•  646
    Human knowledge and the infinite regress of reasons
    Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13): 297-325. 1999.
  •  435
  •  392
    Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoning
    Philosophical Studies 134 (1). 2007.
    The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are …Read more
  •  248
    Why Not Infinitism?
    Epistemology 5 199-208. 2000.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Furthe…Read more
  •  237
    What IS Wrong with Foundationalism is that it Cannot Solve the Epistemic Regress Problem
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1): 166-171. 2004.
    There are many things that could be wrong with foundationalism. For example, some have claimed that a so-called basic belief cannot be both 1) a reason for non-basic beliefs and 2) such that it cannot be provided with at least prima facie justification. If something is a reason, they say, then that something has to be a proposition and if it is a proposition, then it is the kind of thing that requires a reason in order to be even prima facie justified. Another reason that some give for rejecting…Read more
  •  195
    Knowledge, causality, and defeasibility
    Journal of Philosophy 73 (20): 792-812. 1976.
  •  187
    Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress Problem
    In Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge, De Gruyter. pp. 487-508. 2011.
  •  162
    Certainty, a Refutation of Scepticism
    University of Minnesota Press. 1981.
    Rich with historical and cultural value, these works are published unaltered from the original University of Minnesota Press editions.
  •  149
    When infinite regresses are not vicious
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3). 2003.
    I will argue for two main points. First, the regress imbedded in infinitism need not be subject to the Structural Objection; and second, the Structural Objection does not pose a real problem for any regress. I will not be arguing for the correctness of my proposal directly. That is, as will become apparent soon, my proposal rests on two principles of reasoning which together entail infinitism and I will not present my arguments for those principles here. The purpose of this paper is to show that…Read more
  •  145
  •  132
  •  112
    Misleading "misleading defeaters"
    Journal of Philosophy 76 (7): 382-386. 1979.
  •  109
    Real knowledge
    Synthese 55 (2). 1983.
    Philosophers have sought to characterize a type of knowledge — what I call real knowledge — which is significantly different from the ordinary concept of knowledge. The concept of knowledge as true, justified belief — what I call knowledge simpliciter — failed to depict the sought after real knowledge because the necessary and jointly sufficient conditions of knowledge simpliciter can be felicitously but accidentally fulfilled. Real knowledge is knowledge simpliciter plus a set of requirements w…Read more
  •  108
    Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism (review)
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 919. 1998.
    In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his accoun…Read more
  •  106
    The Virtues of Inconsistency
    The Monist 68 (1): 105-135. 1985.
    I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets
  •  82
    The private language argument and the sense-datum theory
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 47 (3): 325-343. 1969.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  72
    Infinitism's Take on Justification, Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism
    Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 153-172. 2005.
    O propósito deste artigo é mostrar como podem ser desenvolvidas explicações robustas de justificação e de certeza no interior do infinitismo. Primeiro, eu explico como a concepção infinitista de justificação epistêmica difere das concepções fundacionista e coerentista. Em segundo lugar, explico como o infinitista pode oferecer uma solução ao problema do regresso epistêmico. Em terceiro lugar, explico como o infinitismo, per se, é compatível com as teorias daqueles que sustentam 1) que o conhecim…Read more
  •  46
    Immune belief systems
    Philosophical Topics 14 (1): 259-280. 1986.
  •  23
    Why Not Infinitism?
    The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5 199-208. 2000.
    As the Pyrrhonians made clear, reasons that adequately justify beliefs can have only three possible structures: foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. Infinitism—the view that adequate reasons for our beliefs are infinite and non-repeating—has never been developed carefully, much less advocated. In this paper, I will argue that only infinitism can satisfy two intuitively plausible constraints on good reasoning: the avoidance of circular reasoning and the avoidance of arbitrariness. Furthe…Read more
  •  20
    Belief, Truth and Knowledge
    with D. M. Armstrong
    Philosophical Review 85 (2): 225. 1976.
  •  17
    An Introduction to the Philosophy of Knowledge
    with Jennifer Trusted, Alan White, Douglas Odegard, Robert Shope, and Marshall Swain
    Philosophical Quarterly 35 (138): 95-104. 1985.