Department Affiliates
Department Activity
Details
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PhD program offered
Also at Ohio State University
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Eric Snyder and Stewart Shapiro, Link’s Revenge: A Case Study in Natural Language MereologyIn Gabriele M. Mras, Paul Weingartner & Bernhard Ritter (eds.), Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics: Proceedings of the 41st International Ludwig Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 3-36. 2018.
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Stewart Shapiro, Properties and predicates, objects and names : impredicativity and the axiom of choiceIn Ivette Fred Rivera & Jessica Leech (eds.), Being Necessary: Themes of Ontology and Modality from the Work of Bob Hale., Oxford University Press. 2018.
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Roy T. Cook and Stewart Shapiro, Robert Lorne Victor Hale FRSE May 4, 1945 – December 12, 2017Philosophia Mathematica 26 (2): 266-274. 2018.
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Stewart Shapiro, Philosophy of MathematicsIn Herman Cappelen (ed.), Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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Øystein Linnebo and Stewart Shapiro, Modality in mathematicsIn Otávio Bueno & Scott Shalkowski (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Modality, Routledge. 2018.
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Lisa Downing, Sensible Qualities and Secondary Qualities in the First DialogueIn Stefan Storrie (ed.), Berkeley's Three Dialogues: New Essays, Oxford University Press. pp. 7-23. 2018.
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Lisa Downing, Are body and extension the same thing? : Locke versus Descartes (versus More)In Philippe Hamou & Martine Pécharman (eds.), Locke and Cartesian Philosophy, Oxford University Press. pp. 63-79. 2018.
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Christopher Pincock, Logical EmpiricismIn Herman Cappelen (ed.), Fixing Language: An Essay on Conceptual Engineering, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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Tristram McPherson, The Ethical Basis for VeganismIn Anne Barnhill, Mark Budolfson & Tyler Doggett (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Food Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2018.
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Tristram McPherson, Naturalistic Moral Realism, Moral Rationalism, and Non-Fundamental EpistemologyIn Karen Jones & François Schroeter (eds.), The Many Moral Rationalisms, Oxford University Press. pp. 187-209. 2018.
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Tristram McPherson, Authoritatively Normative ConceptsOxford Studies in Metaethics 13 253-277. 2018.
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Dana Howard, The Scoundrel and the Visionary: On Reasonable Hope and the Possibility of a Just FutureJournal of Political Philosophy 27 (3): 294-317. 2018.
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Dana Howard, Deciding for the incompetentIn Kalle Grill & Jason Hanna (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Paternalism, Routledge. 2018.
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Sahar Heydari Fard, Decision-Theoretic Consequentialism and the Desire-Luck ProblemJournal of Cognition and Neuroethics 5 (1): 1-14. 2018.
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Colin C. Smith, The Groundwork for Dialectic in Statesman 277a-287bInternational Journal of the Platonic Tradition 12 (2): 132-150. 2018.
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Colin C. Smith, The Emerging Good in Plato’s Philebus (review)Ancient Philosophy 38 (2): 451-454. 2018.
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Eden Lin, Asymmetrism about Desire Satisfactionism and TimeIn Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Vol 7, Oxford University Press. pp. 161-183. 2017.
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Abe Roth, Entitlement to Reasons for ActionIn David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 4, Oxford University Press. pp. 75-92. 2017.
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Abe Roth, Interpersonal Obligation in Joint ActionIn Kirk Ludwig & Marija Jankovic (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality, Routledge. pp. 45-57. 2017.
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Richard Samuels, NativismIn Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, Routledge. 2017.
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Richard Samuels and Kevin Scharp, Analytic Pragmatism and Universal LX VocabularyPhilosophia 45 (4): 1-25. 2017.
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Stewart Shapiro, Computing with Numbers and Other Non-syntactic Things: De re Knowledge of Abstract ObjectsPhilosophia Mathematica 25 (2): 268-281. 2017.
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Craige Roberts and Stewart Shapiro, Ontology via semantics? Introduction to the special issue on the semantics of cardinalsLinguistics and Philosophy 40 (4): 321-329. 2017.
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Teresa Kouri Kissel and Stewart Shapiro, Logical pluralism and normativityInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1-22. 2017.