Raji C. Steineck

I seek to show that the declared aim of Dōgen’s writings, which were often edited versions of ritualised verbal teachings, was to guide disciples on the Buddha Way—a practical path to salvation that was clearly defined and delimited by an authoritative tradition. Dōgen, therefore, tried to preclude rather than foster the open-ended discussion of fundamental problems of human life that is otherwise usually associated with the concept of philosophy. Hence, Dōgen speaks a language of persuasion that is guided by aims and rules of discourse different from those of philosophy. This, or so I argue, is an aspect that is often lost when Dōgen’s thoughts are transferred into philosophical debates. The result is, in many instances, a rather facile alignment with the recipient’s own preconceptions. To substantiate my hypothesis, I start from factual observations concerning the modern philosophical reception of Dōgen’s teachings on time in Japan and the Anglophone world, focusing on the semantic shifts occurring in interpretations by prominent authors such as Tanabe Hajime, Ōmori Shōzō, Rein Raud, and others. I then turn to the theory of translation to analyse the seminal factors at play in this observed process of transformative reception. Finally, I reflect on how conceiving of the transfer of Dōgen’s thought into philosophical discourse as a process of translation can help to build interpretations that are both hermeneutically sound and philosophically interesting.

Conflict is both a creative force in the establishment and a necessary condition for the sustenance of all higher modes of being. This, in short, I find to be one of the most ground-breaking insights of J. T. Fraser’s theory of “Time as a Hierarchy of Creative Conflicts.” As a consequence of this insight, I argue that to understand, with Fraser, the constitutive and creative function of some kinds of conflict will help us to accept, and even embrace, conflict not merely as a perpetual fact, as suggested by Stuart Hampshire, but as a necessary condition that makes possible whatever is of specific value in human culture. I go on to propose to distinguish between accidental and constitutive conflicts, and show how assessing conflicts accordingly can help to better manage them and avoid some destructive paths of action. The paper closes with some reflections on the limitations of the insight and its application.

Ernst Cassirer’s Philosophy of Symbolic Forms (PSF) primarily reflects on culture as a system of normative domains that are path-dependently configured. PSF elaborates on the domains of myth/religion, language, and science, but misses a discussion of the economy. By sketching a corresponding exposition, we contribute to the ongoing discussion of how economic science may investigate the world beyond utility functions. Our argument proceeds along historical and comparative lines with a ‘reciprocal comparison’ of the medieval economies of Europe and Japan. We thus approach the normative essence of economic thought and behaviour and test its variability in socio-cultural contexts diverging from ‘now’ and ‘here’. Our sketch of the economy as a symbolic form has important implications for the theoretical understanding of change in social systems. We argue that existing factors of change recognised in the economics discipline, such as fluctuations in supply and demand, and institutional innovation, critically require a superposition with patterns of cognition as they guide agents in their grasp of economic problems and, consequently, in their responses that shape material economies. We suggest that conceiving of the economy as a symbolic form makes these patterns of cognition accessible.

In this essay I discuss the various ways time can be inscribed in texts below the level of explicit propositions about time. I argue that a full chronographical analysis needs to account for the dimensions of the theoretical, the practical, and the aesthetic. Taking Kant’s table of categories as a guide to the fundamental functions of chronographic determination, I propose a methodology of analysis that goes beyond the aspect of quantitative measurement, and includes typological, thetic, and modal information about time. Numerous examples from various textual domains such as poetry, historiography, science, and law illustrate the wide applicability of the proposed analytical categories. The full matrix of dimensions and determinative functions can be used to describe the chronographic signature of a text, which depends as much on its communicative purpose as on the technologies of calculating and describing time available to its authors.

The contributions to Concepts of Philosophy in Asia and the Islamic World reflect upon the problems implied in the received notions of philosophy in the respective scholarly literatures. They ask whether, and for what reasons, a text should be categorized as a philosophical text (or excluded from the canon of philosophy), and what this means for the concept of philosophy. The focus on texts and textual corpora is central because it makes authors expose their claims and arguments in direct relation to specific sources, and discourages generalized reflections on the characteristics of, for example, Japanese culture or the Indian mind. The volume demonstrates that close and historically informed readings are the sine qua non in discussing what philosophy is in Asia and the Islamic world, just as much as with regard to Western literature Contributors are Yoko Arisaka, Wolfgang Behr, Thomas Fröhlich, Lisa Indraccolo, Paulus Kaufmann, Iso Kern, Ralf Müller, Gregor Paul, Lisa Raphals, Fabian Schäfer, Ori Sela, Rafael Suter, Christian Uhl, Viatcheslav Vetrov, Yvonne Schulz Zinda, and Nicholas Zufferey.

Nishida Kitarō is considered by many as the most important 20th century Japanese philosopher for his ability to employ modern concepts and terminologies, and use them to construct a unique system carrying a distinctly East Asian flavour. In this system, the notion of nothingness plays a fundamental part both in terms of epistemology and ontology. While this conceptual choice was also inspired by Buddhist sources, Nishida also drew on the theoretical philosophy of Hermann Cohen to elaborate, how nothingness could function as both the guarantor of unity and generator of plurality. Close analysis, however, shows that Nishida’s appropriation of Cohen’s concept of the me on as a necessary feature in the „logic of pure knowledge“ sheds the constraints carefully put in place by Cohen. As becomes evident in a comparison between both thinker’s analysis of sensation, Nishida’s unrestricted use of Cohen’s terms collapses precisely those distinctions that give sensation its meaning in the rational assessment of reality. This leaves Nishida’s concept of reality without the critical potential to distinguish between different kinds of normativity and their inter-subjective validity. Nothingness, as Nishida uses the term, is not a logical concept, but functions as an aesthetic symbol invoking sublime ideas of a perfect reality that is one and whole, and at the same time rich and diverse.Nishida Kitarō gilt vielfach als der bedeutendste japanische Philosoph des 20. Jahrhunderts, wenn nicht generell. Zu dieser Einschätzung trug seine Fähigkeit bei, Konzepte und Terminologien der modernen Philosophie aufzugreifen und in ein eigenes System einzubauen, das gleichwohl einen besonderen, ostasiatischen Charakter hatte, auf den er sich auch explizit bezog. Fundamental für dieses System wie für seine Apostrophierung als genuin „östlich“ war die zentrale Rolle, die er dem Nichts sowohl in logischer als auch in ontologischer Hinsicht zusprach. In der Ausarbeitung dieser systematischen Funktion machte sich Nishida Überlegungen von Hermann Cohen zur Logik der reinen Erkenntnis zueigen, die er ausweitete und aus dem Gebiet der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis auf andere Formen menschlichen Weltzugangs übertrug. Die genauere Analyse zeigt, dass die Inanspruchnahme Cohens problematisch ist, weil Nishida zentrale Unterscheidungen Cohens überspielt. Das Nichts, bei Cohen ein notwendiger Umweg zur Sicherung „reiner“ Begriffe, wird bei Nishida zum Quell begrifflicher Unterscheidung selbst. Die Folgen dieser Hypertrophie des Nichts zeigen sich besonders in der Behandlung der Empfindung, die bei Cohen der bloßen Anzeige des Daseins dient, bei Nishida aber sowohl Dasein als auch Realität begründen soll. Nishidas Begriff von Wirklichkeit ermangelt daher einer fundamentalen kritischen Unterscheidung und bleibt letztlich leer, was jedoch durch den durch Übernahme von systemfremden Theoriestücken geschickt erzeugten Schein einer Fülle von Wirklichkeitsbezügen verdeckt wird. Im Kern ist Nishidas Umgang mit Begriffen ästhetisch. Er bildet mit ihnen keine nachvollziehbaren Theorien, sondern erzeugt gerade mit dem Nichtsbegriff den erhabenen Schein umfassender und lebendig-vielfältiger Einheit – ein Schein, der vielleicht inspirierend wirkt, sich aber theoretisch nicht zu bewähren vermag.

This contribution argues that it is misleading to consider Dōgen (1200-1253) a philosopher, in spite of a strong reception of his thought in Japanese and Comparative philosophy since the early 20th century. Dōgen himself gives a decidedly parochial description of his own agenda, and that he considered non-Buddhist views and teachings unworthy of any consideration whatsoever. There are substantial differences between Dōgen's concept of the Buddha Way and philosophy as an open-ended and reasoned discourse on matters of fundamental human concern. Philosophical reception of Dōgen needs to take these differences into account to fully appreciate the challenges posited by his thought.

In recent decades, the concept of religion, and specifically its application to non-Western historic cultural formations has come unter critical scrutiny. This paper applies the analysis of semantic fields to three works by the medieval Japanese Buddhist monk Dōgen (1200–1253), who came to be revered as founder of the still extant Sōtō school of Zen Buddhism. By putting his notion of the ‘Buddha Way’ (butsudō) into strong relief, it provides a basis for comparison with modern concepts of religion. The conclusion is that Dōgen’s ideas conform to a surprisingly large extent with modern ideas. This may be one reason for his popularity in modern times. But Dōgen should not be taken to represent the general world-view of medieval Japan. Further comparative analyses of other corpora remain necessary to gauge the applicability of‘religion’ as a category for the analysis of medieval Japanese culture.

This book chapter is concerned with the questions of authorship in texts related to Dōgen Kigen, a Japanese monk who lived between 1200 and 1253, at the dawn of the Japanese Medieval period. Dōgen was involved to widely varying degrees, in the production of those works catalogued under his name, and figures as different authorial types from the truthful disciple recording his master's words in Hōkyōki to the converse role of authoritative master, whose words are truthfully recorded by his own adepts in Eihei kōroku. His first doctrinal exposition, Bendōwa, exhibits a peculiar model of authorship in acknowledging original compisition (by Dōgen) while fusing this author-figure with the Buddhas and Patriarchs of old.