Macquarie University, Department of Philosophy - PhilPeople

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Also at Macquarie University

Department Affiliates

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Duncan Pritchard, Chapter 4. Hinge Commitments
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. pp. 89-120. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Chapter 1. Radical Skepticism and Closure
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. pp. 9-28. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Chapter 2. Radical Skepticism and Underdetermination
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. pp. 29-60. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Chapter 3. Wittgenstein on the Structure of Rational Evaluation
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. pp. 61-88. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3): 70-90. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Axiology
In Martin Grajner & Pedro Schmechtig (eds.), Epistemic Reasons, Norms and Goals, De Gruyter. pp. 407-422. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Extended knowledge
The Philosophers' Magazine 72 93-94. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Frontmatter
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Introduction
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. pp. 1-8. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Index
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. pp. 237-239. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Notes
In Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. pp. 189-216. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard and Christopher Ranalli, Putnam on Brains-in-Vats and Radical Skepticism
In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Putnam on Brains in Vats, Cambridge University Press. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Seeing it for oneself: Perceptual knowledge, understanding, and intellectual autonomy
Episteme 13 (1): 29-42. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard and Christopher Ranalli, On Metaepistemological Scepticism
In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.) https://philpapers.org/rec/BERTEI-5, Oxford University Press. 2016.

J. Adam Carter and Duncan Pritchard, Cognitive bias, scepticism and understanding
In Stephen R. Grimm, Christoph Baumberger & Sabine Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding: New Perspectives from Epistemology and Philosophy of Science, Routledge. pp. 272-292. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Risk
Journal of Philosophy 113 (11): 550-571. 2016.

Matthew Chrisman, Duncan Pritchard, Guy Fletcher, Elinor Mason, Suilin Lavelle, Michela Massimi, Alasdair Richmond, and Dave Ward, Philosophy for Everyone: second edition
Routledge. 2016.

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Jesper Kallestrup and Duncan Pritchard, Dispositional Robust Virtue Epistemology versus Anti-luck Virtue Epistemology
In Miguel Ángel Fernández Vargas (ed.), Performance Epistemology: Foundations and Applications, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 31-50. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, The Sources of Scepticism
International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3): 203-227. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing
Princeton University Press. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Précis of Epistemological Disjunctivism
Journal of Philosophical Research 41 175-181. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemology
Palgrave-Macmillan. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Veritism and Epistemic Value
In Hilary Kornblith & Brian McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and his Critics, Blackwell. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemological Disjunctivism
Journal of Philosophical Research 41 221-238. 2016.

James Carter, Jesper Kallestrup, and Duncan Pritchard, Introduction
Logos and Episteme 7 (4): 409-411. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1): 70-90. 2016.

Duncan Pritchard and Christopher Ranalli, On Metaepistemological Scepticism
In Brett Coppenger & Michael Bergmann (eds.), Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism, Oxford University Press Uk. pp. 205-223. 2016.

Neil Levy, Culpable Ignorance
Journal of Philosophical Research 41 263-271. 2016.

Neil Levy, Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1): 127-139. 2016.

Neil Levy, George Graham, The Abraham Dilemma: A Divine Delusion. Reviewed by
Philosophy in Review 36 (1): 11-13. 2016.

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Details

MA program offered
PhD program offered
Website
Contact chair of department
Contact administrative assistant