University College London
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 2006
CV
London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Interest
Value Theory
Economics
  •  184
    Egalitarianism under Severe Uncertainty
    Philosophy and Public Affairs 46 (3): 239-268. 2018.
    Decision-makers face severe uncertainty when they are not in a position to assign precise probabilities to all of the relevant possible outcomes of their actions. Such situations are common—novel medical treatments and policies addressing climate change are two examples. Many decision-makers respond to such uncertainty in a cautious manner and are willing to incur a cost to avoid it. There are good reasons for taking such an uncertainty-averse attitude to be permissible. However, little work has…Read more
  •  9
    Shlomi Segall’s Why Inequality Matters contains many novel ideas. It should engage researchers with an interest in debates between luck egalitarians and two of their principal opponents, prioritarians and sufficientarians. While, as I shall argue below, not all of its arguments succeed, it also makes contributions which deserve to profoundly influence debates on distributive justice. I proceed as follows. In Section 1, I summarize the book’s central points; in Section 2, I evaluate some of its a…Read more
  •  346
    Universal Health Coverage, Priority Setting and the Human Right to Health.
    with Benedict Rumbold, Octavio Ferraz, Sarah Hawkes, Rachel Baker, Carleigh Crubiner, Peter Littlejohns, Ole Frithjof Norheim, Thomas Pegram, Annette Rid, Sridhar Venkatapuram, Albert Weale, James Wilson, Alicia Ely Yamin, and Daniel Wang
    The Lancet 390 (10095): 712-14. 2017.
    As health policy-makers around the world seek to make progress towards universal health coverage, they must navigate between two important ethical imperatives: to set national spending priorities fairly and efficiently; and to safeguard the right to health. These imperatives can conflict, leading some to conclude that rights-based approaches present a disruptive influence on health policy, hindering states’ efforts to set priorities fairly and efficiently. Here, we challenge this perception. We …Read more
  •  62
    The price of security: a roundtable
    with Catherine Audard, Tony McWalter, Saladin Meckled-García, and Jonathan Rée
    The Philosophers' Magazine 34 53-59. 2006.
  •  1552
    Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage
    with Ole Frithjof Norheim, Trygve Ottersen, Bona Chitah, Richard Cookson, Norman Daniels, Nir Eyal, Walter Flores, Axel Gosseries, Daniel Hausman, Samia Hurst, Lydia Kapiriri, Toby Ord, Shlomi Segall, Frehiwot Defaye, and Alicia Yamin
    World Health Organisation. 2014.
    This report by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and Universal Health Coverage addresses how countries can make fair progress towards the goal of universal coverage. It explains the relevant tradeoffs between different desirable ends and offers guidance on how to make these tradeoffs.
  •  578
    Why Health-Related Inequalities Matter and Which Ones Do
    In Ole F. Norheim, Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Joseph Millum (eds.), Global Health Priority-Setting: Beyond Cost-Effectiveness, Oxford University Press. pp. 145-62. 2019.
    I outline and defend two egalitarian theories, which yield distinctive and, I argue, complementary answers to why health-related inequalities matter: a brute luck egalitarian view, according to which inequalities due to unchosen, differential luck are bad because unfair, and a social egalitarian view, according to which inequalities are bad when and because they undermine people’s status as equal citizens. These views identify different objects of egalitarian concern: the brute luck egalitarian …Read more
  •  56
    Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage: Applying Principles to Difficult Cases
    with Tessa T.-T. Edejer, Lydia Kapiriri, Ole Frithjof Norheim, James Snowden, Olivier Basenya, Dorjsuren Bayarsaikhan, Ikram Chentaf, Nir Eyal, Amanda Folsom, Rozita Halina Tun Hussein, Cristian Morales, Florian Ostmann, Trygve Ottersen, Phusit Prakongsai, and Carla Saenz
    Health Systems and Reform 3 (4): 1-12. 2017.
    Progress towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) requires making difficult trade-offs. In this journal, Dr. Margaret Chan, the WHO Director-General, has endorsed the principles for making such decisions put forward by the WHO Consultative Group on Equity and UHC. These principles include maximizing population health, priority for the worse off, and shielding people from health-related financial risks. But how should one apply these principles in particular cases and how should one adjudicate bet…Read more
  •  241
    Reply to Crisp
    Utilitas 23 (1): 109-114. 2011.
    In 'Why It Matters that Some Are Worse off than Others,' we offer a new critique of the Priority View. In a recent article, Roger Crisp has argued that our critique is flawed. In this reply, we show that Crisp fails to grapple with, much less defeat, the central claim of our critique. We also show that an example that Crisp offers in support of the Priority View in fact lends support to our critique of that view.
  •  1169
    Who Am I? Beyond 'I Think, Therefore I Am'
    with Frances Kamm, Elie During, Timothy Wilson, and David Jopling
    Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences 1234 (1): 134-148. 2011.
    Can we ever truly answer the question, “Who am I?” Moderated by Alex Voorhoeve (London School of Economics), neuro-philosopher Elie During (University of Paris, Ouest Nanterre), cognitive scientist David Jopling (York University, Canada), social psychologist Timothy Wilson (University of Virginia),and ethicist Frances Kamm (Harvard University) examine the difficulty of achieving genuine self-knowledge and how the pursuit of self-knowledge plays a role in shaping the self.
  •  796
    Vaulting Intuition: Temkin's Critique of Transitivity
    Economics and Philosophy 29 (3): 409-425. 2013.
    In 'Rethinking the Good', Larry Temkin makes two core claims. First, the goodness of a distribution is sometimes ‘essentially comparative’ – it sometimes depends on which alternative distribution(s) it is compared to. Second, such cases threaten the transitivity of ‘all things considered better than’. I argue that the goodness of a distribution may indeed depend on what other distributions are feasible. But contrary to Temkin, I also argue that transitivity holds even when the goodness of a dis…Read more
  •  332
    Response to Our Critics
    with Trygve Ottersen and Ole Frithjof Norheim
    Health Economics, Policy and Law 11 (1): 103-111. 2016.
    We reply to critics of the World Health Organisation's Report "Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health Coverage". We clarify and defend the report's key moral commitments. We also explain its role in guiding policy in the face of both financial and political constraints on making fair choices.
  •  540
    Introduction to the Symposium on Equality versus Priority
    Economics and Philosophy 31 (2): 201-202. 2015.
    This paper introduces a symposium on Equality versus Priority. It explains how cases involving risk are key to distinguishing these views and discusses a 'social egalitarian' critique of both 'telic egalitarians' and 'telic prioritarians'.
  •  64
    John Rawls
    In Julian Baggini & Jeremy Stangroom (eds.), The Great Thinkers A-Z, Continuum. pp. 199-201. 2004.
    The political and philosophical problems John Rawls set out to solve arise out of the identity and conflicts of interests between citizens. There is identity of interests because social cooperation makes possible for everyone a life that is much better than one outside of society. There is a conflict of interests because people all prefer a larger to a smaller share of the benefits of social cooperation, and people have ideological differences. The problem a theory of justice has to solve is how…Read more
  •  771
    Equality versus Priority
    In Serena Olsaretti (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice, Oxford University Press. pp. 65-85. 2018.
    We discuss two leading theories of distributive justice: egalitarianism and prioritarianism. We argue that while each has particular merits and shortcomings, egalitarian views more fully satisfy a key requirement of distributive justice: respect for both the unity of the individual and the separateness of persons.
  •  182
    Conversations on ethics
    Oxford University Press. 2009.
    Can we trust our intuitive judgments of right and wrong? Are moral judgements objective? What reason do we have to do what is right and avoid doing what is wrong? In Conversations on Ethics, Alex Voorhoeve elicits answers to these questions from eleven outstanding philosophers and social scientists: -/- Ken Binmore; Philippa Foot; Harry Frankfurt; Allan Gibbard; Daniel Kahneman; Frances Kamm; Alasdair MacIntyre; T. M. Scanlon; Peter Singer; David Velleman; Bernard Williams. -/- The exchanges ar…Read more
  •  52
    Inequalities in HIV Care: Chances Versus Outcomes
    with Nir Eyal
    American Journal of Bioethics 11 (12): 42-44. 2011.
    We analyse three moral dilemmas involving resource allocation in care for HIV-positive patients. Ole Norheim and Kjell Arne Johansson have argued that these cases reveal a tension between egalitarian concerns and concerns for better population health. We argue, by contrast, that these cases reveal a tension between, on the one hand, a concern for equal *chances*, and, on the other hand, both a concern for better health and an egalitarian concern for equal *outcomes*. We conclude that, in these c…Read more
  •  78
    The good, the right, and the seemly. Ken Binmore interviewed
    The Philosophers' Magazine 21 48-51. 2002.
    An interview with the economist and moral philosopher Ken Binmore about his theory about the origins of our conception of fairness. (Note: A substantially revised and expanded version appears in Conversations on Ethics, OUP 2009).
  •  374
    Review of Hugh LaFolette: The Practice of Ethics (review)
    Social Choice and Welfare 34 497-501. 2010.
    A review of Hugh LaFolette's Practical Ethics
  •  356
    Book review of Lesley A. Jacobs' Pursuing Equal Opportunities: The Theory and Practice of Egalitarian Justice.
  •  1472
    Decide As You Would With Full Information! An Argument Against Ex Ante Pareto
    In Ole Norheim, Samia Hurst, Nir Eyal & Dan Wikler (eds.), Inequalities in Health: Concepts, Measures, and Ethics, Oxford University Press. 2013.
    Policy-makers must sometimes choose between an alternative which has somewhat lower expected value for each person, but which will substantially improve the outcomes of the worst off, or an alternative which has somewhat higher expected value for each person, but which will leave those who end up worst off substantially less well off. The popular ex ante Pareto principle requires the choice of the alternative with higher expected utility for each. We argue that ex ante Pareto ought to be rejecte…Read more
  •  109
    Philippe van Parijs (2003) has argued that an egalitarian ethos cannot be part of a post- Political Liberalism Rawlsian view of justice, because the demands of political justice are confined to principles for institutions of the basic structure alone. This paper argues, by contrast, that certain principles for individual conduct—including a principle requiring relatively advantaged individuals to sometimes make their economic choices with the aim of maximising the prospects of the least advantag…Read more
  •  402
    Why inequality matters: luck egalitarianism, its meaning and value. (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 3. 2017.
    I review Shlomi Segall's book 'Why Inequality Matters'. I argue that it conclusively establishes that alongside egalitarians, prioritarians and sufficientarians must sometimes regard a prospect as better (in at least one respect) when it is not better (in terms of well-being) for anyone. Sufficientarians and prioritarians must therefore relinquish a treasured anti-egalitarian argument. It also makes a powerful case that among these three views, egalitarians are in the best position to explain su…Read more
  •  567
    We argue that there is a marked shift in the moral weight of an increment in a person's well-being when one moves from a case involving only intra-personal trade-offs to a case involving only inter-personal trads-offs. This shift, we propose, is required by the separateness of persons. We also argue that the Priority View put forward by Parfit cannot account for such a shift. We also outline two alternative views, an egalitarian view and a claims-based view, that can account for this shift.
  •  658
    Why Sore Throats Don't Aggregate against a Life, but Arms Do
    Journal of Medical Ethics 41 (6): 492-493. 2015.
    When do claims to be saved of a small or moderate harm aggregate against a competing claim to be saved from an early death? In this short response to Kamm's Bioethical Prescriptions, I argue for the following answer: aggregation of weaker claims against a life is permitted just in case, in a one-to-one contest, a person with a weaker claim would have a personal prerogative to prioritize her claim over a stranger’s competing claim to life.
  •  653
    Why One Should Count Only Claims with which One Can Sympathize
    Public Health Ethics 10 (2): 148-156. 2017.
    When one faces competing claims of varying strength on public resources for health, which claims count? This paper proposes the following answer. One should count, or aggregate, a person’s claim just in case one could sympathize with her desire to prioritize her own claim over the strongest competing claim. It argues that this principle yields appealing case judgments and has a plausible grounding in both sympathetic identification with each person, taken separately, and respect for the person f…Read more
  •  325
    Should losses count? A critique of the complaint model
    Choice Group Working Papers. 2006.
    The Complaint Model is an interpretation of Scanlon’s contractualism which holds that (1) an individual can reasonably reject a distribution of well-being when her complaint against that distribution is larger than any other person’s complaint against any other distribution. The Complaint Model further holds that (2) the size of an individual’s complaint against a distribution is a function of (2a) her absolute level of well-being under that distribution, with the size of her complaint increasin…Read more
  •  671
    Priority or Equality for Possible People?
    Ethics 126 (4): 929-954. 2016.
    Suppose that you must make choices that may influence the well-being and the identities of the people who will exist, though not the number of people who will exist. How ought you to choose? This paper answers this question. It argues that the currency of distributive ethics in such cases is a combination of an individual’s final well-being and her expected well-being conditional on her existence. It also argues that this currency should be distributed in an egalitarian, rather than a prioritari…Read more
  •  89
    Mill and Barry on the Foundations of Liberal Rights
    The Philosophers' Magazine 46 78-82. 2009.
    In On Liberty, Mill famously propounded a view of the good life as the autonomous life. On this view, it is crucial that people develop and exercise, to a high degree, their ability to reason independently about what to believe and what to aim at in life. It is also important that they be able to freely hold and express their beliefs and effectively act on their aims. As Mill put it: The mental and the moral, like the muscular, powers are improved only by being used. ... He who lets the world ..…Read more
  •  852
    Ambiguity Attitudes, Framing and Consistency
    with Ken G. Binmore, Arnaldur Stefansson, and Lisa Stewart
    Theory and Decision 81 (3): 313-337. 2016.
    We use probability-matching variations on Ellsberg’s single-urn experiment to assess three questions: (1) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to changes from a gain to a loss frame? (2) How sensitive are ambiguity attitudes to making ambiguity easier to recognize? (3) What is the relation between subjects’ consistency of choice and the ambiguity attitudes their choices display? Contrary to most other studies, we find that a switch from a gain to a loss frame does not lead to a switch from ambi…Read more
  •  467
    Equal opportunity, equality, and responsibility
    Dissertation, University of London. 2005.
    This thesis argues that a particular version of equal opportunity for welfare is the best way of meeting the joint demands of three liberal egalitarian ideals: distributional equality, responsibility, and respect for individuals’ differing reasonable judgements of their own good. It also examines which social choice rules best represent these demands. Finally, it defends the view that achieving equal opportunity for welfare should not only be a goal of formal public institutions, but that just c…Read more