R Paul

The early twentieth century saw the rise of various movements and communities in response to a perceived crisis in a western modernity that many contemporaries viewed as decadent and in urgent need of social, cultural, and spiritual renewal. In Britain in particular, several groups of traditional artisans expressed their rejection of modernity by leaving the city to form small artistic communities. Such community experiments often had their roots in the nineteeth-century Arts and Crafts movement, a background shared by the founding members of the community at Ditchling in Sussex — Eric Gill, Douglas (Hilary) Pepler, and Edward Johnston — but augmented by an increasing commitment to Roman Catholicism on the part of Gill and Pepler. The Ditchling group’s commitments to traditional handicrafts and the Church made their relationship to modernism tentative and difficult, but some members at least were familiar with artistic developments in the wider world. In particular, Eric Gill would reject modernism at Ditchling, while David Jones would embrace it to assert his artistic and spiritual independence.

David Hume's theoretical philosophy was long dominated by the interpretation of him as a skeptical empiricist as found in the writings of Read, Beattie, Green etc. Although this has changed substantially the last half-century – especially with the advent of the «New Hume Debate» – there is much work that remains to be done, especially in regard to his analysis of causal induction. In this essay I argue that Hume's analysis of, and arguments surrounding, causal induction should not be read as an attempt at doing skeptical metaphysics and/or epistemology, but rather as an early form of cognitive psychology. I argue this thesis in three steps. In the first two sections I analyze Hume's account of his general and more specific project in the Treatise and the first Enquiry and show that Hume takes himself to be doing empirical and experimental psychology. I then turn to Hume's specific argumentation concerning causal induction, where I show that rather than establishing a skeptical position, his arguments prefigure contemporary poverty of stimulus-arguments for innate cognitive mechanisms unexplainable by general-purpose means, and that he can fruitfully be situated along other Scottish thinkers in advancing an early conception of the Duplex Mind.

Often-cited papal pronouncements regarding organ donation emphasize the importance of gift giving and the consent of the donor. However, a critical reading reveals an ill-defined separation of living organ donation and donation after death. Given that a corpse cannot engage in gift giving, nor can it give consent, the family, acting as good stewards, is the proper decision maker for organ donation after death. A historical examination of relics and human anatomical dissection reveals that the Catholic Church has primarily favored the decisional authority of the family over the first-person consent of the dead. Given this history, family-based consent (as opposed to opt-in or opt-out criteria) is the best model to ensure the dignity of the dead.

It is usually assumed in moral philosophy that a teleological approach, as exemplified by Aristotle's ethics of virtue, and a deontological approach, as heralded by Kant's ethics of duty, are incompatible; either the good or the right, to designate these two major traditions by their emblematic predicates. My purpose in this paper is to show that a theory of action, broadly understood, may provide the appropriate framework of thought within which justice can be done to both the Aristotelian and Kantian, the teleological and deontological moments of morality.

In this paper, the Author contends with the problem of an infra‐state differentiation of sources of law. He examines two accounts of a juridical pluralism, that of Walzer (1983) and that of Boltanski and ThCvenot (1991). Both these works reveal a similar inability to account for the political dimension. The Author identifies this inability as the result of the paradox of the political. He goes on to discuss this paradox in terms of a need to reconcile indivisible popular sovereignty with the proliferation of a multitude of sources of legality.

Al elegir el tema de «Hermenéutica y responsabilidad» como núcleo central de los VII Encuentros Internacionales de Filosofía en el Camino de Santiago, la Sociedad Interuniversitaria de Filosofía (SIFA) quiso mostrar el compromiso perenne de la filosofía con la realidad humana. Una realidad sometida a profundas transformaciones que deben ser examinadas para valorar su oportunidad y sus fines. Tal como expresa el subtítulo de este Simposio Internacional, la SIFA acordó rendir un homenaje al filósofo francés Paul Ricoeur, quien fatigado y convaleciente de una reciente enfermedad, realizó un notable esfuerzo para estar con nosotros. Contraviniendo los prudentes consejos de sus médicos, pronunció la conferencia inaugural. En el transcurso de la edición del presente libro llegó la noticia del fallecimiento del maestro, el 20 de mayo de 2005. Santiago de Compostela fue la última ciudad europea a la que Ricoeur se desplazó para participar en una reunión científica internacional.

The author probes Jullien on the problem of time, which is at the heart of European philosophy, while allowing himself to embrace an intelligibility of the ‘infra-philosophical’ leading to a ‘living in philosophy’. The question is both intriguing and rewarding: ‘what the Chinese have thought because they have not thought time’. Yet the author wonders: does Jullien pay more attention to the Greeks than to the Hebrews vis-à-vis China with regard to the concept of time? Jullien’s text on time of course is a piece in a much larger set of texts that bring to the fore questions of life; the author offers, with generosity, much broader thoughts on the possibility of Jullien speaking French while thinking Chinese, and the enigma of living (say in Augustine and Montaigne) within a philosophy of transcendence in the West as opposed to the immanence of philosophy of living in China.