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18Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2014.Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old,…Read more
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3Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: Consideration of (T1) Consideration of (T2)
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Praktische Logik: Traditionen und Tendenzen: Abhandlungen eines Seminars beim 13. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposium Kirchberg am Wechsel 1988 (edited book)Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1990.
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73InfinitismOxford Bibliographies. 2015.Infinitism, along with foundationalism and coherentism, is a logically possible solution to the epistemic regress problem. But unlike the other two views, infinitism has only been developed and defended as a plausible solution since the late 1990’s. Infinitists grant that although there is an ending point of any actual chain of cited reasons for a belief, no belief (including the last one cited) is fully justified until a reason for it is provided. In addition to differing with foundationalism a…Read more
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26El conocimiento humano Y el progreso Infinito Del razonamientoSignos Filosóficos 10 (19): 175-204. 2008.
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61How to get Certain Knowledge from Fallible JustificationEpisteme 16 (4): 395-412. 2019.“Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are aptly formed only if they …Read more
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181Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 919. 1998.In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his accoun…Read more
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The Revolt Against Sense-Data: A Defense of the Sense-Data FrameworkDissertation, Yale University. 1966.
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The Concept of KnowledgeIn Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. 1998.
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1Reply to GinetIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. 2013.
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16How a Pyrrhonian Skeptic Might Respond to Academic SkepticismIn Luper Steven (ed.), The Skeptics: Contemporary Essays, Ashgate Press. pp. 75--94. 2003.
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28When Infinite Regresses Are Not ViciousPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 718-729. 2003.I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this paper is to show that…Read more
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61SkepticismIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. 2002.In ”Skepticism,” Peter Klein distinguishes between the “Academic Skeptic” who proposes that we cannot have knowledge of a certain set of propositions and the “Pyrrhonian Skeptic” who refrains from opining about whether we can have knowledge. Klein argues that Academic Skepticism is plausibly supported by a “Closure Principle‐style” argument based on the claim that if x entails y and S has justification for x, then S has justification for y. He turns to contextualism to see if it can contribute t…Read more
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14Contemporary Responses to Agrippa's TrilemmaIn John Greco (ed.), The Oxford handbook of skepticism, Oxford University Press. 2008.This article discusses contemporary response to the epistemic regress problem or Agrippa's trilemma. The epistemic regress problem is considered the most crucial in the entire theory of knowledge and it is a major concern for many contemporary epistemologists. However, only two of the three alternative solutions have been developed in any detail, foundationalism and coherentism. Infinitism was not seriously considered as a solution because of the finite-mind objection. This article also provides…Read more
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Knowledge is True, Non-defeated Justified BeliefIn Luper Steven (ed.), Essential Knowledge, :ongman. 2003.
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Contemporary ScepticismIn Dancy Jonathan & Sosa Ernest (eds.), A Companion ti Epistemology, Blackwell. 1992, 2010.
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99The private language argument and the sense-datum theoryAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3): 325-343. 1969.This Article does not have an abstract
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47Contextualism and the Real Nature of Academic SkepticismPhilosophical Issues 10 (1): 108-116. 2000.
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Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |