Raji C. Steineck

This contribution argues that it is misleading to consider Dōgen (1200-1253) a philosopher, in spite of a strong reception of his thought in Japanese and Comparative philosophy since the early 20th century. Dōgen himself gives a decidedly parochial description of his own agenda, and that he considered non-Buddhist views and teachings unworthy of any consideration whatsoever. There are substantial differences between Dōgen's concept of the Buddha Way and philosophy as an open-ended and reasoned discourse on matters of fundamental human concern. Philosophical reception of Dōgen needs to take these differences into account to fully appreciate the challenges posited by his thought.

In recent decades, the concept of religion, and specifically its application to non-Western historic cultural formations has come unter critical scrutiny. This paper applies the analysis of semantic fields to three works by the medieval Japanese Buddhist monk Dōgen (1200–1253), who came to be revered as founder of the still extant Sōtō school of Zen Buddhism. By putting his notion of the ‘Buddha Way’ (butsudō) into strong relief, it provides a basis for comparison with modern concepts of religion. The conclusion is that Dōgen’s ideas conform to a surprisingly large extent with modern ideas. This may be one reason for his popularity in modern times. But Dōgen should not be taken to represent the general world-view of medieval Japan. Further comparative analyses of other corpora remain necessary to gauge the applicability of‘religion’ as a category for the analysis of medieval Japanese culture.

This book chapter is concerned with the questions of authorship in texts related to Dōgen Kigen, a Japanese monk who lived between 1200 and 1253, at the dawn of the Japanese Medieval period. Dōgen was involved to widely varying degrees, in the production of those works catalogued under his name, and figures as different authorial types from the truthful disciple recording his master's words in Hōkyōki to the converse role of authoritative master, whose words are truthfully recorded by his own adepts in Eihei kōroku. His first doctrinal exposition, Bendōwa, exhibits a peculiar model of authorship in acknowledging original compisition (by Dōgen) while fusing this author-figure with the Buddhas and Patriarchs of old.

This chapter approaches the hierarchical theory of time from a philosophical point of view. It is based on a critical reading of Fraser's work through Neo-Kantian eyes. The chapter reflects upon the methodological constraints that apply to a natural philosophy of time. At the same time, it attempts to resolve some tensions between this theory's content and its epistemological and ontological foundations as stated by Fraser himself. The chapter begins with a discussion on the essential characteristics of the Neo-Kantian point of view. Next, it enumerates the main points of contention between Fraser's and the Neo-Kantian point of view, but also the logical tensions inherent in Fraser's position. This is followed by a critical review of Fraser's "working concept" of truth and of the extended umwelt principle. Some consequences for the hierarchical theory of time are proposed.

Conflict is both a creative force in the establishment and a necessary condition for the sustenance of all higher modes of being. This, in short, I find to be one of the most ground-breaking insights of J. T. Fraser’s theory of “Time as a Hierarchy of Creative Conflicts.” As a consequence of this insight, I argue that to understand, with Fraser, the constitutive and creative function of some kinds of conflict will help us to accept, and even embrace, conflict not merely as a perpetual fact, as suggested by Stuart Hampshire, but as a necessary condition that makes possible whatever is of specific value in human culture. I go on to propose to distinguish between accidental and constitutive conflicts, and show how assessing conflicts accordingly can help to better manage them and avoid some destructive paths of action. The paper closes with some reflections on the limitations of the insight and its application.

Philosophy now finds itself in a multipolar world, defined by global commercial, scientific and cultural exchange. At any given point in this world, a multitude of norms, traditions, and habits come together in many ways. ›The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms‹ developed by E. Cassirer offers many insights that help to understand the fabric of such a world, but it needs to be revised and critically developed. This book seeks to extract the essential insights of Cassirer concerning the key function of the symbolic in human life, and to develop them in light of other, more socially grounded philosophy, and of sources from the Japanese traditions.