Xiao Ouyang

This issue starts from a conviction that globalization is inevitable, and in this process, we journey together. Globalization for East Asia once meant Westernization, or less geographically specific, universal modernization. However, it became apparent that globalization cannot be simply defined in terms of assimilation and univocality, as insoluble disputes and radical differences in all aspects of life still occur and reoccur. Nonetheless, dialogue and interaction have been happening more frequently on a larger scale, even if sometimes concurrently appearing in the form of miscommunication. Scientists question if the flap of a butterfly’s wings in Brazil can set off a tornado in Texas while poets contemplate whether one falling leaf of a Chinese parasol informs the change of seasons in the whole world. From Turin to Wuhan, when our living conditions have never been more effectively integrated than they are now, it requires us not only to think more correlatively, but also to understand locality in a larger context from a holistic perspective.

Daniel A. Bell’s searching for the possible alternatives to liberal democracy in light of the political progresses in the Asian countries spans two decades, culminating in his proposal of the so-called Chinese political meritocracy or xianneng zhengzhi. This article indicates the conceptual asymmetry between xianneng zhengzhi and “meritocracy” in three aspects. Firstly, xianeng zhengzhi remains at the brighter end of the spectrum of political ideas while “meritocracy” is bogged down in a highly polarized reception. Secondly, “meritocracy” lacks the quintessence of xianneng zhengzhi, namely, an explicit stress on priority of moral worthiness. Thirdly, “meritocracy” is built upon foundational individualism and focuses on the individual performance and achievement. Although Confucian political tradition and the Western conception of meritocracy share some functional similarities, using the synthesized term “Confucian meritocracy” to introduce the Confucian political tradition may commit a cross-cultural hermeneutic fallacy.

There is a bifurcation between shenghuo meixue and everyday aesthetics. The disparity is observed on critical reflection on everydayness, the recognition of negative aesthetic qualities and experience, and the expectation of defamiliarization. In the Neo-Confucian practice of gewu or investigating things, one may find another Chinese inspiration for dealing with the familiar, ordinary, and routine aesthetically. Gewu offers another possibility of “experiencing the ordinary as ordinary”. It can lead to an aesthetical immersive experience, characterized by a sensuous and intuitive recognition of the appropriateness of everyday things dwelling in their contexts, as well as a cosmic understanding of generative power of the universe that is both profound and poetic. By contemplating aesthetic experience facilitated by gewu, aesthetic experience is typically not individual per se, but collective in the sense that many prima facie private and personal aesthetic experiences are possible only because of the collective underneath.

Kant’s coining of «reflective judgment» in the third Critique by a conceptual clarification of the third higher cognitive faculty has long been criticized as redundant for his philosophical system and deemed a typical Kantian architectonic failure. Zhu Xi’s vital development of the doctrine «gewu» in his commentary on The Great Learning has been attacked for centuries for committing a hermeneutic fallacy. I argue that a comparative study shows that both conceptions steered a metaphysical transition towards «the supersensible» in each philosophy, leading to a similar construction of moral teleology. Zhu Xi’s «li» is comparable to Kant’s «purpose» as a moral teleological property. The Neo-Confucian li-qi dichotomy provides a counterpart of the Kantian double causality. Nevertheless, Neo-Confucian moral teleology does not rely on a Kantian-type rationalistic deduction concerning the idea of highest good (as final purpose) nor on the so-called intellectual intuition. Gewu looks outwards for the moral coherence between humans and things, while Kant ultimately rejects the natural world for the sake of moral certainty in terms of freedom and identifies what is unique within us.

Ralph Weber’s recent criticism sheds light on the methodological predicament of comparative philosophy. I examine Weber’s analytical tool and argue that its general applicability and potential unbridled use can lead to a conflict between its own legitimacy and the legitimacy of comparative philosophy as an established sui generis sub-discipline of philosophy which largely functions as “intercultural” or “trans-cultural philosophy”. I defend the cultural approach, and argue that comparative philosophy should be viewed as philosophical data analysis from different spatiotemporal origins, in order to achieve better explanatory power for philosophical study. I point out that philosophy in China has its own peculiar methodological predicament. The comparative study of philosophy is a joint project of inter-cultural dialogue that rests on the collective effort of global participants.

Ralph Weber's reply to my comment, as we have come to expect from his writing, is both well articulated and instructive. His clarification has helped me to further grasp the consideration that underpins his methodological criticism. I am also encouraged to find agreement on the worth of a historical study of comparative philosophy as an established sub-discipline. In addition, Weber's attitude toward "disagreement" is thought-provoking. However, I would like to suggest that disagreement is positive and meaningful if and only if it is not based on misunderstanding, and moreover if disagreement itself should not be regarded as the purpose. The ideal intellec tual exchange should be able to encompass both...

Tianxia and renlei mingyun gongtongti are two Chinese concepts that are of significance for reflecting on ‘China and Global Development.’ Both present a revival of cosmopolitanism in China, while accompanied by a calling for Chinese rejuvenation. In defining cosmopolitanism in terms of two intrinsic conditions – common community and universal equality – I argue that cosmopolitanism rooted in the Chinese philosophical tradition may provide a distinct solution to the equality condition from the Western liberal-individualist ones. I propose the notion of Confucian relational equality. There is indeed ‘inequality’ for the roles in a relation, in the sense that obligations and norms of conduct are defined differently and accomplished co-dependently. However, ideally, all full-fledged person-ings (understood as life stories in a society in a given historical period) are constituted by a dynamic and unfolding manifold of always specific relations concretized by various social roles, and usually do bear a comparable amount of functionally equivalent primary roles. As roles co-emerge among person-ings, relational equality is only possible when roles are continuously generated and sustained by transmission, which entails that community with a history, rather than an abstract and ontological individual, is a prerequisite.

ABSTRACTTo assess the strength of Lloyd's conception of analogy, in particular, his innovative conceptual apparatus ‘the multidimensionality of reality’ and ‘the semantic stretch’, I propose the notion of hermeneutic mechanism as a rival tool of investigation. Hermeneutic mechanism manifests in the interaction of negative and positive hermeneutic forces, the dynamic interdependence between ideal universality and contextualized individuality, and the organism-like ‘hermeneutic circle’. I argue that hermeneutic mechanism not only offers a meta-methodological perspective for appreciating Lloyd's methodological development of analogy for cross-cultural studies, but also incorporates both Lloyd's quest for diversity and his critique of logical dichotomy, and moreover overcomes the explicatory flaw in his ‘multidimensionality of reality’ and colour metaphor.