Department Members
Department Activity
Also at William & Mary
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Chris Tucker, Parity, Pluralism, and Permissible PartialityIn Eric Siverman & Chris Tweed (eds.), Virtuous and Vicious Partiality, Routledge. forthcoming.
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Chris Tucker, The All or Nothing Ranking Reversal and the Unity of MoralityOxford Studies in Normative Ethics. forthcoming.
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Chris Tucker, Withhold by Default: A Difference Between Epistemic and Practical RationalityPhilosophical Studies. forthcoming.
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Chad Vance, Procreation is Immoral on Environmental GroundsThe Journal of Ethics 28 (1): 101-124. 2024.
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Philip Swenson, Compatibilism and Control over the Past: A New Argument Against CompatibilismCriminal Law and Philosophy 18 (1): 201-215. 2024.
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Samuel Director and Christopher Freiman, Civil Liberties in a Lockdown: The Case of COVID-19Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 1 (6): 1-24. 2023.
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Chris Tucker, A Holist Balance ScaleJournal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (3): 533-553. 2023.
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Chris Tucker, Douglas Portmore, Opting for the Best: Oughts and Options(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), pp. xvii + 324 (review)Utilitas 35 (3): 242-244. 2023.
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Aaron Griffith, Basic racial realism, social constructionism, and the ordinary concept of raceJournal of Social Philosophy 54 (2): 236-247. 2023.
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Noah Lemos, Conditionalism, intrinsicalism, and pleasure in the badPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (3): 692-705. 2023.
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Wim Dubbink and Noah Lemos, Editorial to Book SymposiumThe Journal of Ethics 27 (2): 117-117. 2023.
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Chris Tucker, Dogmatism and the Epistemology of Covert SelectionIn Nathan Ballantyne & David Dunning (eds.), Reason, Bias, and Inquiry: The Crossroads of Epistemology and Psychology, Oxford University Press. 2022.
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Chris Tucker, Review of: Daeley, Justin J. Why God Must Do What is Best: A Philosophical Investigation of Theistic Optimism (review)European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 14 (4): 314-318. 2022.
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Matthew Haug, Silencing, Psychological Conflict, and the Distinction Between Virtue and Self-ControlThe Journal of Ethics 26 (1): 93-114. 2022.
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Matthew Haug, Continence, temperance, and motivational conflict: Why traditional neo-Aristotelian accounts are psychologically unrealisticPhilosophical Psychology 35 (2): 205-225. 2022.
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Matthew Haug, Resolving two tensions in (Neo-)Aristotelian approaches to self-controlEthical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4): 685-700. 2022.
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Matthew Haug, Continence, Temperance, and Motivational Conflict: Why Traditional Neo-Aristotelian Accounts are Psychologically UnrealisticPhilosophical Psychology 35 (2): 205-225. 2022.
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Aaron Griffith, True by DefaultJournal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1): 92-109. 2022.
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Philip Swenson, Equal Moral Opportunity: A Solution to the Problem of Moral LuckAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2): 386-404. 2022.
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Philip Swenson, Moral Luck, Free Will Theodicies, and Theological DeterminismIn Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives, Cambridge University Press. pp. 184-194. 2022.
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Noah Lemos, Defeat, pluralism, and indispensable goodsPhilosophical Studies 179 (10): 3039-3053. 2022.
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Noah Lemos, Seemings and the Response to Radical SkepticismInternational Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (2): 105-119. 2022.
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Chris Tucker, Too far beyond the call of duty: moral rationalism and weighing reasonsPhilosophical Studies 179 (6): 2029-2052. 2021.
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Matthew Haug, Trait Self-Control, Inhibition, and Executive Functions: Rethinking some Traditional AssumptionsNeuroethics 14 (2): 303-314. 2021.