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105Overlooking metacognitive experienceBehavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2): 158-159. 2009.Peter Carruthers correctly claims that metacognition in humans may involve self-directed interpretations (i.e., may use the conceptual interpretative resources of mindreading). He fails to show, however, that metacognition cannot rely exclusively on subjective experience. Focusing on self-directed mindreading can only bypass evolutionary considerations and obscure important functional differences
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60Can Nonhuman Primates Read Minds?Philosophical Topics 27 (1): 203-232. 1999.Granted that a given species is able to entertain beliefs and desires, i.e. to have (epistemic and motivational) internal states with semantically evaluable contents, one can raise the question of whether the species under investigation is, in addition, able to represent properties and events that are not only perceptual or physical, but mental, and use the latter to guide their actions, not only as reliable cues for achieving some output, but as mental cues (that is: whether it can 'read minds'…Read more
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122The philosophy of metacognition: Mental agency and self- awarenessOxford University Press. 2013.Does metacognition--the capacity to self-evaluate one's cognitive performance--derive from a mindreading capacity, or does it rely on informational processes? Joëlle Proust draws on psychology and neuroscience to defend the second claim. She argues that metacognition need not involve metarepresentations, and is essentially related to mental agency
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Metacognition and animal rationalityIn Susan Hurley & Matthew Nudds (eds.), Rational Animals?, Oxford University Press. 2006.
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24Review of John Searle, Consciousness and Language (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003 (5). 2003.
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20Examining implicit metacognition in 3.5-year-old children: an eye-tracking and pupillometric studyFrontiers in Psychology 4. 2013.
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4La connaissance philosophique: essais sur l'œuvre de Gilles-Gaston GrangerPresses Universitaires de France - PUF. 1995.
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Questions de forme. Logique et proposition analytique de Kant à CarnapTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 51 (4): 712-713. 1989.
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14Free Will : A Neurophilosophical ViewpointArchives de Philosophie du Droit 55 79-95. 2012.Le déterminisme implique que le libre arbitre n’existe pas, que nous ne pouvons pas faire autrement ; réciproquement, avoir la possibilité de faire autrement implique que le déterminisme ne s’applique pas à l’instant, s’il existe, où on l’exerce. Cependant, la question de la responsabilité rend difficile d’accepter que les agents ne puissent pas faire autrement et motive fortement à rendre compatibles déterminisme et libre arbitre ou à soutenir, dans une veine « incompatibiliste », que le cervea…Read more
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34Précis de La Nature de la Volonté et DisputatioPhilosophiques 0-00. 2008.Cet article résume l'ouvrage paru en 2005 et répond aux objections de Stéphane Chauvier, Daniel Laurier et Pierre Livet dans le cadre d'une disputatio organisée par la revue Philosophiques
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13De la Nécessité d’un système de concepts. Quelques réflexions sur L'Aufbau der Welt de Rudolf CamapPhilosophie Et Culture: Actes du XVIIe Congrès Mondial de Philosophie 2 930-935. 1988.
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202Epistemic agency and metacognition: An externalist viewProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3): 241-268. 2008.Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brai…Read more
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11Bolzano's theory of representation /La théorie de la représentation chez BolzanoRevue d'Histoire des Sciences 52 (3): 363-384. 1999.
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178Mind, space and objectivity in non-human animalsErkenntnis 51 (1): 545-562. 1999.This article is a summary of two chapters of a book published in French in 1997, entitled Comment L'esprit vient aux Bêtes, Paris, Gallimard. The core idea is that the crucial distinction between internal and external states, often used uncritically by theorists of intentionality, needs to be made on a non-circular basis. The proposal is that objectivity - the capacity to reidentify individuals as the same across places and times depends on the capacity to extract spatial crossmodal invariants, …Read more
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Time and conscious experienceIn C.C. Gould (ed.), Artifacts, Representations, and Social Practice, Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1994.
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59Le langage forme-t-il une condition nécessaire de la rationalité?Dialogue 46 (1): 165-172. 2007.A propos de 'Evolution et Rationalité' de Ronald de Sousa (2004)
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18Ruth Barcan Marcus on Believing Without a LanguageIn Michael Frauchiger (ed.), Modalities, Identity, Belief, and Moral Dilemmas, De Gruyter. pp. 111-128. 2015.
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33Source unreliability decreases but does not cancel the impact of social information on metacognitive evaluationsFrontiers in Psychology 6. 2015.
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64Indexes for actionRevue Internationale de Philosophie 1999 (3): 321-345. 1999.This articles examines three ways in which the connection between semantic and pragmatic representations of a single action can be tightened up in order to remedy the puzzle of deviant causation. A first move consists in making the feedback process, i.e. the dynamics of the relationship between both representational components, a central element in the definition of an action. A second step brings in the action-effect principle, emphasizing the teleological relation of each pragmatic representat…Read more
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45Précis of The Philosophy of MetacognitionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (3): 703-709. 2014.
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2Mental acts as natural kindsIn Till Vierkant, Julian Kieverstein & Andy Clark (eds.), Decomposing the Will, Oxford University Press. pp. 262-282. 2013.This chapter examines whether, and in what sense, one can speak of agentive mental events. An adequate characterization of mental acts should respond to three main worries. First, mental acts cannot have pre-specified goal contents. For example, one cannot prespecify the content of a judgment or of a deliberation. Second, mental acts seem to depend crucially on receptive attitudes. Third, it does not seem that intentions play any role in mental actions. Given these three constraints, mental and …Read more
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41Epistemic normativity from the reasoner's viewpointBehavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5): 265-265. 2011.Elqayam & Evans (E&E) are focused on the normative judgments used by theorists to characterize subjects' performances (e.g. in terms of logic or probability theory). They ignore the fact, however, that subjects themselves have an independent ability to evaluate their own reasoning performance, and that this ability plays a major role in controlling their first-order reasoning tasks
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81Criticial Review of: When self-consciousness breaks, by G. Lynn Stephens & G. GrahamPhilosophical Psychology 15 (4): 543-550. 2002.The book under review offers two important contributions. One is a valuable discussion of the various ways of addressing the paradoxical experience of externality. The other is an emphasis on a distinction between the experience of subjectivity and the experience of agency. This review tries to show that this distinction is indeed a crucial feature in any solution to the question of externality, but that it is associated with a view of thinking as acting that is questionable
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11The representational basis of brute metacognition: a proposalIn Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press. pp. 165--183. 2009.
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393A plea for mental actsSynthese 129 (1): 105-128. 2001.A prominent but poorly understood domain of human agency is mental action, i.e., thecapacity for reaching specific desirable mental statesthrough an appropriate monitoring of one's own mentalprocesses. The present paper aims to define mentalacts, and to defend their explanatory role againsttwo objections. One is Gilbert Ryle's contention thatpostulating mental acts leads to an infinite regress.The other is a different although related difficulty,here called the access puzzle: How can the mindalr…Read more
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374Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? (review)Synthese 159 (2). 2007.Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity an…Read more
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Action |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Biology |