David Basinger

Reason and Religious Belief, now in its fifth edition, explores perennial questions in the philosophy of religion. Drawing from the best in both classical and contemporary discussions, the authors examine religious experience, faith and reason, the divine attributes, arguments for and against the existence of God, divine action (in various forms of theism), Reformed epistemology, religious language, religious diversity, and religion and science.Revised and updated to reflect current philosophical discourse, the fifth edition offers new material on neuro-theology, the "new Atheism," the intelligent design movement, theistic evolution, and skeptical theism. It also provides more coverage of non-Western religions--particularly Buddhism--and updated discussions of evidentialism, free will, life after death, apophatic theology, and more. A sophisticated yet accessible introduction, Reason and Religious Belief, Fifth Edition, is ideally suited for use with the authors' companion anthology, Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, Fourth Edition (OUP, 2009).

The 5th edition of Philosophy of Religion: Selected Readings, includes 82 classic and contemporary readings on philosophy of religion. It covers standard topics (like religious experience, theistic arguments, the problem of evil, life after death, and miracles) but also tackles more unusual topics often requested by instructors (like religion and science, religious pluralism, and religious ethics). Although the book focuses on the Western tradition, it also includes Continental, feminist, and Asian writings.

While many ground religious tolerance on a sense of unity or enrichment resulting from religious diversity, the acclaimed scholars contributing to this volume place under scrutiny a fascinating alternative proposal for a pathway to religious tolerance: that the serious consideration of religious diversity tends to reveal the weakness of support many have for their religious commitments and that the humility produced tends to result in religious tolerance. The authors illuminate the debate within philosophyabout the way beliefs are supported, the controversy between internalism and externalism, and disagreement about how humility and tolerance are related.

Religious diversity exists whenever seemingly sincere, knowledgeable individuals hold incompatible beliefs on the same religious issue. Diversity of this sort is pervasive, existing not only across basic theistic systems but also within these theistic systems themselves. Religious Diversity explores the breadth and significance of such conflict. Examining the beliefs of various theistic systems, particularly within Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism and Buddhism, Basinger discusses seemingly incompatible claims about many religious issues, including the nature of God and the salvation of humankind. He considers particularly the work of Hick, Gellman, Plantinga, Schellenberg, Alston, Wainwright, and Quinn, applying their perspectives on 'exclusivism' and 'pluralism' as they become relevant to the issues in question. Basinger's survey of the relevant literature, proposed solutions, and fresh insights offer an invaluable contribution not only for philosophers of religion and philosophical theologians but for anyone interested in the increasingly significant question of what a religious believer can or cannot justifiably say about their religious perspective.

This book is a critical overview of the manner in which the concept of miracle is understood and discussed in contemporary analytic philosophy of religion. In its most basic sense, a miracle is an unusual, unexpected, observable event brought about by direct divine intervention. The focus of this study is on the key conceptual, epistemological, and theological issues that this definition of the miraculous continues to raise. As this topic is of existential as well as theoretical interest to many, there is no reason to believe the concept of miracle won't continue to be of ongoing interest to philosophers.

It has become quite popular recently to maintain that a God who possessed simple foreknowledge - knowledge of what has happened, is happening and will actually happen - would have absolutely no greater providential control over earthly affairs than a God who possessed no foreknowledge at all. In an article in this journal, David P. Hunt disputes this claim, arguing that it is at least true that it is possible for complete foreknowledge to contribute to more providential control than would be available with no foreknowledge. I argue that while Hunt's strategy - which is to place divine decision-making before creation and make it hypothetical - is ingenious, it ultimately fails.

There have been many calls recently for philosophers to rethink what philosophy is and how it should be practiced. Among the most vocal critics is an influential group of feminist philosophers who argue that since current philosophical activity is based primarily on a conception of reason that is both inherently inadequate and oppressive to women, it is imperative that our understanding of the nature and practice of philosophy be significantly modified. I argue that this criticism is fundamentally misguided. Specifically, it seems to me that while philosophers may at times need to rethink the role of the traditional philosophical method of inquiry in the context of general societal debate and rethink the techniques used to help others understand and apply this methodology, this method of inquiry, itself, is not in need of abandonment or major modification.

Few atheologians still maintain that the existence of evil is logically incompatible with the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God. But many still wish to maintain not only that (a) the existence of evil in great abundance counts as evidence against the existence of an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good God but also that the ability of the theist to respond to such evil is so limited that (b) on rational grounds one should believe that God does not exist. In a recent article, Michael Martin clearly sets forth what I consider to be the standard atheological argument for (a) and (b).¹ The purpose of this paper is not only to critique this argument but, in the process, to outline the set of tasks that I believe atheologians have yet to accomplish before it can be demonstrated that evil furnishes the basis for a good inductive argument against God's existence.

To say that God is omniscient, most philosophers and theologians agree, is to say that he knows all true propositions and none that are false. But there is a great deal of disagreement about what is knowable. Some believe that God's knowledge is limited to everything that is actual and that which will follow deterministically from it. He knows, for example, exactly what Caesar was thinking when he crossed the Rubicon and how many horses he had in his army that day. And he knows exactly how Gorbachev feels about the use of nuclear weapons. And since he knows how the ‘laws of nature’ function, he knows, for example, how certain weather systems will develop and what their effects will be on certain natural environments. But with respect to any future state of affairs which includes free human decision-making as a causal component, God is said not to know what will occur. God, as the ultimate psychoanalyst or behaviourist, can with great accuracy predict what we will freely decide to do in the future in many cases. He might well, for example, be able to predict quite accurately who will win the 1988 Presidential election. But a God who possesses only ‘present knowledge’ cannot know who will win. Given that the election in question is dependent on free choices which have yet to be made, there is presently nothing for God to know.

In an ongoing dialogue, Robert Larmer and I have been discussing whether the undisputed occurrence of certain conceivable events would require all honest, thoughtful individuals to acknowledge that God has intervened in earthly affairs. I argue that there is no reason to believe that a nontheist who acknowledged certain healings to be strong evidence for theism but did not see such evidence as outweighing what she viewed as the stronger counterevidence, and thus remained a nontheist, could justifiably be accused of adopting a dogmatic, uncritical question-begging stance.