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18Ad Infinitum: New Essays on Epistemological Infinitism (edited book)Oxford University Press UK. 2014.Infinitism is an ancient view in epistemology about the structure of knowledge and epistemic justification, according to which there are no foundational reasons for belief. The view has never been popular, and is often associated with skepticism, but after languishing for centuries it has recently begun a resurgence. Ad Infinitum presents new work on the topic by leading epistemologists. They shed new light on infinitism's distinctive strengths and weaknesses, and address questions, new and old,…Read more
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3Skepticism: Ascent and Assent?In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa and His Critics, Blackwell. 2004.This chapter contains section titled: Consideration of (T1) Consideration of (T2)
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Praktische Logik: Traditionen und Tendenzen: Abhandlungen eines Seminars beim 13. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposium Kirchberg am Wechsel 1988 (edited book)Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1990.
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73InfinitismOxford Bibliographies. 2015.Infinitism, along with foundationalism and coherentism, is a logically possible solution to the epistemic regress problem. But unlike the other two views, infinitism has only been developed and defended as a plausible solution since the late 1990’s. Infinitists grant that although there is an ending point of any actual chain of cited reasons for a belief, no belief (including the last one cited) is fully justified until a reason for it is provided. In addition to differing with foundationalism a…Read more
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26El conocimiento humano Y el progreso Infinito Del razonamientoSignos Filosóficos 10 (19): 175-204. 2008.
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61How to get Certain Knowledge from Fallible JustificationEpisteme 16 (4): 395-412. 2019.“Real knowledge,” as I use the term, is the most highly prized form of true belief sought by an epistemic agent. This paper argues that defeasible infinitism provides a good way to characterize real knowledge and it shows how real knowledge can arise from fallible justification. Then, I argue that there are two ways of interpreting Ernest Sosa's account of real knowledge as belief that is aptly formed and capable of being fully defended. On the one hand, if beliefs are aptly formed only if they …Read more
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181Foundationalism and the Infinite Regress of ReasonsMetaepistemology and Skepticism (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 919. 1998.In Metaepistemology and Skepticism (Rowman & Littlefield:\n1995), Richard Fumerton defends foundationalism. As part of\nthe defense he rejects infinitism--the view that holds that\nthe solution to the problem of the regress of justificatory\nreasons is that the reasons are infinitely many and\nnonrepeating. I examine some of those arguments and attempt\nto show that they are not really telling against (at least\nsome versions of) infinitism. Along the way I present some\nobjections to his accoun…Read more
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The Revolt Against Sense-Data: A Defense of the Sense-Data FrameworkDissertation, Yale University. 1966.
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The Concept of KnowledgeIn Edward Craig (ed.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Routledge. 1998.
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138The Virtues of InconsistencyThe Monist 68 (1): 105-135. 1985.I "argue" that by knowingly accepting a set of propositions which is logically inconsistent, An epistemic agent need not violate any valid epistemic rule. Those types of logically inconsistent sets which it is permissible to accept are distinguished from those which may not be accepted. The results of the discussion are applied to the lottery paradox set of propositions and the preface paradox set. I also "suggest" that it may be an epistemic virtue to accept some inconsistent sets
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231Infinitism and the Epistemic Regress ProblemIn Tolksdorf Stephan (ed.), Conceptions of Knowledge, De Gruyter. pp. 487-508. 2011.
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111, two basic forms of philosophical skepticismIn Paul K. Moser (ed.), The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 336. 2002.
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ClosureIn Audi Robert (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, Cambridge University Press. 1995.
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515Human knowledge and the infinite progress of reasoningPhilosophical Studies 134 (1). 2007.The purpose of this paper is to explain how infinitism—the view that reasons are endless and non-repeating—solves the epistemic regress problem and to defend that solution against some objections. The first step is to explain what the epistemic regress problem is and, equally important, what it is not. Second, I will discuss the foundationalist and coherentist responses to the regress problem and offer some reasons for thinking that neither response can solve the problem, no matter how they are …Read more
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Warrant, Proper Function, Reliabilism and DefeasibilityIn Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Warrant and Contemporary Epistemology, Rowman & Littlefield. 1996.
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2Review of Armstrong's Belief, Truth and Knowledge, Philosophical Review, 85.2 1976, 225-227 (review)Philosophical Review 82 (5): 225-227. 1976.
New Brunswick, New Jersey, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |