognizes characters' thoughts and perceptions in third-person narrative. An effect of perspective on reference in narrative is addressed: References in passages told from the perspective of a character reflect the character's beliefs. An algorithm that uses the results of our discourse process to understand references with respect to an appropriate set of …Read more
-
123Is Artificial General Intelligence Impossible?Cosmos+Taxis 12 (5+6): 5-22. 2024.In their Why Machines Will Never Rule the World, Landgrebe and Smith (2023) argue that it is impossible for artificial general intelligence (AGI) to succeed, on the grounds that it is impossible to perfectly model or emulate the “complex” “human neurocognitive system”. However, they do not show that it is logically impossible; they only show that it is practically impossible using current mathematical techniques. Nor do they prove that there could not be any other kinds of theories than those in…Read more
-
209Non-Existent Objects and Epistemological OntologyGrazer Philosophische Studien 26 (1): 61-95. 1985.This essay examines the role of non-existent objects in "epistemological ontology"--the study of the entities that make thinking possible. An earlier revision of Meinong's Theory of Objects is reviewed, Meinong's notions of Quasisein and Aussersein are discussed, and a theory of Meinongian objects as "combinatorially possible" entities is presented.
-
249Critical Review of Minds, Brains and ScienceNoûs 22 (4): 585-609. 1988.Critical Review of Searle's Minds, Brains and Science
-
10Meinong and the Principle of Independence. Its Place in Meinong's Theory of Objects and Its Significance in Contemporary Philosophical LogicJournal of Symbolic Logic 51 (1): 248-252. 1986.
-
515Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to BozşahinMinds and Machines 29 (2): 227-237. 2019.A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.
-
494Syntax, Semantics, and Computer ProgramsPhilosophy and Technology 33 (2): 309-321. 2020.Turner argues that computer programs must have purposes, that implementation is not a kind of semantics, and that computers might need to understand what they do. I respectfully disagree: Computer programs need not have purposes, implementation is a kind of semantic interpretation, and neither human computers nor computing machines need to understand what they do.
-
31Raymond M. Smullyan. Logicians who reason about themselves. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 341–352 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 668-669. 1988.
-
19Leora Morgenstern. A first order theory of planning, knowledge, and action. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 99–114 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 664-665. 1988.
-
31
-
17Jaakko Hintikka. Reasoning about knowledge in philosophy: the paradigm of epistemic logic. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 63–80 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 663-664. 1988.
-
30Kurt Konolige. What awareness isn't: a sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 241–250 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 667-668. 1988.
-
17Joseph Y. Halpern. Reasoning about knowledge: an overview. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 1–17 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 660-661. 1988.
-
23Gordon Plotkin and Colin Stirling. A framework for intuitionistic modal logics. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 399–406 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 669. 1988.
-
22Stanley J. Rosenschein and Leslie Pack Kaelbling. The synthesis of digital machines with provable epistemic properties. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 83–98 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 664. 1988.
-
26Gerhard Lakemeyer. Steps towards a first-order logic of explicit and implicit belief. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 325–340 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 668. 1988.
-
22Fred Landman. Pegs and alecs. An abridged version of LIII 656. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 45–61 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 662-663. 1988.
-
30Jim Des Rivières and Hector J. Levesque. The consistency of syntactical treatments of knowledge. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 115–130 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 665-666. 1988.
-
25Brian Cantwell Smith. Varieties of self-reference. Theoretical aspects of reasoning about knowledge, Proceedings of the 1986 conference, edited by Joseph Y. Halpern, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Los Altos1986, pp. 19–43 (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 661-662. 1988.
-
127Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to BozşahinMinds and Machines 29 (2): 227-237. 2019.A response to a recent critique by Cem Bozşahin of the theory of syntactic semantics as it applies to Helen Keller, and some applications of the theory to the philosophy of computer science.
-
263Meinongian Semantics and Artificial IntelligenceHumana Mente 6 (25): 25-52. 2013.This essay describes computational semantic networks for a philosophical audience and surveys several approaches to semantic-network semantics. In particular, propositional semantic networks are discussed; it is argued that only a fully intensional, Meinongian semantics is appropriate for them; and several Meinongian systems are presented.
-
88What is a Computer? A SurveyMinds and Machines 28 (3): 385-426. 2018.A critical survey of some attempts to define ‘computer’, beginning with some informal ones, then critically evaluating those of three philosophers, and concluding with an examination of whether the brain and the universe are computers.
-
99The purpose of this essay is to exhibit in detail the setting for the version of the Cogito Argument that appears in Descartes’s Meditations. I believe that a close reading of the text can shed new light on the nature and role of the “evil demon”, on the nature of God as he appears in the first few Meditations, and on the place of the Cogito Argument in Descartes’s overall scheme.
-
2Review: Raymond M. Smullyan, Logicians who Reason about Themselves (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 668-669. 1988.
-
88Because mere calculating isn't thinking: Comments on Hauser's Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing?Minds and Machines 3 (1): 11-20. 1993.Hauser argues that his pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion - Cal thinks - most would deny. He considers several ways to avoid this conclusion, and finds them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standard…Read more
-
3Review: Jim des Rivieres, Hector J. Levesque, The Consistency of Syntactical Treatments of Knowledge (review)Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (2): 665-666. 1988.
-
43Preface to: Where Does I Come From? Special Issue on Subjectivity and the Debate over Computational Cognitive ScienceMinds and Machines 5 (4): 513-620. 1995.Intro to the proceedings of a conference on the first person in philosophy, artificial intellgence, and cognitive science
-
16Predication, fiction, and artificial intelligenceTopoi 10 (1): 79-111. 1991.This paper describes the SNePS knowledge-representation and reasoning system. SNePS is an intensional, propositional, semantic-network processing system used for research in AI. We look at how predication is represented in such a system when it is used for cognitive modeling and natural-language understanding and generation. In particular, we discuss issues in the representation of fictional entities and the representation of propositions from fiction, using SNePS. We briefly survey four philoso…Read more
Buffalo, New York, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Computation, Misc |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Language |
Areas of Interest
6 more