R Paul

Chapter 4 considers the importance of moral character in the impressions and evaluations we form of other people in our daily lives, reporting on recent research showing that moral character is extremely important in person perception and evaluation, much more so than the related notion of social warmth. Moral character is also seen as fundamental to identity. The chapter raises three central questions about the perception of moral character that remain to be answered: (i) Is morality properly conceived of as a third dimension of person and group perception, separate from both competence and warmth? (ii) How is morality and warmth information actually obtained in ordinary social interactions?, and (iii) What is the perceived structure of moral character? It then take some preliminary steps in these directions.

Innate and cultural programming act to a large degree by creating predispositions, rather than fixed outcomes. Predispositions vary in different domains of life. There are both innate and cultural influences on environments, which in turn, influence both biological and cultural evolution. Preadaptation is a common feature of both biological and cultural evolution. The same type of co-opting occurs in development, in the form of accessing older systems for newer functions. These and many other points are illustrated primarily in the domain of food.

" L'ouvrage comporte trois parties nettement délimitées par leur thème et leur méthode. La première, consacrée à la mémoire et aux phénomènes mnémoniques, est placée sous l'égide de la phénoménologie au sens husserlien du terme. La deuxième, dédiée à l'histoire, relève d'une épistémologie des sciences historiques. La troisième, culminant dans une méditation sur l'oubli, s'encadre dans une herméneutique de la condition historique des humains que nous sommes. Mais ces trois parties ne font pas trois livres. Bien que les trois mâts portent des voilures enchevêtrées mais distinctes, ils appartiennent à la même embarcation, destinée à une même et unique navigation. Une problématique commune court en effet à travers la phénoménologie de la mémoire, l'épistémologie de l'histoire, l'herméneutique de la condition historique : celle de la représentation du passé. Je reste troublé par l'inquiétant spectacle que donne le trop de mémoire ici, le trop d'oubli ailleurs, pour ne rien dire de l'influence des commémorations et des abus de mémoire - et d'oubli. L'idée d'une politique de la juste mémoire est à cet égard un de mes thèmes civiques avoués. " Paul Ricœur.

This paper investigates the posthuman ramifications of machine learning (ML) in cancer cell detection, analyzing how artificial intelligence fundamentally alters the production of medical knowledge, reshapes human-machine interactions in healthcare, and contests anthropocentric notions of embodiment, agency, and mortality. This analysis examines recent advancements in multicancer early detection (MCED) technologies and deep learning methodologies, exploring how AI-mediated diagnosis challenges conventional medical epistemologies and creates novel posthuman assemblages that obscure the distinctions between human and non-human agencies in healthcare. Utilizing a posthumanist framework that acknowledges both the opportunities and risks of technological mediation, we examine the ontological, ethical, and political aspects of algorithmic medicine, interrogating how these technologies redefine our comprehension of disease, the posthuman body, and decentralized medical authority in an era of intelligent machines.

ABSTRACT Genealogies are an increasingly important part of contemporary political philosophy. However, even recent genealogies differ a great deal in terms of their ends and methods. Strikingly, this has received virtually no discussion in the literature. This article begins to fill that gap. It does so by comparing and contrasting the genealogies of Bernard Williams, Quentin Skinner, and Raymond Geuss, exploring their different goals, methods, and value for political philosophy. This helps us better understand these different kinds of genealogy in their own right; shows the distinct value of each of these different kinds of genealogy to political philosophy; and enables political philosophers to better be able to select the kind of genealogical investigation most relevant to their interests and to employ the correct kind of genealogy better as a result.

The present study investigated the degree to which transgressors’ affective reactions influence children's moral judgments. Eighteen children at each of three different grade levels (first‐, second‐, and third‐grade) were required to make judgments of the goodness or badness of four different transgressors.The transgressors acted out of good or bad intent, produced low or high levels of damage and displayed the affective reactions of happiness, sadness or neutrality because of the outcomes they produced. Results showed that the transgressors’ affective reactions significantly influenced the children's moral judgments. More importantly, the children excluded intention information when they evaluated transgressors who displayed reactions of happiness. But, they did not exclude intentions when they evaluated transgressors who displayed reactions of sadness or neutrality. A number of hypotheses were offered to account for the means by which reactions of happiness block children's use of intent information.

Will understanding our brains help us to know our minds? Or is there an unbridgeable distance between the work of neuroscience and the workings of human consciousness? In a remarkable exchange between neuroscientist Jean-Pierre Changeux and philosopher Paul Ricoeur, this book explores the vexed territory between these divergent approaches--and comes to a deeper, more complex perspective on human nature.Ranging across diverse traditions, from phrenology to PET scans and from Spinoza to Charles Taylor, What Makes Us Think? revolves around a central issue: the relation between the facts (or "what is") of science and the prescriptions (or "what ought to be") of ethics. Changeux and Ricoeur ask: Will neuroscientific knowledge influence our moral conduct? Is a naturally based ethics possible? Pursuing these questions, they attack key topics at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience: What are the relations between brain states and psychological experience? Between language and truth? Memory and culture? Behavior and action? What is a mental representation? How does a sign relate to what it signifies? How might subjective experience be constructed rather than discovered? And can biological or cultural evolution be considered progressive? Throughout, Changeux and Ricoeur provide unprecedented insight into what neuroscience can--and cannot--tell us about the nature of human experience.Changeux and Ricoeur bring an unusual depth of engagement and breadth of knowledge to each other's subject. In doing so, they make two often hostile disciplines speak to one another in surprising and instructive ways--and speak with all the subtlety and passion of conversation at its very best.

This volume, the first part of Paul Ricoeur's Philosophy of the Will, is an eidetics, carried out within carefully imposed phenomenological brackets. It seeks to deal with the essential structure of man's being in the world, and so it suspends the distorting dimensions of existence, the bondage of passion, and the vision of innocence, to which Ricoeur returns in his later writings. The result is a conception of man as an incarnate Cogito, which can make the polar unity of subject and object intelligible and provide a basic continuity for the various aspects of inquiry into man's being-in-the-world.

Why do major historical events such as the Holocaust occupy the forefront of the collective consciousness, while profound moments such as the Armenian genocide, the McCarthy era, and France's role in North Africa stand distantly behind? Is it possible that history "overly remembers" some events at the expense of others? A landmark work in philosophy, Paul Ricoeur's _Memory, History, Forgetting_ examines this reciprocal relationship between remembering and forgetting, showing how it affects both the perception of historical experience and the production of historical narrative. _Memory, History, Forgetting_, like its title, is divided into three major sections. Ricoeur first takes a phenomenological approach to memory and mnemonical devices. The underlying question here is how a memory of present can be of something absent, the past. The second section addresses recent work by historians by reopening the question of the nature and truth of historical knowledge. Ricoeur explores whether historians, who can write a history of memory, can truly break with all dependence on memory, including memories that resist representation. The third and final section is a profound meditation on the necessity of forgetting as a condition for the possibility of remembering, and whether there can be something like happy forgetting in parallel to happy memory. Throughout the book there are careful and close readings of the texts of Aristotle and Plato, of Descartes and Kant, and of Halbwachs and Pierre Nora. A momentous achievement in the career of one of the most significant philosophers of our age, _Memory, History, Forgetting_ provides the crucial link between Ricoeur's _Time and Narrative_ and _Oneself as Another_ and his recent reflections on ethics and the problems of responsibility and representation. “His success in revealing the internal relations between recalling and forgetting, and how this dynamic becomes problematic in light of events once present but now past, will inspire academic dialogue and response but also holds great appeal to educated general readers in search of both method for and insight from considering the ethical ramifications of modern events.... It is indeed a master work, not only in Ricoeur’s own vita but also in contemporary European philosophy.”—_Library Journal _“Ricoeur writes the best kind of philosophy—critical, economical, and clear.”— _New York Times Book Review _.