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13Bolzano’s Analytic RevisitedThe Monist 64 (2): 214-230. 1981.What I propose is to reconsider the interpretation of Bolzano’s concept of analytic propositions which was offered thirty years ago by Bar-Hillel. The claim of Bar-Hillel was that, in a late addition to his book, The Theory of Science, Bolzano actually had been radically improving his concept of analyticity, thus creating some inconsistencies with the previous, uncorrected version. This allows us to equate the new Bolzanian definition of analytic with what was to be defined, a century later, as …Read more
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51A critical review of G. Lynn Stephens & G. Graham's when self-consciousness breaks (review)Philosophical Psychology 15 (4). 2002.This book deals with the experience of externality, i.e. an experience, common in schizophrenia, present both in verbal hallucination and in thought insertion. The view defended is that thought insertion is a case of failed agency, experienced by the agent at the personal level as an intelligible thought with which she cannot identify. Such a case in which sense of agency and sense of subjectivity come apart reveals the existence of two dimensions in self-consciousness. Several difficulties of t…Read more
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50Rationality and metacognition in non-human animalsIn Susan L. Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. pp. 247--274. 2006.The project of understanding rationality in non-human animals faces a number of conceptual and methodological difficulties. The present chapter defends the view that it is counterproductive to rely on the human folk psychological idiom in animal cognition studies. Instead, it approaches the subject on the basis of dynamic- evolutionary considerations. Concepts from control theory can be used to frame the problem in the most general terms. The specific selective pressures exerted on agents endowe…Read more
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Kai Vogeley, Martin Kurthen, Peter Falkai, and Wolfgang Maier. Essential Functions of the HumanConsciousness and Cognition 8 270. 1999.
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26Intentionality, Consciousness and the System's PerspectiveIn Denis Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and Intentionality: Models and Modalities of Attribution, Springer. pp. 51--72. 1999.
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278Perceiving IntentionsIn Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology, Clarendon Press. 2003.This paper defends the view that knowledge about one's own intentions can be gained in part through perception, although not through introspection. The various kinds of misperception of one's intentions are discussed. The latter distinction is applied to the analysis of schizophrenic patients' delusion of control.
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105Overlooking metacognitive experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 158-159. 2009.Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences
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60Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds?Philosophical Topics 27 (1): 203-232. 1999.Granted that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have (epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only perceptual or physical, but mental, and use the latter to guide their actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues (that is: whether it can 'read minds'…Read more
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122The philosophy of metacognition: Mental agency and self- awarenessOxford University Press. 2013.Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency
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Metacognition and animal rationalityIn Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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24Review of John Searle, Consciousness and Language (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (5). 2003.
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20Examining implicit metacognition in 3.5-year-old children: an eye-tracking and pupillometric studyFrontiers in Psychology 4. 2013.
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4La connaissance philosophique: essais sur l'œuvre de Gilles-Gaston GrangerPresses Universitaires de France - PUF. 1995.
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Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à CarnapTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4): 712-713. 1989.
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14Free Will : A Neurophilosophical ViewpointArchives de Philosophie du Droit 55 79-95. 2012.Le déterminisme implique que le libre arbitre n’existe pas, que nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement ; réciproquement, avoir la possibilité de faire autrement implique que le déterminisme ne s’applique pas à l’instant, s’il existe, où on l’exerce. Cependant, la question de la responsabilité rend difficile d’accepter que les agents ne puissent pas faire autrement et motive fortement à rendre compatibles déterminisme et libre arbitre ou à soutenir, dans une veine « incompatibiliste », que le cervea…Read more
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34Précis de La Nature de la Volonté et DisputatioPhilosophiques 0-00. 2008.Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques
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13De la Nécessité d’un système de concepts. Quelques réflexions sur L'Aufbau der Welt de Rudolf CamapPhilosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 2 930-935. 1988.
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178Mind, space and objectivity in non-human animalsErkenntnis 51 (1): 545-562. 1999.This article is a summary of two chapters of a book published in French in 1997, entitled Comment L'esprit vient aux Bêtes, Paris, Gallimard. The core idea is that the crucial distinction between internal and external states, often used uncritically by theorists of intentionality, needs to be made on a non-circular basis. The proposal is that objectivity - the capacity to reidentify individuals as the same across places and times depends on the capacity to extract spatial crossmodal invariants, …Read more
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202Epistemic agency and metacognition: An externalist viewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brai…Read more
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11Bolzano's theory of representation /La théorie de la représentation chez BolzanoRevue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3): 363-384. 1999.
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Time and conscious experienceIn C.C. Gould (ed.), Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1994.
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59Le langage forme-t-il une condition nécessaire de la rationalité?Dialogue 46 (1): 165-172. 2007.A propos de 'Evolution et Rationalité' de Ronald de Sousa (2004)
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18Ruth Barcan Marcus on Believing Without a LanguageIn Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas, De Gruyter. pp. 111-128. 2015.
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33Source unreliability decreases but does not cancel the impact of social information on metacognitive evaluationsFrontiers in Psychology 6. 2015.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |