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33Intentionality and Phenomenality: Phenomenological Take on the Hard ProblemCanadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1): 63-92. 2003.In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by mean…Read more
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9One Hundred Years of Phenomenology: Husserl’s Logical Investigations Revisited (edited book)Springer Verlag. 2002.This volume commemorates the centenary of Logical Investigations by subjecting the work to a comprehensive critical analysis. It contains new contributions by leading scholars addressing some of the most central analyses to be found in the book.
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293Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debateInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (1): 42-66. 2004.In a number of papers, Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre have claimed that Husserl is an internalist. In this paper, it is argued that their interpretation is based on two questionable assumptions: (1) that Husserl's noema should be interpreted along Fregean lines, and (2) that Husserl's transcendental methodology commits him to some form of methodological solipsism. Both of these assumptions are criticized on the basis of the most recent Husserl-research. It is shown that Husserl's concept of …Read more
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9Minimal self and narrative self. A distinction in need of refinementIn Thomas Fuchs, Heribert Sattel & Peter Heningnsen (eds.), The Embodied Self: Dimensions, Coherence, and Disorders, Heningnsen. pp. 3--11. 2010.
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43Analytic and Continental Philosophy: From Duality Through Plurality to UnityIn Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 79-94. 2016.
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3Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person PerspectiveHuman Studies 30 (3): 269-273. 2005.
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74Faces and ascriptions: Mapping measures of the selfConsciousness and Cognition 20 (1): 141-148. 2011.The ‘self’ is increasingly used as a variable in cognitive experiments and correlated with activity in particular areas in the brain. At first glance, this seems to transform the self from an ephemeral theoretical entity to something concrete and measurable. However, the transformation is by no means unproblematic. We trace the development of two important experimental paradigms in the study of the self, self-face recognition and the adjective self ascription task. We show how the experimental i…Read more
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1037Two takes on a one-level account of consciousnessPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12. 2006.My presentation will discuss two one-level accounts of consciousness, a Brentanian and a Husserlian. I will address some of the relevant differences
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108Manfred Frank and Niels Weidtmann (Eds.): Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes (review)Husserl Studies 28 (1): 81-84. 2012.Manfred Frank and Niels Weidtmann (Eds.): Husserl und die Philosophie des Geistes Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-4 DOI 10.1007/s10743-011-9101-2 Authors Dan Zahavi, Center for Subjectivity Research, Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark Journal Husserl Studies Online ISSN 1572-8501 Print ISSN 0167-9848
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236The uncanny mirror: A re-framing of mirror self-experienceConsciousness and Cognition 20 (2): 204-213. 2011.Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one’s specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with…Read more
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311Self and consciousnessIn Exploring the Self: Philosophical and Psychopathological Perspectives on Self-experience, John Benjamins. pp. 55-74. 2000.In his recent book ‘Kant and the Mind’ Andrew Brook makes a distinction between two types of selfawareness. The first type, which he calls empirical self-awareness, is an awareness of particular psychological states such as perceptions, memories, desires, bodily sensations etc. One attains this type of self-awareness simply by having particular experiences and being aware of them. To be in possession of empirical self-awareness is, in short, simply to be conscious of one’s occurrent experience. …Read more
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Intentionalität und BewusstseinIn Verena E. Mayer & Christopher Erhard (eds.), Edmund Husserl: logische Untersuchungen, Akademie Verlag Berlin. 2008.
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28The Phenomenological Mind is the first book to properly introduce fundamental questions about the mind from the perspective of phenomenology. Key questions and topics covered include: What is phenomenology? naturalizing phenomenology and the empirical cognitive sciences phenomenology and consciousness consciousness and self-consciousness, including perception and action time and consciousness, including William James intentionality the embodied mind action knowledge of other minds situated and e…Read more
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40Phenomenology of reflection: Section III, chapter 2, Universal structures of pure consciousnessIn Andrea Sebastiano Staiti (ed.), Commentary on Husserl's "Ideas I", De Gruyter. pp. 177-194. 2015.
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57Expression and empathyIn Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed, Kluwer/springer Press. pp. 25--40. 2007.
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21Intentionnalité et phénoménalité : un regard phénoménologique sur le « problème difficile »Philosophie 1 (1): 80-104. 2014.Dans son ouvrage L’Esprit conscient, David Chalmers a introduit une distinction, qui nous est aujourd’hui devenue familière, entre le problème difficile de la conscience [hard problem] et les problèmes faciles de la conscience [easy problems]. Les problèmes faciles sont ceux qui concernent la question de savoir comment l’esprit réussit à traiter de l’information, à réagir aux stimuli provenant de l’environnement...
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375What is the relation between phenomenology and metaphysics? Is phenomeno- logy metaphysical neutral, is it without metaphysical bearings, is it a kind of propaedeutics to metaphysics, or is phenomenology on the contrary a form of metaphysics, perhaps even the culmination of a particular kind of metaphysics (of presence)? What should be made clear from the outset is that there is no easy and straightforward answer to the question concerning the relation between phenome- nology and metaphysics. Th…Read more
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215Being someonePSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11. 2005.My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.
Copenhagen, Hovedstaden, Denmark
Areas of Specialization
2 more
Philosophy of Consciousness |
Intentionality |
Persons |
Philosophy of Cognitive Science |
Phenomenology |
Existentialism |
Hermeneutics |