I work in political philosophy and bioethics. I've done a fair bit of writing about disability - what it is; how it relates to egalitarian justice, and to health. This also includes work on some practical, applied, issues, particularly around access to and rights in prostheses.
I'm mainly focused for now on questions about the body - what it means for something (a hand, a liver, a prosthetic limb) to be a part of the body; what follows, morally, when something is. I'm working on a theory according to which the answers to these questions are intimately related: on which our bodies, basically, are those things that matter morally in certain sp…
I work in political philosophy and bioethics. I've done a fair bit of writing about disability - what it is; how it relates to egalitarian justice, and to health. This also includes work on some practical, applied, issues, particularly around access to and rights in prostheses.
I'm mainly focused for now on questions about the body - what it means for something (a hand, a liver, a prosthetic limb) to be a part of the body; what follows, morally, when something is. I'm working on a theory according to which the answers to these questions are intimately related: on which our bodies, basically, are those things that matter morally in certain specific ways (those things, specifically, in which we have a certain distinctive set of rights).
More tentatively, I'm also getting stared on another aspect of our rights in our persons - our rights, not in our bodies, but in our minds. This relates to the issues concerning, e.g., manipulation, mental privacy, and the disturbing possibility that new technologies (AI, neurointerventions) will allow new and concerning forms of access to our minds. But it also has a theoretical aspect: concerning whether, for instance, our rights in our minds reduce to rights in our bodies (I doubt it); or (more likely) whether it makes sense to think of the mind, morally, on analogy to the body, as a space with boundaries others ought not to cross.
