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25Anonymity versus commitment: The dangers of education on the internetEthics and Information Technology 1 (1): 15-20. 1999.I shall translate Kierkegaard's account of the dangers and opportunities of what he called the Press into a critique of the Internet so as to raise the question: what contribution -- for good or ill -- can the World Wide Web, with its ability to deliver vast amounts of information to users all over the world, make to educators trying to pass on knowledge and to develop skills and wisdom in their students? I will then use Kierkegaard's three-stage answer to the problem of lack of involvement pose…Read more
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43320. What Computers Can’t Do: A Critique of Artificial ReasonIn Bernard Williams (ed.), Essays and Reviews: 1959-2002, Princeton University Press. pp. 90-100. 2014.
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276Heterophenomenology: Heavy-handed Sleight-of-hand (review)Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2): 45-55. 2007.We argue that heterophenomenology both over- and under-populates the intentional realm. For example, when one is involved in coping, one’s mind does not contain beliefs. Since the heterophenomenologist interprets all intentional commitment as belief, he necessarily overgenerates the belief contents of the mind. Since beliefs cannot capture the normative aspect of coping and perceiving, any method, such as heterophenomenology, that allows for only beliefs is guaranteed not only to overgenerate be…Read more
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1Nihilism online : the future of information technology seen in 1850 by Sören KierkegaardFranciscanum 44 (130-132): 287-300. 2002.
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1The perceptual noema: Gurwitsch's crucial contributionIn Aron Gurwitsch & Lester E. Embree (eds.), Life-World and Consciousness, Ill., Northwestern University Press. pp. 135--139. 1972.
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321of autonomous agency. Yet neither denies the importance of human freedom. In Heidegger's early work the subject is reinterpreted as Dasein -- a non autonomous, culturally bound (or thrown) way of being, that can yet change the field of possibilities in which it acts. In middle Heidegger, thinkers alone have the power to disclose a new world, while in later Heidegger, anyone is free to step back from the current world, to enter one of a plurality of worlds, and, thereby, facilitate a change in th…Read more
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La vittoria di Deep Blue su Kasparov dimostra il successo dell’intelligenza artificiale?Discipline Filosofiche 14 (2). 2004.
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656The Current Relevance of Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of EmbodimentElectronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy. 1998.In this paper I would like to explain, defend, and draw out the implications of this claim. Since the intentional arc is supposed to embody the interconnection of skillful action and perception, I will first lay out an account of skill
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148Existential Phenomenology and the Brave New World of The MatrixThe Harvard Review of Philosophy 11 (1): 18-31. 2003.The Matrix raises several familiar philosophical problems in such new ways that students all over the country are assigning it to their philosophy professors. In so doing, they have offered us a great opportunity to illustrate some of the basic insights of existential phenomenology. The Matrix might seem to renew Descartes’s worry that, since all we ever experience are our own inner mental states, we might, for all we could tell, be living in an illusion created by a malicious demon. In that cas…Read more
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100Ways of the Hand: A Rewritten AccountMIT Press. 2001.Ways of the Hand tells the story of how David Sudnow learned to improvise jazz on the piano. Because he had been trained as an ethnographer and social psychologist, Sudnow was attentive to what he experienced in ways that other novice pianists are not. The result, first published in 1978 and now considered by many to be a classic, was arguably the finest and most detailed account of skill development ever published.Looking back after more than twenty years, Sudnow was struck by the extent to whi…Read more
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38Refocusing the question: Can there be skillful coping without propositional representations or brain representations?Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4): 413-425. 2002.
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74Comments on Cristina Lafont's interpretation of being and timeInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (2). 2002.This Article does not have an abstract
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216A Merleau-Pontyian Critique of Husserl’s and Searle’s Representationalist Accounts of ActionProceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (3): 287-302. 2000.Husserl and Searle agree that, for a bodily movement to be an action, it must be caused by a propositional representation. Husserl's representation is a mental state whose intentional content is what the agent is trying to do; Searle thinks of the representation as a logical structure expressing the action's conditions of satisfaction. Merleau-Ponty criticises both views by introducing a kind of activity he calls motor intentionality, in which the agent, rather than aiming at success, feels draw…Read more
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50Intelligence without representation – Merleau-Ponty's critique of mental representation The relevance of phenomenology to scientific explanationPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (4): 367-383. 2002.Existential phenomenologists hold that the two most basic forms of intelligent behavior, learning, and skillful action, can be described and explained without recourse to mind or brain representations. This claim is expressed in two central notions in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception: the intentional arc and the tendency to achieve a maximal grip. The intentional arc names the tight connection between body and world, such that, as the active body acquires skills, those skills are “sto…Read more
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7Phenomenology, Dasein, and Truth: Heidegger Reexamined (edited book)Routledge. 2002.First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company
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21Beyond hermeneutics: Interpretation in late Heidegger and recent FoucaultIn Gary Shapiro & Alan Sica (eds.), Hermeneutics: Questions and Prospects, University of Massachusetts Press. pp. 66--83. 1984.
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338What Computers Still Can’T Do: A Critique of Artificial ReasonMIT Press. 1992.A Critique of Artificial Reason Hubert L. Dreyfus . HUBERT L. DREYFUS What Computers Still Can't Do Thi s One XZKQ-GSY-8KDG What. WHAT COMPUTERS STILL CAN'T DO Front Cover.
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4How to stop worrying about the frame problem even though it's computationally insolubleIn Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), The Robot's Dilemma, Ablex. pp. 95--112. 1987.
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105On the Ordering of Things: Being and Power in Heidegger and FoucaultSouthern Journal of Philosophy 28 (S1): 83-96. 1990.
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66Our contemporary nihilism -- Homer's polytheism -- From Aeschylus to Augustine : monotheism on the rise -- From Dante to Kant : the attractions and dangers of autonomy -- Fanaticism, polytheism, and Melville's "evil art" -- David Foster Wallace's nihilism -- Conclusion : lives worth living in a secular age.
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415The return of the myth of the mentalInquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 50 (4). 2007.McDowell's claim that "in mature human beings, embodied coping is permeated with mindedness",1 suggests a new version of the mentalist myth which, like the others, is untrue to the phenomenon. The phenomena show that embodied skills, when we are fully absorbed in enacting them, have a kind of non-mental content that is non-conceptual, non-propositional, non-rational and non-linguistic. This is not to deny that we can monitor our activity while performing it. For solving problems, learning a new …Read more
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20Authenticity, Death, and the History of Being: Heidegger Reexamined (edited book)Routledge. 2002.First Published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company
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58From micro-worlds to knowledge representation: AI at an impasseIn J. Haugel (ed.), Mind Design, Mit Press. pp. 161--204. 1981.
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Areas of Specialization
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
20th Century Philosophy |
Continental Philosophy |