•  10
    Who Owns the Data in a Medical Information Commons?
    with Amy L. McGuire, Jessica Roberts, and Barbara J. Evans
    Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 47 (1): 62-69. 2019.
  •  7
    Being and Owning: The Body, Bodily Material, and the Law by Jesse Wall (review)
    Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 28 (4): 13-16. 2019.
    Jesse Wall's Being and Owning: The Body, Bodily Material, and the Law addresses the legal status of 'bodily material'; items which used to be, but are no longer, part of a living human organism: especially, 'separated' materials like gametes or tissue samples, and cadavers and other mortal remains. Wall's discussion, however, ranges widely across jurisprudential and philosophical issues concerning our relation to our bodies and our rights in them. His central, plausible contention is that body r…Read more
  •  11
    Disability, Disease, and Health Sufficiency
    In Carina Fourie & Annette Rid (eds.), What is Enough?: Sufficiency, Justice, and Health, Oxford University Press. 2016.
    This chapter argues that standard accounts of health are ill-suited to constructing a plausible theory of health justice, particularly a sufficientarian theory. The problem in these accounts is revealed by their treatment of disability. Theorists of health justice need to define “health” more narrowly to capture the legitimate claims of people with disabilities. Following Ronald Amundson and Peter Hucklenbroich, this chapter proposes such a definition. Health, as defined in this chapter, is the …Read more
  •  28
    Sexual Reorientation in Ideal and Non‐Ideal Theory
    Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (4): 463-485. 2018.
  •  32
    On valuing impairment
    Philosophical Studies 175 (5): 1113-1133. 2018.
    In The Minority Body, Elizabeth Barnes rejects prevailing social constructionist accounts of disability for two reasons. First, because they understand disability in terms of oppressive social responses to bodily impairment, they cannot make sense of disability pride. Second, they maintain a problematic distinction between impairment and disability. In response to these challenges, this paper defends a version of the social model of disability, which we call the Social Exclusion Model. On our ac…Read more
  •  34
    You Didn't Build That: Equality and Productivity in a Complex Society
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1): 69-88. 2019.
    This paper argues for Serious Distributive Egalitarianism – the view that some material inequalities are seriously objectionable as such; not merely, say, because such inequalities tend to generate inequalities in status. Social justice requires equality, I argue, because basic social institutions produce important goods and are produced in turn by the relevantly equal contributions of all those that comply with them. E.g., basic social institutions make it much easier to produce cooperatively t…Read more
  •  99
    Distributing Collective Obligation
    Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (3): 1-23. 2015.
    In this paper I develop an account of member obligation: the obligations that fall on the members of an obligated collective in virtue of that collective obligation. I use this account to argue that unorganized collections of individuals can constitute obligated agents. I argue first that, to know when a collective obligation entails obligations on that collective’s members, we have to know not just what it would take for each member to do their part in satisfying the collective obligation, but …Read more
  •  160
    Natural and Social Inequality
    with David Wasserman
    Journal of Moral Philosophy 13 (5): 576-601. 2016.
    _ Source: _Page Count 26 This paper examines the moral import of a distinction between natural and social inequalities. Following Thomas Nagel, it argues for a “denatured” distinction that relies less on the biological vs. social causation of inequalities than on the idea that society is morally responsible for some inequalities but not others. It maintains that securing fair equality of opportunity by eliminating such social inequalities has particularly high priority in distributive justice. D…Read more
  •  44
    Disabled – therefore, Unhealthy?
    Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5): 1259-1274. 2016.
    This paper argues that disabled people can be healthy. I argue, first, following the well-known ‘social model of disability’, that we should prefer a usage of ‘disabled’ which does not imply any kind of impairment that is essentially inconsistent with health. This is because one can be disabled only because limited by false social perception of impairment and one can be, if impaired, disabled not because of the impairment but rather only because of the social response to it. Second, I argue that…Read more
  •  10
    Poverty, Agency, and Human Rights, edited by Diana Meyers Tietjens (review)
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3): 614-617. 2016.