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8Intencionalnost i iskustvoFilozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2): 319-337. 2006.Od objavljivanja Chalmersova utjecajnog rada The Conscious Mind , bilo je uobičajeno dijeliti filozofijske probleme svijesti na dvije grupe. Dok se tzv. »teški problem svijesti« tiče prirode fenomenalne svijesti i perspektive prve-osobe, »laki problem svijesti« uglavnom se bavi pojmom intencionalnosti. No je li stvarno moguće potpuno istraživati intencionalnost bez uzimanja u obzir iskustvene dimenzije? I vice versa, je li moguće razumjeti prirodu subjektivnosti i iskustva ako ignoriramo intenci…Read more
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501Phenomenology and the project of naturalizationPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (4): 331-47. 2004.In recent years, more and more people have started talking about the necessity of reconciling phenomenology with the project of naturalization. Is it possible to bridge the gap between phenomenological analyses and naturalistic models of consciousness? Is it possible to naturalize phenomenology? Given the transcendental philosophically motivated anti-naturalism found in many phenomenologists such a naturalization proposal might seem doomed from the very start, but in this paper I will examine an…Read more
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82Steven Galt Crowell: 'Husserl, Heidegger, and the space of meaning: Paths toward transcendental phenomenology' (review)Continental Philosophy Review 36 (3): 325-334. 2003.
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673Intentionality and ExperienceSynthesis Philosophica 20 (2): 299-318. 2005.Since the publication of Chalmer’s influential work, The Conscious Mind, it has been customary to divide the philosophical problems of consciousness into two groups. Whereas the so-called ‘hard problem’ of consciousness concerns the nature of phenomenal awareness and the first-person perspective, the ‘easy problems of consciousness’ mainly concern the notion of intentionality. But is it really possible to investigate intentionality thoroughly without taking the experiential dimension into accoun…Read more
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27A Question of Method: Reflective vs. Hermeneutical PhenomenologyThe Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 12 111-118. 2007.In his Allgemeine Psychologie of 1912, Natorp formulates a by now classical criticism of phenomenology. 1. Phenomenology claims to describe and analyze lived subjectivity itself. In order to do so it employs a reflective methodology. But reflection is a kind of internal perception; it is a theoretical attitude; it involves an objectification. And as Natorp then asks, how is this objectifying procedure ever going to provide us with access to lived subjectivity itself? 2. Phenomenology aims at des…Read more
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305Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person PerspectiveBradford Book/MIT Press. 2005.The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
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247Horizontal intentionality and transcendental intersubjectivityTijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2): 304-321. 1997.Through an investigation of Husserl's concept of horizontal intentionality, the article basically argues that the horizon is intrinsically intersubjective, and that it entails an implicit reference to the intentions of possible Others. Against this background it is argued that our perceptual experience of an embodied Other, our factual encounter with the Other, is not the most basic and fundamental type of intersubjectivity. On the contrary, it presupposes a type of intersubjectivity which belon…Read more
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2Merleau-ponty's reading of HusserlIn Ted Toadvine & Lester E. Embree (eds.), , Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 3-30. 2002.
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263Philosophical Issues: PhenomenologyIn Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-87. 2007.Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousne…Read more
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112Empathy≠sharing: Perspectives from phenomenology and developmental psychologyConsciousness and Cognition 36 543-553. 2015.
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6The Self-pluralisation of the primal life. A problem in Fink's Husserl-interpretationRecherches Husserliennes 2 3-18. 1994.
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162Life, thinking and phenomenology in the early BergsonIn Michael R. Kelly (ed.), Bergson and phenomenology, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 118--133. 2010.How should we appraise Bergson’s relation to phenomenology? There are different ways to tackle this question. In the following my focus will be quite narrow. I will restrict myself to a close reading of Bergson’s doctoral dissertation Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. The question I wish to ask is basically whether the analysis of consciousness that Bergson provides in the second chapter of the dissertation is phenomenologically convincing.
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278Phenomenal consciousness and self-awareness: A phenomenological critique of representational theoryJournal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6): 687-705. 1998.Given the recent interest in the subjective or phenomenal dimension of consciousness it is no wonder that many authors have once more started to speak of the need for pheno- menological considerations. Often however the term ‘phenomenology’ is being used simply as a synonym for ‘folk psychology', and in our article we argue that it would be far more fruitful to turn to the argumentation to be found within the continental tradition inaugurated by Husserl. In order to exemplify this claim, we crit…Read more
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232Self-awareness and alterity: a phenomenological investigationNorthwestern University Press. 1999.... Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or ...
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156The fracture in self-awarenessIn Self-Awareness, Temporality, and Alterity, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 21--40. 1998.
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540Inner time-consciousness and pre-reflective self-awarenessIn Donn Welton (ed.), The New Husserl: A Critical Reader, Indiana University Press. pp. 157-180. 2003.If one looks at the current discussion of self-awareness there seems to be a general agreement that whatever valuable philosophical contributions Husserl might have made, his account of self-awareness is not among them. This prevalent appraisal is often based on the claim that Husserl was too occupied with the problem of intentionality to ever really pay attention to the issue of self-awareness. Due to his interest in intentionality Husserl took object-consciousness as the paradigm of every kind…Read more
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45First-personal self-reference and the self-as-subject☆Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3): 600-603. 2007.
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216Perception of duration presupposes duration of perception - or does it? Husserl and Dainton on timeInternational Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (3): 453-471. 2007.In his recent book The Stream of Consciousness, Dainton provides what must surely count as one of the most comprehensive discussions of time-consciousness in analytical philosophy. In the course of doing so, he also challenges Husserl's classical account in a number of ways. In the following contribution, I will compare Dainton's and Husserl's respective accounts. Such a comparison will not only make it evident why an analysis of time-consciousness is so important, but will also provide a neat o…Read more
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188Time and consciousness in the bernau manuscriptsHusserl Studies 20 (2): 99-118. 2004.Even a cursory glance in Die Bernauer Manuskripte über das Zeitbewusstsein makes it evident that one of Husserl’s major concerns in his 1917-18 reflections on time-consciousness was how to account for the constitution of time without giving rise to an infinite regress. Not only does Husserl constantly refer to this problem in Husserliana XXXIII – as he characteristically writes at one point “Überall drohen, scheint es, unendliche Regresse” – but he also takes care to distinguish between several …Read more
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517Internalism, externalism, and transcendental idealismSynthese 160 (3): 355-374. 2008.The analyses of the mind–world relation offered by transcendental idealists such as Husserl have often been dismissed with the argument that they remain committed to an outdated form of internalism. The first move in this paper will be to argue that there is a tight link between Husserl’s transcendental idealism and what has been called phenomenological externalism, and that Husserl’s endorsement of the former commits him to a version of the latter. Secondly, it will be shown that key elements i…Read more
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36Openness versus interdependence: A reply to KyseloPhilosophical Psychology 29 (7): 1066-1067. 2016.
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777Beyond empathy: Phenomenological approaches to intersubjectivityJournal of Consciousness Studies 8 (5-7): 151-167. 2001.Drawing on the work of Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Husserl and Sartre, this article presents an overview of some of the diverse approaches to intersubjectivity that can be found in the phenomenological tradition. Starting with a brief description of Scheler's criticism of the argument from analogy, the article continues by showing that the phenomenological analyses of intersubjectivity involve much more than a 'solution' to the 'traditional' problem of other minds. Intersubjectivity doesn…Read more
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195Subjectivity and the First-Person PerspectiveSouthern Journal of Philosophy 45 (S1): 66-84. 2007.Phenomenology and analytical philosophy share a number of common concerns, and it seems obvious that analytical philosophy can learn from phenomenology, just as phenomenology can profit from an exchange with analytical philosophy. But although I think it would be a pity to miss the opportunity for dialogue that is currently at hand, I will in the following voice some caveats. More specifically, I wish to discuss two issues that complicate what might otherwise seem like rather straightforward int…Read more
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257Naturalized phenomenologyIn S. Gallagher & D. Schmicking (eds.), Handbook of Phenomenology and Cognitive Science, Springer. 2009.It is always risky to make sweeping statements about the development of philosophy, but if one were nevertheless asked to describe 20th century philosophy in broad strokes, one noteworthy feature might be the following: Whereas important figures at the beginning of the century, figures such as Frege and Husserl, were very explicit in their rejection of naturalism (both are known for their rejection of the attempt to naturalize the laws of logic, i.e., for their criticism of psychologism), the si…Read more
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119Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and ShameOxford University Press. 2014.Dan Zahavi engages with classical phenomenology, philosophy of mind, and a range of empirical disciplines to explore the nature of selfhood. He argues that the most fundamental level of selfhood is not socially constructed or dependent upon others, but accepts that certain dimensions of the self and types of self-experience are other-mediated
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94Husserl and transcendental intersubjectivity: a response to the linguistic-pragmatic critiqueOhio University Press. 2001.__Husserl and Transcendental Intersubjectivity __analyzes the transcendental relevance of intersubjectivity and argues that an intersubjective transformation of transcendental philosophy can already be found in phenomenology, especially in Husserl. Husserl eventually came to believe that an analysis of transcendental intersubjectivity was a _conditio sine qua non_ for a phenomenological philosophy. Drawing on both published and unpublished manuscripts, Dan Zahavi examines Husserl's reasons for t…Read more
Copenhagen, Hovedstaden, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
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Philosophy of Consciousness |
Intentionality |
Persons |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Phenomenology |
Existentialism |
Hermeneutics |