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67Common sense in Thomas ReidCanadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1): 142-155. 2011.This paper explains the nature and role of common sense in Reid and uses the exposition to answer some of Reid's critics. The key to defending Reid is to distinguish between two kinds of priority that common sense beliefs are supposed to enjoy. Common sense beliefs enjoy epistemological priority in that they constitute a foundation for knowledge; i.e. they have evidential status without being grounded in further evidence themselves. Common sense beliefs enjoy methodological priority in that they…Read more
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18Religious Knowledge in the Context of Conflicting TestimonyProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 83 61-76. 2009.An adequate account of testimonial knowledge in general explains how religious knowledge can be grounded in testimony, and even in the context of conflicting testimonial traditions. Three emerging trends in epistemology help to make that case. The first is to make a distinction between two projects of epistemology: “the project of explanation” and “the project of vindication.” The second is to emphasize a distinction between knowledge and understanding. The third is to ask what role the concept …Read more
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28Why Not Reliabilism?In Olsson Erik (ed.), The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 31--41. 2003.
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``Agent Reliabilism"In James Tomberlin (ed.), Philosophical Perspecives, Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview Publishing Co.. 1999.
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17Plantinga, Foundationalism, and the Charge of Self-referential IncoherenceGrazer Philosophische Studien 31 (1): 187-193. 1988.Alvin Plantinga charges classical foundationalism with self-referential incoherence, meaning that that doctrine employs criteria for rationally acceptable propositions which exclude the criteria themselves. More specifically, the charge is that the criteria are neither properly basic nor supported by properly basic propositions. In section 1 the doctrine of classical foundationalism is briefly explained. In section 2, a defense against Plantinga's objection is provided showing how the foundation…Read more
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3922. virtues in epistemologyIn Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology, Longman. pp. 211. 2003.In ”Virtues in Epistemology,” John Greco presents and evaluates two main notions of intellectual virtue. The first concerns Ernest Sosa's development of this concept as a disposition to grasp truth and avoid falsehood. Greco contrasts this with moral models of intellectual virtue that include a motivational component in their definition, namely a desire for truth. Instead, Greco argues that a minimalist reliabilist account of intellectual virtue “in which the virtues are conceived as reliable co…Read more
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218Internalism and epistemically responsible beliefSynthese 85 (2). 1990.In section one the deontological (or responsibilist) conception of justification is discussed and explained. In section two, arguments are put forward in order to derive the most plausible version of perspectival internalism, or the position that epistemic justification is a function of factors internal to the believer's cognitive perspective. The two most common considerations put forward in favor of perspectival internalism are discussed. These are the responsibilist conception of justificatio…Read more
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7The Value ProblemIn Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 313--22. 2009.
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63Skepticism, Reliabilism, and Virtue EpistemologyThe Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5 139-147. 2000.I review a familiar skeptical argument from Hume, and conclude that it requires us to accept that there is no necessary relation between beliefs about the world and their evidential grounds; that is, there is no logical or quasi-logical relation between empirical beliefs and their grounds, such that their grounds entail them, or even make them probable. I then argue that generic reliabilism can accommodate this fact about evidential grounds in a non-skeptical way. According to reliabilism, the g…Read more
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47Evidentialism: Essays in EpistemologyInternational Philosophical Quarterly 45 (4): 556-558. 2005.
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19Précis of Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical InquiryPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2): 432-436. 2003.The second major thesis of the book follows closely on the first: that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central role in the methodology of philosophy, and especially in the methodology of epistemology. A close analysis of skeptical arguments highlights our pre-theoretically plausible, but ultimately mistaken, assumptions about the nature of knowledge and evidence. Skeptical arguments are powerful just because their assumptio…Read more
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279Worries about Pritchard’s safetySynthese 158 (3): 299-302. 2007.I take issue with two claims that Duncan Pritchard makes in his recent book, "Epistemic Luck". The first concerns his safety-based response to the lottery problem; the second his account of the relationship between safety and intellectual virtue.
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124A Different Sort of ContextualismErkenntnis 61 (2-3): 383-400. 2004.A number of virtue epistemologists endorse the following thesis: Knowledge is true belief resulting from intellectual virtue, where Ss true belief results from intellectual virtue just in case S believes the truth because S is intellectually virtuous. This thesis commits one to a sort of contextualism about knowledge attributions. This is because, in general, sentences of the form X occurred because Y occurred require a contextualist treatment. This sort of contextualism is contrasted with more …Read more
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6Perception as InterpretationProceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 72 229-237. 1998.
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Foundationalism and Philosophy of ReligionIn Brian Davies (ed.), Philosophy of Religion: A Guide to the Subject, Georgetown University Press. pp. 35. 1998.
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357The nature of ability and the purpose of knowledgePhilosophical Issues 17 (1). 2007.The claim that knowledge is a kind of success from ability has great theoretical power: it explains the nature of epistemic normativity, why knowledge is incompatible with luck, and why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. This paper addresses objections to the view by wedding it with two additional ideas: that intellectual abilities display a certain structure, and that the concept of knowledge functions to flag good information, and good sources of information, for use in practica…Read more
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158Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and OtherwiseMetaphilosophy 34 (3): 353-366. 2003.This essay defends virtue reliabilism against a line of argument put forward by Duncan Pritchard. In the process, it discusses (1) the motivations for virtue reliabilism, (2) some analogies between epistemic virtue and moral virtue, and (3) the relation between virtue (epistemic and otherwise) and luck (epistemic and otherwise). It argues that considerations about virtue and luck suggest a solution to Gettier problems from the perspective of a virtue theory.
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155Externalism and skepticismIn Richard Schantz (ed.), The Externalist Challenge, De Gruyter. pp. 53. 2004.Part 1 argues that, despite rhetorical appearances, McDowell accepts a standard version of epistemic externalism. Moreover, epistemic externalism plays an important role in McDowell’s response to skepticism. Part 2 argues that, contra McDowell, epistemic externalism is necessary for rejecting skepticism, and content externalism is not sufficient for rejecting skepticism.
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4Skepticism about the External WorldIn The Oxford Handbook of Skepticism, Oxford University Press. pp. 108--128. 2008.
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1179Catholics vs. Calvinists on Religious KnowledgeAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1): 13-34. 1997.In this paper I will take it for granted that Zagzebski's position articulates a broadly Catholic perspective, and that Plantinga's position accurately represents a broadly Calvinist one. But I will argue that so construed, the Catholic and the Calvinist are much closer than Zagzebski implies: both views are person-based in an important sense of that term; both are internalist on Zagzebski's usage and externalist on the standard usage; and Plantinga's position is consistent with the social eleme…Read more
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59Review of Noah Lemos, Common Sense: A Contemporary Defense (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2005 (7). 2005.
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304What's wrong with contextualism?Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232): 416-436. 2008.This paper addresses two worries that might be raised about contextualism in epistemology and that carry over to its moral analogues: that contextualism robs epistemology (and moral theory) of a proper subject-matter, and that contextualism robs knowledge claims (and moral claims) of their objectivity. Two theses are defended: (1) that these worries are appropriately directed at interestdependent theories in general rather than at contextualism in particular, and (2) that the two worries are ove…Read more
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66Précis of putting skeptics in their place: The nature of skeptical arguments and their role in philosophical inquiry (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2). 2003.The second major thesis of the book follows closely on the first: that the analysis of skeptical arguments is philosophically useful and important, and should therefore have a central role in the methodology of philosophy, and especially in the methodology of epistemology. A close analysis of skeptical arguments highlights our pre-theoretically plausible, but ultimately mistaken, assumptions about the nature of knowledge and evidence. Skeptical arguments are powerful just because their assumptio…Read more
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157Virtues in EpistemologyIn Paul Moser (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 287--315. 2002.Part One reviews some recent history of epistemology, focusing on ways in which the intellectual virtues have been invoked to solve specific epistemological problems. This part gives a sense of the contemporary landscape that has emerged and clarifies some of the disagreements among those who invoke the virtues in epistemology. Part Two explores some problems about knowledge in greater detail, and defends a externalist approach in virtue epistemology
Washington, District of Columbia, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Religion |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |