•  11
    Metacognition and mindreading in young children: A cross-cultural study
    with Sunae Kim, Beate Sodian, Markus Paulus, Atsushi Senju, Akiko Okuno, Mika Ueno, and Shoji Itakura
    Consciousness and Cognition 85 103017. 2020.
  •  8
  •  1
    Entretien avec Joëlle Proust
    Cahiers Philosophiques 4 7. 2011.
  •  19
    De la difficulté d’être naturaliste en matiére d’intentionalité
    Revue de Synthèse 111 (1-2): 13-32. 1990.
  •  8
    with François de Polignac, Françoise Vielliard, Jean-Claude Margolin, Paul J. Smith, Joël Cornette, Pierre-François Moreau, and Mireille Gueissaz
    Revue de Synthèse 110 (3-4): 499-515. 1989.
  •  10
    XIII-Epistemic Agency and Metacognition: An Externalist View
    Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.
  • Interpréter Diderot aujourd'hui, Colloque de Cerisy
    with E. De Fontenay
    Diderot Studies 23 204-206. 1988.
  •  58
    Dans son compte-rendu de mon livre, Les Animaux Pensent-ils?, Machery objecte que l'évolution n'étant ni hiérarchique ni linéaire, il n'et pas justifié de proposer une analyse hiérarchique des représentations. Je réponds à cette objection, en montrant qu'on peut en effet distinguer des types de représentation par leurs propriétés sémantiques et computationnelles. On peut reconnaître le caractère anagénétique du développement de la cognition sans pour autant légitimer une conception hiérarchique …Read more
  •  53
    Metacognition and mindreading: one or two functions?
    In Michael Beran, Johannes Brandl, Josef Perner & Joëlle Proust (eds.), The foundations of metacognition, Oxford University Press. pp. 234. 2012.
    Given disagreements about the architecture of the mind, the nature of self-knowledge, and its epistemology, the question of how to understand the function and scope of metacognition – the control of one's cognition - is still a matter of hot debate. A dominant view, the self-ascriptive view (or one-function view), has been that metacognition necessarily requires representing one's own mental states as mental states, and, therefore, necessarily involves an ability to read one's own mind. The sel…Read more
  •  53
    Growing suspicions were raised however that an exclusively language-oriented view of the mind, focussing on the characterization of anhistorical, static mental states through their propositional contents, was hardly compatible with what is currently known of brain architecture and did not fare well when confronted with results from many behavioral studies of mental functions. My aim in what follows is to show that these forms of dissatisfaction stem from the fact that brain evolution and develop…Read more
  •  53
    Bolzano’s Analytic Revisited
    The Monist 64 (2): 214-230. 1981.
    What I propose is to reconsider the interpretation of Bolzano’s concept of analytic propositions which was offered thirty years ago by Bar-Hillel. The claim of Bar-Hillel was that, in a late addition to his book, The Theory of Science, Bolzano actually had been radically improving his concept of analyticity, thus creating some inconsistencies with the previous, uncorrected version. This allows us to equate the new Bolzanian definition of analytic with what was to be defined, a century later, as …Read more
  •  18
    Response to Phil Gerrans
    Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4): 513-514. 2003.
    Phil Gerrans comments on Proust's paper entitled 'Thinking of oneself as the same' raise two points; one has to do with the value of sceptical arguments about self-knowledge, the other with what a self can know of him/herself. These two comments are discussed. It is shown first that metacognition operates on content as well as on vehicles, which leaves every replica with her own numerical identity. Second, the homuncular fallacy is discussed as part of a response to the second point
  •  75
    Simulation and Knowledge of Action (edited book)
    John Benjamins. 2002.
    CHAPTER Simulation theory and mental concepts Alvin I. Goldman Rutgers University. Folk psychology and the TT-ST debate The study of folk psychology, ...
  • Perception et intermodalité. Approches actuelles de la question de Molyneux
    Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 187 (3): 358-359. 1997.
  •  51
    Epistemic action, extended knowledge, and metacognition
    Philosophical Issues 24 (1): 364-392. 2014.
    How should one attribute epistemic credit to an agent, and hence, knowledge, when cognitive processes include an extensive use of human or mechanical enhancers, informational tools, and devices which allow one to complement or modify one's own cognitive system? The concept of integration of a cognitive system has been used to address this question. For true belief to be creditable to a person's ability, it is claimed, the relevant informational processes must be or become part of the cognitive c…Read more
  •  4
    On Indicative conditionals and Rationality in the Wason Task
    PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (1). 2009.
    In his interesting paper, Duca argues that even though people don't apply a logical rule of inference – contraposition- when they try to solve the Wason task, they may be using another kind of formal strategy in terms of probabilistic relations between the antecedent and the consequent. It is suggested that there are two ways of intepreting this task – one logical and apriori, the other hypothetical and data driven. Taking a probabilistic interpretation of the conditional rule for subjects' card…Read more
  •  37
    Conversational metacognition
    In Ipke Wachsmuth, Manuela Lenzen & Günther Knoblich (eds.), Embodied Communication in Humans and Machines, Oxford University Press. pp. 329. 2008.
    This chapter aims to relate two fields of research that have been rarely – if ever – associated, namely embodied communication and metacognition. Exploring this relationship offers a new perspective for understanding the relationship between self-knowledge and mindreading. "Embodied communication" refers to the process of conveying information to one or several interlocutors through speech and associated bodily gestures, or through gestures only. It is prima facie plausible that embodied commun…Read more
  •  164
    Philosophy Compass 5 (11): 989-998. 2010.
  •  76
    Thinking of oneself as the same
    Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4): 495-509. 2003.
    What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own internal states). This view is compatible with the …Read more
  •  26
    Experience of agency in patients with schizophrenia involves an interesting dissociation; these patients demonstrate that one can have a thought or perform an action consciously without being conscious of thinking or acting as the motivated agent, author of that thought or of that action. This chapter examines several interesting accounts of this dissociation, and aims at showing how they can be generalized to thought insertion phenomena. It is argued that control theory allows such a generaliza…Read more
  •  63
    Les conditions de la connaissance de soi
    Philosophiques 27 (1): 161-186. 2000.
    La connaissance de soi suppose que l'on puisse former des pensées vraies de la forme 'je Y que P', où 'Y' fait référence à une attitude propositionnelle, 'P' à son contenu, et 'je' au penseur de cette pensée. La question qui se pose est de savoir, ce qui, dans le contenu mental occurrent [P], justifie l'auto-attribution de cette pensée. Ce problème dit de la transition soulève trois difficultés ; celle de la préservation du contenu intentionnel entre la pensée de premier et de second ordre ; cel…Read more
  •  20
    Réponses à mes critiques
    Philosophiques 35 (1): 139-159. 2008.