André Laks

In the _Poetics_, Aristotle, defines metaphor as the transfer of a term from a given, foreign domain to another one. If, as does the classical doctrine of tropes, we consider that it substitutes the ‘proper’ term, the metaphor has a purely ornamental value and we can do without it. Modern theories insist, on the contrary, on the cognitive value of the metaphor: because it offers a re-description of the world, the metaphor is “alive”. The question is to what extent this cognitive conception of metaphor, in spite of its classical reception, is already at work in Aristotle’s differentiated analysis of the phenomenon, as Ricœur claims. The answer is ‘yes but rather no’. This is because the cognition Aristotle talks about in relation to metaphor is of a special type, a “quasi-cognition”.

It is well known that when it comes to perception in the De anima, Aristotle uses affection-related vocabulary with extreme caution. This has given rise to a debate between interpreters who hold that in Aristotle’s account, the act of sense-perception nevertheless involves the physiological alteration of the sense organ (Richard Sorabji), and those think, with Myles Burnyeat, that for Aristotle, perception does not involve any material process, so that an Aristotelian physics of sense-perception is a “physics of forms alone”. The present article suggests that the dematerialisation of Aristotle’s theory of perception, which has a long story from Alexander of Aphrodisias to Brentano, may be in fact traced back to Theophrastus’ exegesis of Aristotle’s relevant passages in the De anima in his Physics, as we can reconstruct it on the basis of Priscian’s Metaphrasis in Theophrastum and Simplicius’ commentary of Aristotle’s De Anima. The reconstruction also provides a scholastic-theoretical frame to Theophrastus’ critical exposition of ancient theories about sense perception in his De sensibus, whether or not the discussion originally belonged to Theophrastus’ Physics.

This essay aims at establishing that the word “free” (eleutheros) and related terms are used by Plato in the Laws in two main senses. There is, first, the constitutional meaning of “freedom” which is put to work in book 3 in order to analyze moderately good and degenerate forms of historical constitutions. Strikingly enough, this meaning does not play any subsequent role in the shaping of the Platonic constitution itself—a fact which requires some kind of explanation. There is, then, scattered throughout the work, the behavioral meaning of “freedom” according to which the citizens of Magnesia, who are free in the sense that they are free men, are supposed to behave as such and to be educated accordingly, that is as “gentlemen.” One important aspect here is that a free education will appeal to rationality. The philosophically interesting fact, however, is that there appears to be no intrinsic link for Plato between freedom and rationality, as we might expect on the basis of modern philosophical assumptions whereby freedom is grounded on rationality. Rather, freedom is the condition for exercising rationality, because this exercise takes time. True, there is in the Laws a unique occurrence of yet another conception of “freedom” according to which one is free when one's reason masters one's desires. One might speculate why Plato did not develop this specific conception of freedom, which is in some sense closer to some modern views about liberty, as is shown, for example, from I. Berlin's concept of “positive liberty.” Footnotesa I would like to thank the editors for revising the English of this paper, as well as for a further series of useful suggestions.

Does Anaxagoras admit that the world is destructible? Aëtius’ doxographical handbook says as much, and so does a doxographical scholion derived from Alexander of Aphrodisias’ lost commentary on Aristotle’s Physics (Frag. 539 Rashed) according to the transmitted text. However, because of other difficulties occurring in the same scholion, Rashed was led to correct not only this text, thus making it contradict Aëtius’ testimony, but also the entry dedicated to Plato. My article suggests that while Rashed’s corrections are superfluous, the problems that triggered them are of great interest for the history of the doxographical tradition, for the way in which this tradition was used by Alexander of Aphrodisias and Simplicius in their commentaries on Aristotle’s Physics and, last but not least, for the understanding of the difficulties that ancient interpreters had to confront when they had to make sense of the lines now known as Anaxagoras B12 DK – difficulties that modern interpreters have still to confront.

Cet ouvrage s'inscrit dans la série des travaux que le Centre de Recherche Philosophique de l'Université de Lille III consacre à l'étude des cosmologies grecques. Après le système classique d'Empédocle et la réflexion critique d'Epicure à l'époque hellénistique, on s'intéresse ici à un penseur charnière, le dernier représentant de l' "ancienne physique".La notoriété de Diogène d'Apollonie est faible, au-delà du cercle restreint des spécialistes du Ve siècle grec. Ce tard venu n'a pas le renom d'Anaximandre ou d'Empédocle, ni celui de Démocrite, dont il est contemporain. Et pourtant, sa pensée n'est pas seulement l'ultime avatar d'une lignée dont il serait au fond indigne. Elle représente au contraire une forme d'achèvement, offrant une solution possible, dans le cadre du paradigme cosmologique hérité, au problème, laissé ouvert par le système d'Anaxagore, du mode d'action de "l'intellect" (νούς) dans le monde. La pertinence et la spécificité de la démarche, qui induit une doctrine de l'immanence, ressortent clairement quand on la confronte avec la célèbre critique d'Anaxagore menée par Socrate au nom de la téléologie dans le Phédon de Platon, et qui signe l'arrêt de mort de la spéculation présocratique.

When we talk about Presocratic philosophy, we are speaking about the origins of Greek philosophy and Western rationality itself. But what exactly does it mean to talk about “Presocratic philosophy” in the first place? How did early Greek thinkers come to be considered collectively as Presocratic philosophers? In this brief book, André Laks provides a history of the influential idea of Presocratic philosophy, tracing its historical and philosophical significance and consequences, from its ancient antecedents to its full crystallization in the modern period and its continuing effects today. Laks examines ancient Greek and Roman views about the birth of philosophy before turning to the eighteenth-century emergence of the term “Presocratics” and the debates about it that spanned the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. He analyzes the intellectual circumstances that led to the idea of Presocratic philosophy—and what was and is at stake in the construction of the notion. The book closes by comparing two models of the history of philosophy—the phenomenological, represented by Hans-Georg Gadamer, and the rationalist, represented by Ernst Cassirer—and their implications for Presocratic philosophy, as well as other categories of philosophical history. Other figures discussed include Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, Diogenes Laertius, Schleiermacher, Hegel, Nietzsche, Max Weber, and J.-P. Vernant. Challenging standard histories of Presocratic philosophy, the book calls for a reconsideration of the conventional story of early Greek philosophy and Western rationality.

Le Centre de Recherche Philologique de l'Université de Lille III publie ici, dans un premier cahier, quelques études consacrées à l'histoire de l'épicurisme, qui est l'objet d'une des activités principales. Les travaux de ses membres ont en commun d'insister sur l'examen approfondi de la lettre du texte, où nous voyons la condition d'un renouvellement de la compréhension. La critique de la tradition interprétative fait partie de ce réexamen, dont le le lieu privilégié se trouve dans des textes qui, se situant eux-mêmes dans une continuité remarquable, comme le poème de Lucrèce et le mur d'Oenoanda, imposent une réflexion sur les modes de l'actualisation dans le cadre d'une orthodoxie essentielle. Nous sommes heureux de publier en même temps les travaux d'hôtes du Centres et en particulier les dernières découvertes de Martin F. Smith à Oenoanda, qui marquent une nouvelle étape de la connaissance de l'inscription de Diogène. David Sedley qui a présenté à Lille, dans une série de séminaires, les problèmes posés par l'interprétation des papyrus du Péri Phuseôs d'Epicure, reprend ici l'analyse de quelques parties de la Vie de Diogène Laërce, complétant heureusement le commentaire de ce texte par André Laks. P.H. Schrijvers explique, à propos d'un chapitre de la physiologie, de quelle manière doit être reprise, slon lui, la question des "sources" de Lucrèce, considérées comme la matériel d'une culture scientifique globale. Diskin Clay, qui entretient avec le Centre des relations suivies et déjà aniciennes, communique, sur ce sujet, les éléments d'une réflexion de portée générale.