David Basinger

David Griffin and Nelson Pike recently had a spirited discussion on divine power. The essence of the discussion centered around what was labelled Premise X: “It is possible for one actual being's condition to be completely determined by a being or beings other than itself.” Pike maintains that ‘traditional’ theists have affirmed Premise X but denies that this entails that God has all the power there is and thus denies that Premise X can be considered incoherent for this reason. Griffin maintains that traditional theists have as a matter of fact affirmed that God has all the power there is and then argues that, given standard Process metaphysical assumptions, to say that God has all the power there is is incoherent. Griffin succeeds in demonstrating that, given Process assumptions, God cannot determine all of the activities of any human--i.e., all of an individual’s desires, choices and actions. But Pike is primarily interested in whether God could determine all of the bodily behaviors of any given human. And to this question, Griffin gives no response.

P.J. McGrath has recently challenged the standard claim that to escape the problem of evil one need only alter one’s conception of God by limiting his power or his goodness. If we assume that God is infinitely good but not omnipotent, then God can scarcely be a proper object of worship. And if we assume that if God is omnipotent but limited in goodness, he becomes a moral monster. Either way evil remains a problem for theistic belief. I argue that McGrath fails to distinguish between the deductive and inductive problem of evil and between a limitation in God’s “strength” and a limitation in God’s “ability to act”, and that once these distinctions are made, his argument fails.

The concept of middle knowledge---God’s knowledge of what would in fact happen in every conceivable situation---is just beginning to receive the attention it deserves, For example, it is just now becoming clear to many that classical theism requires the affirmation of middle knowledge. But this concept is also coming under increasing criticism. The most significant of these, I believe, has been developed in a recent discussion by William Hasker, in which he argues that the concept of a true counterfactual of freedom is incoherent. I also believe, however, that his critique ultimately fails and specify why in the essay which follows.

In a recent discussion, Susan Anderson argues that Alvin Plantinga’s version of the Free Will Defense has not shown that the existence of God is neither precluded nor rendered improbable by the existence of evil. She grants Plantinga that God cannot control free actions and that only free actions have moral worth but denies that this entails that God cannot insure a world containing only moral good. God could do so, she argues, simply by taking away the freedom of persons when he foresees they would sin if allowed to act freely. Anderson also believes that Plantinga must assume that God is a benevolent being who attempts to bring about the greatest net good if he is to justify the evil we experience, both she argues that such an assumption is dubious. I argue that both of these arguments contain fundamental misinterpretations of Plantinga’s Free Will Defense and, accordingly, that neither presents a serious objection to it.

Religious diversity exists whenever seemingly sincere, knowledgeable individuals hold incompatible beliefs on the same religious issue. Diversity of this sort is pervasive, existing not only across basic theistic systems but also within these theistic systems themselves. Religious Diversity explores the breadth and significance of such conflict. Examining the beliefs of various theistic systems, particularly within Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Basinger discusses seemingly incompatible claims about many religious issues, including the nature of God and the salvation of humankind. He considers particularly the work of Hick, Gellman, Plantinga, Schellenberg, Alston, Wainwright, and Quinn, applying their perspectives on 'exclusivism' and 'pluralism' as they become relevant to the issues in question. Basinger's survey of the relevant literature, proposed solutions, and fresh insights offer an invaluable contribution not only for philosophers of religion and philosophical theologians but for anyone interested in the increasingly significant question of what a religious believer can or cannot justifiably say about their religious perspective.

To say that God is omniscient is normally to say that God knows all true propositions and none that are false. But what exactly is knowable? Some believe that God possesses only ‘present knowledge’ . All that is know-able is that which is actual and that which follows deterministically from it. Others believe that God possesses ‘simple foreknowledge’ . God can also know what will actually happen, including what humans will freely do. And still others believe that God possesses ‘middle knowledge’ . God is able to know not only what will happen in the actual world or what could happen in all worlds but also what would in fact happen in every possible situation, including what every possible free creature would in fact do in every possible situation in which that creature could find itself

MANY ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN THEISTS CLAIM THAT THEY HAVE IDENTIFIED (OR AT LEAST HAVE THE CAPACITY TO IDENTIFY) OBSERVABLE PHENOMENA AS MIRACULOUS. I ARGUE THAT, ALTHOUGH THE CHRISTIAN THEIST CAN SUCCESSFULLY CIRCUMVENT THE STANDARD HUMEAN EPISTEMOLOGICAL BARRIER, HE CAN STIPULATE NO OBJECTIVE CRITERIA FOR THE IDENTIFICATION OF A MIRACULOUS OCCURRENCE, EVEN IF IT IS GRANTED THAT THE CHRISTIAN GOD EXISTS AND THAT THE CHRISTIAN CANON ACCURATELY DESCRIBES HOW THIS BEING RELATES TO OUR PHYSICAL UNIVERSE. I CONCLUDE, ACCORDINGLY, THAT ’MIRACLE’ MUST NECESSARILY REMAIN A SUBJECTIVE CONCEPT FOR THE ORTHODOX CHRISTIAN THEIST

Robert Pargetter has recently argued that, even if the theist cannot produce plausible explanations for the evil we experience, the atheologian has no justifiable basis for claiming that evil can in any sense count as strong evidence against God's existence. His strategy is to challenge as question-begging (1) the atheologian's assumption that a prima facie conflict between God and evil exists and (2) the atheologian's claim that God's nonexistence is a more plausible explanation for unresolved (unexplained) evil than a number of theistic options. I argue that Pargetter is unsuccessful, mainly because he (1) fails to understand clearly the conditions under which a prima facie moral conflict exists and (2) fails to distinguish clearly between 'plausibility' and 'possibility' as these terms are applicable to explanatory hypotheses.

In a recent article in this journal, Michael Murray and Kurt Meyers offer us two innovative and thought-provoking responses to the important question of why God would, even occasionally, refrain from giving us that which he can and would like to give us until we request that he do so: to help the believer learn more about God and thus become more like him and to help the believer realize she is dependent on God. I argue that neither explanation is adequate and thus that more work on this significant topic remains to be done

Proponents of The Free Will Defense frequently argue that it is necessary for God to create self-directing beings who possess the capacity for producing evil because, in the words of F.R. Tennant, “moral goodness must be the result of a self-directing developmental process.” But if this is true, David Paulsen has recently argued, then the proponent of the Free Will Defense cannot claim that God has an eternally determinate nature. For if God has an eternally determinatenature and moral goodness must be the result of a developmental process, then God cannot be considered morally good. In response, I argue that (1) many contemporary Free Will theists do not affirm a developmental concept of morality and thus avoid Paulsen’s criticism and that (2) even those who affirm a developmental concept of morality on the human level need not grant that divine morality is also developmental in nature.