Ohad Nachtomy

This paper explores the philosophical transitions in the relations between existence and possibility in Leibniz and Kant. It begins with Leibniz’s formulation of a strictly logical notion of possibility; proceeds with Kant’s pre-critical statement in 1763 that existence is not a predicate; and ends with the _Critique of Pure Reason_ in which the theory of possibility is constrained by the subjective conditions of experience (to supply the material for thinking possibilities) and is thus relativized to the human mind. I present Leibniz’s view of possibility against the traditional view of temporal modalities; and, in this light, his dual notion of existence. I then argue that, in Kant’s pre-critical essay of 1763, the view that existence is not a predicate is strongly related to the logical view of possibility advanced by Leibniz. I conclude with Kant’s transition to the critical period and its implications on the analysis of modality.

This chapter examines Leibniz’s comment on fragment 22 of Pascal’s _Pensées_ in the Port-Royal Edition (currently Lafuma 199). Leibniz responds to Pascal’s employment of the infinitely large and infinitely small and to the way he uses infinity to describe living beings through the example of a mite (_ciron_). In contrast, Leibniz employs the image of a living mirror (_miroir vivant_). The chapter argues that, despite superficial similarities, Leibniz’s use of infinity to define living beings stands in stark contrast to Pascal’s use of infinity, in that it stresses unity and harmony rather than divisibility and disparity. Leibniz’s use of infinity through the notion of a living mirror suggests that each individual forms an integral part of a well-connected and harmonious system. Whereas Pascal uses infinity to highlight our alienation and incomprehension of the world, for Leibniz infinity serves as a mark of unity, connectedness, and belonging.

Leibniz’s theory of organic _emboîtement i_s well known, but seldom analyzed in detail. The model of embodiment Leibniz deploys is not a material one, not the kind of physical _emboîtement_ that we find exemplified in Russian dolls, which are physically encapsulated one within the other, or the view of living things as subtle machines advanced by Descartes. This paper will examine several models of embodiment: physical, logical, expressive/representative, as well as a model of functional organization. I will conclude that the latter captures most adequately the Leibnizian view of a living being as a nested individual and the kind of embodiment it involves. What makes all these nested individuals components of a single individual is that they all follow one dominant program of action which may be seen as composed of many subprograms. But they all serve a single end (telos) that informs the developmental program of an individual.

In this article, I argue that Leibniz connects the notion of infinity and life so that, after the New System of Nature, infinity figures as a mark of living beings. I examine Leibniz’s sources for this view, arguing that it is best seen as a synthesis of mathematical, empirical, theological, and metaphysical sources. I then focus on the metaphysical source, examining the connection between infinity, perfection, and being in some detail. My conclusion is that Leibniz defines living beings as infinite in a qualified (graded) sense, so that they are infinite in kind, that is, infinite in some ways but limited in others, and that their infinity is distinct from the absolute infinity (and perfection) of God, on the one hand, and the mere infinity of mathematical things, on the other.

This paper examines Spinoza's complex treatment of wonder (admiratio) in relation to his broader philosophical project. While Descartes valorised wonder as a starting point for inquiry, Spinoza critiques it as a cognitive distraction that impedes adequate understanding. This paper shows that Spinoza's reconfiguration of wonder exemplifies his strategy of reinterpreting traditional concepts within a naturalistic framework. By positioning wonder as a byproduct of ignorance and a tool exploited by religious and political authorities, Spinoza critiques Cartesian dualism, theological dogma and the manipulation of human affectivity. Ultimately, this paper demonstrates that Spinoza's nuanced view of wonder is essential for understanding his alternative model of human flourishing, grounded in reason, self‐determination and the intellectual love of God. Spinoza's analysis remains relevant to contemporary debates about secularism, scientific understanding and the human need for meaning.

abstract: Throughout his career, Leibniz defines individual substances in different ways. In the 1680s, especially in the Discourse on Metaphysics, Leibniz develops an original definition of substance through the complete concept of an individual (CCI). Most commentators hold that the CCI fades out in Leibniz's later philosophy. Others argue that the "law of the series" (LoS) replaces the definition of an individual substance through the CCI. We argue that these definitions are complementary. Early versions of the LoS inform the development of the CCI in the 1680s and are clearly pronounced in Leibniz's later texts. We discuss several often-neglected texts that show that the CCI is still present in Leibniz's late writings. We support the complementarity thesis by suggesting that the CCI primarily characterizes possible individuals, whereas the LoS characterizes actual individuals. As such, the LoS is especially apt to highlight the dynamic traits that Leibniz ascribes to individual substances from the 1690s.

At the present state of industrialized agriculture and specialized economy, achieving nutritional self-sufficiency on a personal level is widely considered a naïve goal, unsuited to the present technological era. Furthermore, nutritional self-sufficiency is considered overly demanding in terms of training, land, labor intensity, and time requirements. This study contests these common notions. Drawing on a study of a small (approximately 0.075 ha) low-input self-sufficient farm in an industrialized country, we show that achieving nutritional self-sufficiency on this farm required modest initial agricultural training, a small parcel of land, and, perhaps most surprisingly, a single day of labor per month, on average. We offer these results as proof of concept that, when properly planned, nutritional self-sufficiency may be sustained over an extended period (more than a decade) and that doing so may be compatible with working full-time outside the farm, as well as engaging in regular leisure activities. We also propose that some upscaling is viable at the industrial, small-scale, and household levels.

This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. Readers will learn about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic.

La communication qui suit porte sur le concept de relation tel que le définit Leibniz dans sa correspondance avec Arnauld. La première partie présente trois des présupposés impliqués dans ce concept, à savoir 1) qu'il y a des relations entre des individus possibles, 2) que ces relations sont nécessaires à la notion de mondes possibles et 3) qu'elles sont également nécessaires pour compléter l'individuation des individus possibles. Dans la deuxième partie, on verra que le premier présupposé semble entrer en conflit avec le nominalisme de Leibniz et son refus d'attribuer une réalité aux relations. Un problème de circularité entrave la résolution de ce conflit: d'une part, Leibniz considère en effet que les relations interindividuelles présupposent des individus, mais d'autre part, le troisième présupposé indique que de telles relations sont nécessaires à l'individuation même des individus possibles. Dans la troisième partie, on proposera une solution à ce problème de circularité au moyen du concept d'espace logique de possibilités. Dans cet espace logique, la place qu'occupe un individu est à la fois 1) constitutive de son concept et 2) une notion relationnelle. Grâce au concept de relation que propose Leibniz, les concepts d'individus et l'espace logique en viennent ainsi à se constituer mutuellement, ce qui ouvre une avenue hors de la circularité

The article presents Leibniz's preoccupation (in 1675?6) with the difference between the notion of infinite number, which he regards as impossible, and that of the infinite being, which he regards as possible. I call this issue ?Leibniz's Problem? and examine Spinoza's solution to a similar problem that arises in the context of his philosophy. ?Spinoza's solution? is expounded in his letter on the infinite (Ep.12), which Leibniz read and annotated in April 1676. The gist of Spinoza's solution is to distinguish between three kinds of infinity and, in particular, between one that applies to substance, and one that applies to numbers, seen as auxiliaries of the imagination. The rest of the paper examines the extent to which Spinoza's solution solves Leibniz's problem. The main thesis I advance is that, when Spinoza and Leibniz say that the divine substance is infinite, in most contexts it is to be understood in non-numerical and non-quantitative terms. Instead, for Spinoza and Leibniz, a substance is said to be infinite in a qualitative sense stressing that it is complete, perfect and indivisible. I argue that this approach solves one strand of Leibniz's problem and leaves another unsolved

In this article we examine the “phenotype” concept in light of recent technological advances in Genome-Wide Association Studies . By observing the technology and its presuppositions, we put forward the thesis that at least in this case genotype and phenotype are effectively coidentifled one by means of the other. We suggest that the coidentiflcation of genotype-phenotype couples in expression-based GWAS also indicates a conceptual dependence, which we call “co-deñnition.” We note that viewing these terms as codeflned runs against possible expectations, viz., that genotypes and phenotypes could ultimately be expressed independently from one another. In addition, the co-definition of genotypes and phenotypes in this context emphasizes the correlative character of both genotypes and phenotypes in GWAS

In her stimulating article, Catherine Wilson considers the moment of worlds-making in Leibniz’s philosophy. She raises the following question: “How do possible substances give rise to possible worlds?“ and observes that the moment of world-making is as puzzling as it is interesting. In section 2 of her article, Wilson considers two approaches to the question. According to the first, possible individuals logically precede possible worlds and possible worlds are constituted either by combinations of possible individuals or by mechanically checking the compossibility relations among them. This approach assumes that possible individuals are given and complete and that worlds result from their various conjunctions. On this approach, a world is a set of compossible individuals, i.e., a set of complete individuals whose co-existence is possible.

This paper examines a widely accepted reading of monads as the most fundamental elements of reality. Garber [Leibniz – Body, Substance, Monad, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009] argues that simple monads – seen as mind-like atoms without parts and extension – replace the corporeal substance of Leibniz’s middle period. Phemister [Leibniz and the Natural World – Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005] argues that monads figure also at the top as complete corporeal substances. Building on Fichant [‘L’invention métaphysique’ in G.W. Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique suivi de Monadologie et autres textes, edited by Michel Fichant, Paris: Gallimard, 2004], I argue that, for Leibniz, monads function not only as building blocks at the bottom level of composition but also at the top, as grounding the unity and hence the being of complete substances and organic unities. Since organic unities or living beings are seen by Leibniz as natural machines with a nested structure, and since monads are likened to living beings, this would imply that the use of the concept ‘monad’ holds not only at the bottom, and not only at the top, but all over the range between them.

Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities presents a wide array of possible cities—cities whose composition turns on a productive ambiguity of their being described or invented by Marco Polo in his conversations with Kublai Khan. Implicit in this book is also a theory about how all possible cities are composed. The method turns on decomposing a city down to its basic elements and recomposing it in different ways through the imagination. I argue that there is a close affinity between Calvino’s theory of fictional cities and Leibniz’s theory of possible worlds. The main similarity is that both theo­ries are combinatorial—they suppose that possibilities are produced by combination and variation of basic elements. The paper presents Leibniz’s theory of possibility in its metaphysical context and explores the similarity with Calvino’s cities in their literary context. I suggest that there is a rather strong relation between the theory of literary fiction implicit in Invisible Cities and Leibniz’s theory of possibility, in that both define the possible in terms of the conceivable. Indeed, Leibniz often refers to literary examples to substantiate his position, and I argue that this reveals an essential feature of his theory.

While the definition of the ‘genotype’ has undergone dramatic changes in the transition from classical to molecular genetics, the definition of the ‘phenotype’ has remained for a long time within the classical framework. In addition, while the notion of the genotype has received significant attention from philosophers of biology, the notion of the phenotype has not. Recent developments in the technology of measuring gene-expression levels have made it possible to conceive of phenotypic traits in terms of levels of gene expression. We demonstrate that not only has this become possible but it has also become an actual practice. This suggests a significant change in our conception of the phenotype: as in the case of the ‘genotype’, phenotypes can now be conceived in quantitative and measurable terms on a comprehensive molecular level. We discuss in what sense gene expression profiles can be regarded as phenotypic traits and whether these traits are better described as a novel concept of phenotype or as an extension of the classical concept. We argue for an extension of the classical concept and call for an examination of the type of extension involved

In her stimulating article, Catherine Wilson considers the moment of worlds-making in Leibniz’s philosophy. She raises the following question: “How do possible substances give rise to possible worlds?“ and observes that the moment of world-making is as puzzling as it is interesting. In section 2 of her article, Wilson considers two approaches to the question. According to the first, possible individuals logically precede possible worlds and possible worlds are constituted either by combinations of possible individuals or by mechanically checking the compossibility relations among them. This approach assumes that possible individuals are given and complete and that worlds result from their various conjunctions. On this approach, a world is a set of compossible individuals, i.e., a set of complete individuals whose co-existence is possible.