David Copp

According to the Rationality Doctrine, whether morality is normative depends on the existence of a link of an important kind between morality and rationality. The RD is intuitively appealing and has a historical pedigree. Versions have been endorsed by philosophers who otherwise disagree fundamentally. A version of it has been used in arguing against the chapter’s account of the normativity of morality on the basis that, allegedly, it fails to establish the right kind of link between morality and rationality. Yet there are different views about what kind of link is required. After addressing issues about the concepts of normativity and rationality, the chapter narrows attention to one account of the required link, the Basic Linkage Thesis. As the chapterr shows, there is reason to doubt the truth of the BLT, which means that, if we hold that morality is normative, we need to question the RD. The chapterr considers and criticizes arguments for the RD and then presents three arguments intended to show that the RD cannot reasonably be invoked in order to adjudicate among moral theories.

A person who sees that she morally ought to do something might wonder whether it would make sense for her to do it. Perhaps Aurelia is on a crowded bus, standing next to an old man whose wallet is almost falling out of his pocket. She says, “I see that the morally right thing would be to warn this man to take care of his wallet. But why should I do the right thing? In fact, why shouldn't I steal his wallet? It would be wrong of me to do this, but so what? No one is looking. I won't get caught. What's to fear?“We can imagine different scenarios of this kind. In one scenario, Aurelia is on the verge of deciding to steal the old man's wallet. She believes it would be wrong to do this, and she is asking whether there is any reason not to go ahead.

The interpretation of the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill has been a matter of controversy at least since J.O. Urmson published his well known paper over twenty-five years ago. Urmson attributed to Mill a form of “rule-utilitarianism”, contrasting his reading with the “received view” on which Mill held a form of “act-utilitarianism”. Since then, the interpretive problem has typically been seen to be that of determining which of these two types of theory should be attributed to Mill, or, at least of determining whether Mill was a “rule-utilitarian”. However, as the distinction is typically made, it is possible to have a utilitarian theory which is neither an act- nor a rule-utilitarian theory. 1n particular, as I will attemptto show, Mill's theory is of neither type but is an example of a sophisticated type of utilitarianism which we might call “iterated-utilitarianism”, for reasons which will become clear in what follows.

Moral and political philosophers commonly appeal to moral “intuitions” at crucial points in their reasoning. This chapter considers recent challenges to this practice—here referred to as “the Method”—based in empirical studies of moral intuitions. It contends that such studies do not justify radical or revisionary conclusions about the Method. A method is aimed at achieving certain goals. The key issue is the nature of the goals in relation to which the Method is to be evaluated. This chapter argues that the relevant goal is not the “realist goal” of discovering the truth about moral and political matters. The central point is that, the chapter argues, the systematic philosophical study of moral and political questions would be worthwhile even if it turned out that moral realism cannot be vindicated or that the Method cannot be vindicated in relation to the realist goal. If this is correct, then the goal relative to which it is crucial to vindicate the Method is not the realist goal. A Rawlsian view is more plausible, according to which the relevant goal is to “characterize our moral sensibility” as it would be in “reflective equilibrium.” It turns out, however, that this Rawlsian view has some, perhaps unwelcome, deflationary implications.

The ProblemEconomic efficiency is naturally thought to be a virtue of social policies and decisions, and cost-benefit (CB) analysis is commonly regarded as a technique for measuring economic efficiency. It is not surprising, then, that CB analysis is so widely used in social policy analysis. However, there is a great deal of controversy about CB analysis, including controversy about its underlying philosophical rationale. The rationales that have been proposed fall into three basic, though not mutually exclusive categories. There aremoralistviews to the effect that an acceptable CB analysis would provide, or contribute to, anethicalappraisal of proposed policies or projects. There arerationalistviews to the effect that an acceptable CB analysis would contribute to the selection of social policies and projects that are “socially rational.” Finally, there are so-calledmanagement scienceviews to the effect that the purpose of CB analysis is to promote the achievement of objectives held by the policy maker, whatever they may be. Different positions are available within each of these categories. But there is also the possibility that CB analysis lacksanyviable rationale. I will examine some of the major rationales for CB analysis in this paper, and I will suggest that the last view is close to the truth.

As practiced by Alvin Goldman, social epistemology addresses the epistemic consequences and requirements of social practices and institutions. Since political institutions have epistemic consequences and requirements, social epistemology has a great deal to offer to political philosophy. Goldman’s work in this area is rich and interesting, and, in his recent book, Knowledge in a Social World, he has much to say that deserves the attention of political philosophers. I highly recommend, for example, his discussion of freedom of expression, and his critique of post-modernist views about truth. In this essay, I shall focus on Goldman’s characteristically sophisticated and well-informed discussion of the epistemic requirements of democracy. I shall argue that there are instructive mistakes in Goldman’s views, but in drawing attention to these mistakes, I do not want to obscure the significance of Goldman’s work. We value both democracy and knowledge, and, because of this, we need to pay attention to the questions Goldman has raised both about the requirements of democracy and about its impact on the distribution of knowledge.

This comment addresses two issues that arise in Sacconi/faillo/ottone's essay. The first is the problem of compliance as it arises in social contract theory. The second is the problem of avoiding an incoherence that arises in the formulation of welfarist principles of distributive justice if these principles are taken to be concerned with the distribution of welfare without restriction. Sacconi, Faillo, and Ottone define an interesting class of principles that govern only the distribution of 'material utility', which they distinguish from 'conformist utility'. Sacconi, Faillo, and Ottone are primarily concerned, however, to argue that there is a need to revise 'the utility maximization model of a rational economic man'. I discuss this claim briefly, in concluding the paper.

The interpretation of the utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill has been a matter of controversy at least since J.O. Urmson published his well known paper over twenty-five years ago. Urmson attributed to Mill a form of “rule-utilitarianism”, contrasting his reading with the “received view” on which Mill held a form of “act-utilitarianism”. Since then, the interpretive problem has typically been seen to be that of determining which of these two types of theory should be attributed to Mill, or, at least of determining whether Mill was a “rule-utilitarian”. However, as the distinction is typically made, it is possible to have a utilitarian theory which is neither an act- nor a rule-utilitarian theory. 1n particular, as I will attemptto show, Mill's theory is of neither type but is an example of a sophisticated type of utilitarianism which we might call “iterated-utilitarianism”, for reasons which will become clear in what follows.

This paper is a reply to Anton Leist’s criticisms of the view I develop in my book, Morality, Normativity, and Society. Leist claims that my “standard-based” account of the truth conditions of moral propositions is incoherent. I argue that he is mistaken about this. Leist claims that my “society-centered” account of the justification of moral standards has “nasty” implications. In the course of answering this worry, I develop the idea of a “moral necessity”. My theory implies that although moral propositions are metaphysically contingent, they are most likely morally necessary. I also explain that, despite its relativism, the society-centered view is quite compatible with the idea that there are certain “moral universals”. Finally, Leist claims that the arguments I have given in favor of my view are unsuccessful. But it is a mistake to think that decisive arguments can be expected in this area. The most we can expect is a clear statement of the costs and benefits of a theory. I claim that my account of the nature and grounding of morality has important advantages over familiar alternatives.